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Abstract
Such is the powerful, emotive nature of the subject of euthanasia that its reach stretches
beyond the pages of specialised medical journals or the conference rooms of an interested few.
Despite this, investigation into the historical origins of current euthanasia debates has, until very
recently, been a neglected area of academic interest. Contemporary euthanasia debates are often
presented in a manner where the values at stake are viewed as essentially ahistorical and my
thesis seeks to address this imbalance.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing throughout the twentieth century,
the medical profession and lay writers in Britain mobilised an array of philosophical and
technical arguments in order either to support or oppose euthanasia. My thesis elucidates and
explores these arguments, tracing them through two centuries of changing attitudes towards
death, suffering and pain. The thesis starts by examining how powerful pain-relieving drugs that
rendered the patient unconscious were adopted into the repertoire of nineteenth-century medical
practice. Then, with the position of this new form of pain relief consolidated, the first lay
demands for euthanasia surfaced in the form of proposals that the incurable, suffering patient be
made irrevocably unconscious so as to secure a medically-managed, painless death.
Moving into the twentieth century, the official line of the medical profession was one that
defended the use of pain relief that potentially shortened life but contested any suggestion that
death be brought about at the patient's request. However, by the middle of the twentieth century,
support for legalised euthanasia was more sustained and organised. The question of pain -
whether it could be relieved and how it was to be managed - was now entrenched in the debate
over euthanasia. It was in this context that the hospice movement emerged, where sophisticated
pain-relieving technologies were harnessed with a distinct ideology that rejected legalised
euthanasia. As I explore at the end of my thesis, this provided an institutional 'solution' to the
problem of how to care for the dying patient in pain as well as a template for an 'ideal' form of
death that stood as an alternative to legalised euthanasia.
Informed by the methodological approaches of history and sociology, my analysis
incorporates close readings of unpublished archive literature, set alongside wider surveys of
pertinent primary and secondary sources. I focus on the process of how the values and ideas
connected with arguments over euthanasia were articulated, placing particular emphasis on the
way in which the negotiation and interpretation of medical practice fed into debates about the
management of death. Throughout the thesis, I examine how the concept of 'natural' death was
mobilised in a variety of ways, serving as part of the rhetorical strategies used by those on both
sides of the debate. I conclude that the medical profession's commitment to the Hippocratic
principle, that the physician should not kill, involved the accommodation of medical
interventions in order to relieve pain in the dying patient. At the same time, however, this tended
to exclude any notion that such interventions disrupted the concept of 'natural' death. This
negotiation between principle and practice, I contend, is central to understanding historical
arguments over euthanasia and, indeed, remains an ongoing process underpinning the
construction of current debates.
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INTRODUCTION
I. Situating the Thesis: Existing Literature on the History of Euthanasia
Turn the pages of any one of the growing number of books devoted to the subject of
'medical ethics' and the likelihood is that there will be a section devoted to the subject of
euthanasia debated from varying philosophical, theological and medical perspectives.
'Should a doctor ever kill his or her patient?' - the absorbing nature of the question is such
that its reach stretches across academic disciplines. Indeed, interest in euthanasia spills over
into popular consciousness providing what has been described as "a secular form of religion
... a forum for the personal exploration of the human condition, a platform for defending
human values".1 Much has been written and spoken about euthanasia and at first it seems as
if there is little new argumentative or analytical space in which to move.
Every so often, frequently in response to a high-profile case that gains widespread
attention, the ritual airing of well-rehearsed argument and counter argument is publicly
conducted. Thus, with familiarity, 'respect for autonomy' and 'individual choice' are pitted
against 'sanctity of life' and 'slippery slope' positions.2 The debate reaches a philosophical
impasse, concludes without change in the law and the sometimes dormant but ever present
issue of euthanasia waits to be stirred once more. Engaging and interesting though it
undoubtedly is, the difficulty with philosophical 'ethical' deliberation, at least when
approaching the question of euthanasia from a historian's perspective, is that it tends to
freeze the contextually specific and contestable outcomes of past medical-ethical discourse
into an immutable catalogue of competing claims.3 The result is that euthanasia debates are
often presented in a manner in which the values at stake are viewed as essentially ahistorical.
My thesis seeks to address this imbalance by examining euthanasia debates in their
particular historical contexts. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the medical
profession and lay writers in Britain mobilised an array of philosophical and technical
arguments in order to either endorse or reject euthanasia. The thesis elucidates and explores
these arguments, tracing them through two centuries of changing attitudes to death and
suffering. The focus is predominantly, though not exclusively, on arguments marshalled by
the British medical profession and in this sense the thesis is located in the realm of values
and ideas. However, these values and ideas of the medical profession are embedded in an
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ever-changing culture and for this reason the thesis sets the arguments in context by
considering the impact of new medical practices, particularly in relation to pain relief,
alongside wider societal attitudes towards death and pain.
The thesis starts by examining how powerful pain-relieving drugs that rendered the
patient unconscious were adopted into the repertoire of nineteenth-century medical practice.
Then, with the position of this new form of pain relief consolidated, the first lay demands for
euthanasia surfaced in the form of proposals that the incurable, suffering patient be made
irrevocably unconscious so as to secure a medically-managed, painless death. Moving into
the twentieth century, the official line of the medical profession was one that defended the
use of pain relief that potentially shortened life, but contested the suggestion that death be
induced at the patient's request. The question of pain - whether it could be relieved and how
it was to be managed - was now entrenched in the debate over euthanasia. It was in this
context that the hospice movement emerged, where sophisticated pain-relieving technologies
were harnessed with a distinct ideology that rejected legalised euthanasia. As I explore at the
end of the thesis, this provided an institutional 'solution' to the problem of how to care for
the dying patient in pain as well as a template for an 'ideal' form of death that stood as an
alternative to legalised euthanasia.
I am interested in the language that was used when constructing arguments in
opposition to or support of the proposal that the physician should end life. I am also
interested in the ways in which changing medical practices designed to relieve pain were
understood and articulated in relation to the medical profession's ongoing commitment to the
professed principle that the physician should not kill. My analysis incorporates close
readings of archive literature and key primary texts, set alongside wider surveys of pertinent
primary and secondary sources that relate to nineteenth and twentieth-century attitudes (both
medical and non-medical) to death, pain and euthanasia. This thesis, then, is not a history of
the practice of euthanasia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but it is a history of the
ways in which the articulation of principles and practices fed into public debates about
euthanasia and the medical management of pain in the dying patient.
Until very recently, historically orientated analysis of euthanasia debates has been
limited. A number of short papers have examined the precedent for suicide in classical
antiquity and considered the attitude of the Hippocratic physician to cases of incurable and
painful illness.4 In chapters of books primarily concerned with the philosophical, medical
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and legal dimensions of euthanasia, other writers have surveyed the history of arguments
relating to the ethics of suicide and assisted suicide. Considering religious attitudes to the
taking of life, they have highlighted, amongst other points, Sir Thomas More's apparent
support for suicide and euthanasia in cases of incurable and painful disease in the sixteenth
century.5 This literature serves as a useful reminder that debate concerning the rights and
wrongs of ending life (either one's own life or the life of another) has a long history.
However, some of its content contains analysis that arguably causes confusion. For
example, Ludwig Edelstein has suggested that "euthanasia was an everyday reality in
classical antiquity", with the implication being that during this period physicians were
regularly ending the lives of those in their care.6 Such an interpretation perhaps shows
insufficient sensitivity to changing historical definitions of the term 'euthanasia'. A
compound of two Greek words, eu meaning 'good' and thanatos meaning 'death',
'euthanasia' has been defined in different ways depending on the historical context in which
the word was applied. There are indeed examples of the term 'euthanasia' being used in
classical literature, but here the 'good death' meant simply a gentle and peaceful death with
no suggestion that 'euthanasia' implied the physician intervening to deliberately end life.
That is not to say that physicians at this time did not end the lives of those suffering from
incurable and painful illness. Indeed, Edelstein provides evidence to support the claim that
some of them did and argues that since the Hippocratic Oath explicitly prohibited the
physician from ending life the subject must have been a source of concern. Without
attempting to reconstruct the world of medical practice in classical antiquity, as Edelstein has
done, it is extremely difficult either to verify or disprove the claim that physicians
deliberately ended the lives of their patients at this time. That is not the matter in question
here. What is in question, is the meaning that is ascribed to the term 'euthanasia'. Edelstein
takes a twentieth-century definition of the word 'euthanasia' and applies it to a period when
there is no indication that it meant the physician intervening in order to end life.
Before continuing with any further discussion of existing literature that relates to this
thesis, it is important to try to seek some clarity with regard to the meaning of the word
'euthanasia'. No one definition can be given since, as I have already suggested, it has had
different meanings at different points in history. Even in current debates, 'euthanasia' has a
range of meanings that are defined by the context in which the word is used and also by the
ideological position of the individual or group using the term. 'Euthanasia' is perhaps most
commonly understood as a situation in which the life of a patient is voluntarily ended as the
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direct result of a deliberate intervention on the part of a physician - typically by the
administration of dose of narcotics sufficiently powerful to bring about immediate death.
This is sometimes described as active euthanasia. Yet it may also used to describe a scenario
in which the withholding or withdrawal of treatment leads to foreseeable death, a definition
that is given the label passive euthanasia. Alternatively, it may be used to describe a situation
in which the life of a patient is ended without his or her express consent but the physician is
nevertheless judged to be acting in the patient's 'best interests' - this is sometimes termed
non-voluntary euthanasia.
This is a somewhat simplistic and cursory description of the various categories of
meaning into which the term 'euthanasia' can be sub-divided. There is a great deal of
sophisticated legal and philosophical literature that considers whether these distinctions are
sustainable and examines the types of medical practice that should and should not be
described as 'euthanasia'. The definitions that I mention have evolved over time and
continue to be the subject of negotiation and disagreement - a theme that I consider in detail
at the end of this thesis. Indeed, by following the arguments that I examine throughout the
thesis it is possible to trace the history of some of the various practices that may be grouped
under the term 'euthanasia' today. I will revisit the important issue of defining euthanasia
later in this introduction when I set out the thematic content and structure of the chapters that
follow. For now, I merely wish to draw attention to the point that 'euthanasia' has not always
been linked with idea of the physician ending life and that, even in current debates, its
meaning is contested and disputed.
Having questioned the anachronistic style analysis of some writing on the history of
euthanasia, it should be acknowledged that there are examples of literature that is sensitive to
the different ways in which the word 'euthanasia' has been used at different times. In
particular, papers by W. Bruce Fye and I. Van der Sluis on the historical background to
nineteenth and twentieth-century euthanasia debates provided a valuable starting point for
my own reading and I make frequent reference to their work in the course of the thesis.7 In
addition, very recently two substantial contributions to research on the history of euthanasia
debates have been made. The first is Nicholas Kemp's book on the history of the euthanasia
movement in Britain, which, with great detail, explores the links between early twentieth-
century eugenic ideas and the campaign for legalised euthanasia that began in the 1930s.8
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Kemp argues that the discussion and debate of proposals for the non-voluntary killing
of those suffering from mental illness is often wrongly excluded from histories of euthanasia.
This, he explains, is because the term 'euthanasia' was rarely used in connection with such
discussion and because the relevant literature is to be found, not in the mainstream medical
press, but in publications produced by the Eugenics Society and by individuals sympathetic
to proposals for non-voluntary killing. Kemp contends, however, that this discussion of non¬
voluntary killing influenced debates about legalised euthanasia later in the twentieth century.
Even though the proposed legislation spoke only of voluntary euthanasia for those suffering
from incurable and painful illness, lie argues that "the euthanasia debate after 1930 would
retain an identifiable stream of opinion that sought to extend euthanasia to defectives".9
Kemp suggests that a number of prominent activists in the British campaign for
legalised, voluntary euthanasia for incurable and suffering patients in the 1930s based their
support for such a proposal on a commitment to eugenic ideas. For them, voluntary
euthanasia was not simply about ending the individual patient's suffering. It was also tied to
the idea that others should not be burdened by an individual perceived as contributing little
or nothing of value to society. As I have stated, the non-voluntary killing of those with
mental illness was not publicly advanced. Yet Kemp maintains that this was the result, not of
any ideological hostility to such an idea on the part of some of those who supported legalised
euthanasia, but because it was seen as too politically charged an idea to advocate openly. He
argues (and provides documentary evidence to support his position) that in certain quarters
of the euthanasia movement it was thought best to initially focus on voluntary euthanasia for
patients suffering from incurable and painful diseases. Ultimately, however, they considered
that the proposals for legalised euthanasia would be extended so that they were applied to
other cases including the mentally ill and physically disabled.
The second comprehensive historical account of euthanasia debates to be published in
recent years is Ian Dowbiggin's study of the euthanasia movement in America.10 As well as
exploring the links between the campaign for legalised euthanasia and other social
movements such as those supporting birth control and abortion, Dowbiggin, like Kemp,
makes a connection between pre-Second World War calls for voluntary euthanasia and the
influence of eugenic ideas. A criticism often levelled at those who currently advocate
voluntary euthanasia is that such legislation would open the way for the killing of the
elderly, those with mental illness and the physically disabled. Dowbiggin argues that
however hard those who campaign for legalised voluntary euthanasia attempt to distance
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themselves from such criticism, they will find it difficult to break the connection made
between euthanasia and a certain type of eugenic thought. Whether or not such a connection
can be justifiably made today remains a continuing point of dispute, but Dowbiggin's
analysis reveals that the link between euthanasia and eugenic thought has, at certain points in
early twentieth-century history, been strong.
Kemp and Dowbiggin give detailed accounts of the origins of organised euthanasia
movements and the links between eugenic thought and the campaigns for legalised
euthanasia. In presenting a substantial amount of new information on the history of
euthanasia movements, their work goes a long way towards giving a fuller picture of the
context in which euthanasia debates were played out. Indeed, their work proved extremely
useful in directing my own thoughts and reading. For example, Kemp draws attention to the
existence of a body of literature on non-voluntary killing that, he argues, is relevant to the
history of subsequent debates on euthanasia but has been ignored because, at the time, the
term 'euthanasia' was not used in connection with such discussion. In a similar manner
(though applied in a very different context), I consider the way in which pain-relieving
practices were negotiated and debated within the medical profession before the emergence of
explicit debates about the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia. Again, the term 'euthanasia'
was not always connected to this debate over pain relief, but as I will explain in this thesis,
the themes that were raised in this discussion were to prove important precursors to
arguments that would surface in later debates concerning legalised voluntary euthanasia.
However, my own study differs significantly from the work of Kemp and Dowbiggin
- both in style and in content. I am interested in the relationship between euthanasia debates
and arguments related to pain and pain relief. As a consequence, I do not refer to the
influence of eugenic thought in the same sustained and detailed manner. Another difference
is that my thesis focuses predominantly on the attitudes within the British medical profession
as opposed to considering in any great detail the history of organised euthanasia movements.
As I have stated, Kemp and Dowbiggin's work presents a considerable amount of new
material on these movements but it does not devote quite the same amount of attention to the
debates over pain relief that, I contend, were an important part of arguments over legalised
euthanasia. I have attempted to move beyond writing a history that simply restates the
medical profession's ongoing official opposition to legalised euthanasia. Rather, I have
attempted to look at the ways in which the arguments that constituted such opposition were
framed and negotiated in relation to changing medical practice. In doing so, my aim in this
6
thesis is to try to closely analyse and deconstruct the three-way relationship between the
medical profession, the medical management of pain, and debates over euthanasia.
II. The Analytical Framework of the Thesis
When I was reflecting on material assembled during the course of my research on
nineteenth and twentieth-century euthanasia debates, I was struck by a recurring theme - the
concept of 'natural' versus 'artificial' death. Direct and indirect references to the notion of
dying 'naturally' appeared repeatedly throughout the literature I had gathered, with the
concept of 'natural' death mobilised in a variety of ways as part of the rhetorical strategies
used by those on both sides of debates over legalised euthanasia. Then, after reading Jane
Elizabeth Seymour's study of death in intensive care, I began to see similarities between her
analysis of the relationship between attitudes to death and medical interventions of the
highly-technological kind, and my own research on the relationship between euthanasia
debates and pain-relieving practices."
Seymour's ethnographic study consisted of interviews with the friends and family of
patients who died, or came close to death, in an intensive care setting. Contrary to the
common image, in which high levels of medical and technological intervention are often
associated with deaths that are 'unnatural' and inhumane, the respondents' attitudes to such
interventions were shown to be far more complex. The study revealed that technological
intervention was not necessarily viewed as disrupting or interfering with the course of a
'natural' death if the outcomes of such intervention were seen as corresponding with the
respondents' own perceptions of a dignified and peaceful death.
For example, if the family and friends had time to say goodbye, were prepared for the
death of the patient and the process of dying was perceived to be pain-free, then
technological intervention was not seen as an obstacle to a humane and dignified death for
the patient. Rather, such intervention was absorbed in to an image of 'natural' death. If,
however, death was unexpected and sudden, and the type of medical intervention employed
could not be absorbed into an image of a dignified and peaceful death, then death in
intensive care was viewed as 'unnatural'. Seymour persuasively argues that her findings
suggest "that it is perceptions of the meaning of technology, rather than its simple
minimisation or absence, which determine representations of death within highly
technological surroundings".12
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It occurred to me that a similar process might have been at work in the debates over
euthanasia and the management of pain that this thesis examines. As I will argue in the
following chapters, the notion of 'natural' death as being peaceful and pain-free has origins
in the late eighteenth century and was consolidated in the nineteenth century. This coincided
with an increase in the medical use of pain-relieving drugs so as to ease the dying process
and an elevation in the importance of the role of the bedside physician. Although, in this
case, the question was clearly not of medical intervention of the highly technological kind,
the use of pain-relieving drugs was, in a not dissimilar manner, absorbed into a concept of
'natural' death. Indeed, their very use by the physician enabled the dying man or woman's
final hours to conform to the model of the 'natural' death.
I will argue that medical profession's commitment to the Hippocratic principle that the
physician should not kill involved the accommodation of medical interventions that relieved
pain in the dying patient but also potentially shortened life. At the same time, such
interventions were framed in such a manner that the concept of 'natural' death was left
undisrupted. Au important element of the late nineteenth and twentieth-century euthanasia
debates involved opposing parties contesting what 'natural' death meant and how it might be
practically secured. For those who argued against the proposal that the physician should
administer pain-relieving drugs so as to induce death, such a suggestion was viewed as
entirely 'unnatural'. Yet for those who argued in favour, such a proposal offered the means
by which the patient could request a peaceful, dignified end that corresponded with the ideal
of 'natural' death. This, it was argued, would avoid a death that was marked by periods of
pain or loss of consciousness and confusion - features of a type of death considered neither
dignified nor humane.
Mention of the concept of 'natural' death immediately brings into focus the work of
Philippe Aries and Ivan Illich on the relationship between medical intervention and the way
in which death is experienced and understood. In influential socio-historical studies
(Seymour's paper refers to the writing of Aries and Illich, as do many of the other secondary
sources I have consulted), they posit similar historical paradigms of 'natural' death that stand
in contrast to a bleak view of modern, 'medicalised' death. In a sweeping narrative, Aries
argues that attitudes to death have gradually yet radically shifted, from an acceptance of
death "being the acceptance of an overwhelming Destiny" to the eventual modern "denial"
of death. "Technically, we admit that we might die", writes Aries, but then concludes, "...
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really, at heart we feel we are non-mortals."13 Stripped of cultural and religious meaning,
death is now "a technical phenomenon", fragmented into medically classified parts and
understood only by experts.14 The "simple familiarity" of "tame" death has succumbed to the
"dirty" and "wild" experience of medicalised death, an experience that Aries captures in his
image of the modern patient dying in hospital, covered with tubes.15
Following on a similar interpretative track, Ivan Illich begins his analysis of modern
medicine with the powerful assertion that "The disabling professional control of medicine
has reached the proportions of an epidemic." Then, in considering changing historical
understanding of pain, he argues that "progress in civilisation" has been dominated by the
quest to control and manage suffering, to the point where pain is ultimately "medically
expropriated", transforming patients into "unfeeling spectators of their own decaying
selves".16 Lay acceptance of modern medical power is such that "man has now lost his faith
in his ability to die" and for this reason Illich concludes that "the right to be professionally
killed" has become a "major issue". Western man has relinquished his "right to preside at his
own death", "technical death" has triumphed over "dying" and modern medicine "has
brought the epoch of natural death to an end".17
This medicalisation thesis, as advanced by Aries and Illich, portrays euthanasia as a
symptom of an increasingly technical, bureaucratic and professionally controlled society.
Illich states that "man has lost the autonomy to recognise when his time has come and to take
death into his own hands", which on first reading sounds very like the type of rhetoric
employed by the pro-euthanasia lobby. However, rather than viewing euthanasia as a
rejection of medicalised life, Illich argues that euthanasia epitomises 'artificial' death where,
estranged from any meaningful understanding of death, patients relinquish control to medical
experts. The "lost autonomy" that Illich has in mind refers, not to any modern notion of
euthanasia, which he sees as medical engineering under the guise of individual 'freedom'.
Rather, it refers to an image of an individual reconciled to the inevitability of his or her
mortality but in some sense 'owning' this experience of death when it occurs. This, it seems,
is the paradox at the heart of euthanasia: on the one hand perceived as the antithesis of
'artificial' existence, through the individual reclaiming his or her own 'natural' death; on the
other, as in Illich's case, viewed as the ultimate extension of institutional and medical
control.
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Given that, as I have stated, both direct and indirect references to 'natural' death recur
throughout my primary and secondary source material, Aries and Illich provide valuable
theoretical positions to be used and indeed critiqued. While the notion of 'natural' death
clearly resonates throughout the euthanasia debates that I examine, what is less clear is
whether this notion conforms entirely to the analysis that Aries and Illich offer. In my study
of medical attitudes towards euthanasia, I argue that the modern euthanasia debate began
long before the period when Aries and Illich maintain that technologically dominated, highly
medicalised death ended 'natural' death. The euthanasia debate that this thesis begins with,
finds its origins in the mid-to late nineteenth century, many years before the existence of
intensive care units, life sustaining and supporting technology or, for that matter, an
organised, state-run health service.18
It must be said that Illich does not argue that the medicalisation of death abruptly
commenced with the advent of bio-technological advances. Instead, he argues that the
process was a lengthy one, passing almost unnoticed as the medical "expropriation" of death
gradually and incrementally took hold. From this perspective, beginning the thesis in the
nineteenth century and focusing, as I do, on the introduction of powerful pain-relieving
drugs, does not necessarily undermine Illich's position. Illich does, after all, consider "the
killing of pain" - which he agrees begins in earnest in the nineteenth century - as a key
component in the medicalisation of death. Also, he does not advance an entirely benign view
of 'natural' death. According to Illich, the image of 'natural' death has evolved over
hundreds of years, with each century broadening and deepening in its medical character.
"The history of natural death", he argues, "is the history of the medicalisation of the struggle
against death."19 A close reading of Illich's work reveals that one must tread carefully so as
not to caricature the way in which he conceives 'natural' death.
Illich and Aries were writing in the aftermath of the first sociological studies that
examined provision for care of the dying in hospitals.20 These studies, conducted during the
late 1960s, revealed a depressing picture of 'hospitalised death', with dying patients left
isolated and often heavily sedated, not simply in order to relieve their pain, but to obviate the
need for hospital staff to interact with them.21 They also provided powerful descriptions of
patients being 'managed' in apparently inhumane ways, leading Illich to remark that reading
these studies would "cure one of any desire for professional assistance".22 However, even
after allowing for a greater degree of nuance in reading Illich and allowing for observational
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empirical evidence that lends credence to the 'medicalisation' thesis, both his analysis and
the analysis given by Aries should be treated with caution.
Written into their conception of 'natural' death is an arguably nostalgic and
romanticised view of history, that looks, as medical sociologist Tony Walter puts it, "back to
a pre-modern era before the scientific and medical discourses of modernity 'ruined' dying".23
Norbert Elias casts a similar sceptical eye on the work of Aries. "Aries' selection of facts",
he argues, "is based upon a preconceived opinion ... In a Romantic spirit Aries looks
mistrustfully on the bad present in the name of a better past."24 Illich and Aries advanced an
image of a 'lost', yet potentially recoverable, 'natural death'. For Illich this means
recovering an original 'natural death' before it was corrupted by the creeping onslaught of
medicalisation and for Aries, it also means a return to a 'natural', pre-medicalised past.23
This selective editing of the past, what historian Eric Hobsbawm terms 'invented
tradition', establishes a paradigm of 'natural' death to be used as an ideal against which other
deaths can be measured. It does not mean, however, that such a 'natural' death does, or
indeed ever did, exist.26 As I discussed earlier, the origins of the concept of 'natural death' as
peaceful and painless can be traced to the late eighteenth century. Subsequently, each society
has negotiated its own vision of what it means to die 'naturally'. Partly, and here I would
agree with Illich, this process does involve 'natural' death incorporating and absorbing new
medical techniques. However, the very existence of the idea of natural death also influences
the manner in which these new techniques are deployed.27 In this sense, the historically and
culturally specific relationship between 'natural' death and medicine is a reflexive one, with
natural death not simply being defined by medicine, but also, in some measure, directing and
even limiting medical aspirations.28
My historical analysis of nineteenth and twentieth-century euthanasia debates utilises
ideas generated by a growing body of historical and sociological literature on death and
dying. In part, my work takes up and uses the 'medicalisation' thesis but it also offers a more
critical view of the notion that 'medicalisation' has somehow destroyed 'natural' death.29
The process of culturally constructing a concept of 'nature', and the way in which varying
understandings of what is 'natural' have historically fed into debates surrounding death, are
themes that resonate throughout this thesis. Unlike Illich, I do not argue that there is an ideal
'natural' death, to which we can return. However, I do argue that the idea of 'natural' death
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and competing claims to define and interpret this idea, are at the centre of historical
euthanasia debates and debates relating to the practice of alleviating pain.30
The paradox of euthanasia remains and, for those who have argued and continue to
argue in favour of and against euthanasia, the ideal of 'natural' death remains very real.
Support for euthanasia is given either in the form of rejection of the inadequacies of
'artificial' medical intervention (although significantly, euthanasia requires that medical
intervention be embraced to some degree) or in a form that views euthanasia as a 'natural'
extension of medical capability in the face of 'unnatural' suffering. Those against euthanasia
argue that it is a wholly 'unnatural' enterprise - an 'artificial' solution to problems that
medicine (and indeed society at large) must address but without disturbing the essentially
'natural' process of dying. When considering the history of euthanasia debates and debates
related to pain relief, the theme of 'natural' versus 'artificial' death provides an analytical
framework that is sufficiently dynamic to allow discussion of arguments drawn from very
different historical contexts.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the concerns of this thesis is to reveal the changing
ways in which euthanasia has been defined in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and to
show the manner in which these contested definitions of euthanasia were applied and
defended. The term 'euthanasia' only took on connotations of medical intervention in order
to bring about death in the latter half of the nineteenth century; before then it simply implied
a calm and peaceful death. By the first half of the twentieth century, the meaning of
euthanasia was the subject of increasing debate as opposing parties sought to lay claim to a
definition of euthanasia on their own terms. By this stage, official medical voices conceded
that the use of pain relieving-drugs carried a risk of hastening death but maintained that such
a view did not compromise the earlier definition of euthanasia that implied merely a peaceful
death. The idea that euthanasia should imply legal recognition of the physician bringing
about death was resisted. Then, after the emergence of the hospice movement in the late
1960s, there is a distancing of the medical profession from any association with the term
euthanasia, which by this time was established in its definition as the deliberate ending of
life by physician administered means.
Thus, euthanasia has had multiple definitions at different times, emerging at the end of
the nineteenth century to mean not only peaceful death but also being used by lay writers to
evoke the concept of medical intervention that brought about death. This dual meaning of
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euthanasia persists throughout the first half of the twentieth century, but also subtly alters
with doctors acknowledging that they might hasten death (this was not the case in the
nineteenth century) in the course of relieving suffering. At the same time, an organised lobby
of support for the legalisation and formal codification of euthanasia uses the term in a
different manner, in this context defining euthanasia as the explicit ending of a patient's life
by a physician acting on the patients request. It is this definition that prevails and ultimately
takes hold.
The changing subtleties of meaning that are grouped under the single term
'euthanasia' must be borne in mind when discussing historical euthanasia debates in relation
to 'natural' and 'artificial' death. Part of the problem when seeking a definition of euthanasia
is that its meaning is constantly in the process of being re-defined and scrutinised.
Nevertheless, whilst sensitive to the variable ways in which the word 'euthanasia' has been
used, in the opening chapters of this thesis I refer to the word 'euthanasia' as it was used for
most of the nineteenth century - to imply a peaceful, painless and easy death. At this stage
the word was not connected with medical intervention that deliberately brought about death.
In the 1870s, euthanasia began to be used to imply the physician intervening at the patient's
request so as to intentionally end life.
Yet the original meaning remained popular, particularly with late nineteenth and early
twentieth-century medical men. So to avoid confusion, I refer to the second definition, that
implied patient-requested death, as 'active' euthanasia. Gradually, however, this second
definition began to take hold, even when used by doctors. Consequently, as the thesis
progresses I simply use the term 'euthanasia' to refer to the proposal that patient-requested
death be legalised. As discussed earlier, the word 'euthanasia' has also been used to refer to
other practices such as withholding or withdrawing treatment or the non-voluntary ending of
life. Whenever possible, I have taken care to explicitly spell out the particular meaning that
was attached to the term.
Historically, the medical profession has been divided on the subject of euthanasia.
Officially, however, the profession has continually opposed any moves to alter the status of
the law so as to allow physicians to end patients' lives. This thesis is an examination of the
medical profession maintaining an idea of 'natural' death, such that it excludes the
legalisation of euthanasia yet embraces other changes in medical practice. This thesis
involves a discussion of the technical negotiations that have taken place, both inside and
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outside of the medical profession, when considering what is to count as euthanasia. As I
consider later, part of this negotiation has involved defining and re-defining what is to count
as 'killing'.
That being said, there is one final point that should be made in relation to the way in
which the term 'euthanasia' has been used. There simply is no parallel between the
nineteenth and twentieth century debates explored at length in this thesis, whereby pain-
relief becomes part of a debate relating to shortening life, and the so-called Nazi 'euthanasia'
programme of the 1930s and 40s. The latter killed an estimated 200,000 mentally ill or
physically disabled people. As the historian Michael Burleigh describes, Nazi euthanasia was
indeed "a state sponsored programme of mass murder".31 This is a thesis about changing
constructions of 'natural' death in relation to euthanasia debates and it is an analysis of the
various and complex arguments employed by opponents and proponents when defining their
respective positions. Clearly, however, practices that have been grouped under the term
'euthanasia' have had, at a certain point in history, the most devastating of implications. I do
not look at the Nazi euthanasia programme in any great detail in this thesis, except in so far
as it filters through into British euthanasia debates in the aftermath of its impact.
Nevertheless, no exposition of euthanasia could omit a reference to this particularly dark
chapter in the term's history, nor for that matter ignore how practices labelled as medical
'treatment' led to the deaths of so many. 32
III. An Analysis of Historical Euthanasia Debates: Three Categories of Argument
With an overarching theme of 'natural' death as a unifying reference point, I set out
three central elements to the historical debates over euthanasia that this thesis examines.
These three elements or 'categories of argument' thread their way through this history of
euthanasia, but they represent concepts that are porous, not constant and unchanging in their
formulation but rather varying with time and place. The three categories of historical
argument are as follows: - 1) A category of deontological, principled arguments, utilised to
either rule out euthanasia on the basis that killing is wrong and life is sacred, or to endorse
euthanasia on the basis that it is right to kill in certain circumstances. - 2) A category of
arguments that revolve around the significance of the practical management of pain
mobilised by both supporters and opponents of euthanasia. These may be used to argue that
it is 'natural' to seek to relieve pain but 'unnatural' to deliberately end life. Or alternatively,
such arguments may be used to argue that euthanasia is the 'natural' extension of pain relief
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and that the practice of pain relief leads to de facto euthanasia. - 3) A category of arguments
deployed either to support or reject euthanasia that focus on the concept of 'social death', the
notion that an individual's 'real' death can precede his or her 'biological death'.
The content of each of these three categories of argument and the manner in which
they relate to one another changes according to the historical context in which they are set.
Also, the argumentative weight given to the three categories shifts depending on this context.
For example, in the nineteenth century, I argue that the euthanasia debate I examine revolves
largely (though not solely) around the interplay between categories one and two - that is, the
group of arguments made from first principles and the group of arguments relating to the
alleviation of pain. By the mid-twentieth century, the third category of arguments, centring
on a notion of 'social' death, is given greater prominence. At each stage in the debates, the
categories of argument incorporate or refer to an idea of 'natural' death, drawing on its
qualities as an ideal in order to explain and legitimise the positions of those who mobilise the
various arguments.
i. Maintaining principle in the light of changing practice and attitudes
This thesis offers an historical analysis of medical responses to the question of
euthanasia across two centuries of shifting medical practice and wider societal attitudes
towards death. Viewed largely from the perspective of the medical community, it is not only
a history of changing medical practice but also a history of the technical and philosophical
arguments that the medical profession employs in defence of their official position that
opposes legalised euthanasia. The first category of arguments that I identify focuses on the
principled endorsement or rejection of euthanasia. These arguments from first principles are
often a starting point for either opposition to or support for euthanasia, grounded as they are
in positions that either hold that life is sacred or that ending life is permissible in certain
cases. Throughout the euthanasia debates that I examine, the argument that it is wrong to kill
emerges again and again, changing in the context in which it is applied but resolutely
retaining its place within these debates. That 'the doctor should never kill', is a principle that
has resiliently endured as the official position held by the medical profession, despite the
impact of changing medical practice and societal attitudes. The arguments grouped within
this first category highlight continuity through change - namely, the defence of the medical
profession of a general principle in the face of the need to accommodate altering practice and
values.
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The tension between the principle that the doctor should not kill and the practice of
relieving pain came to light in the second half of the nineteenth century when it became clear
that powerful pain relieving drugs, such as chloroform and morphine, enabled doctors to
render suffering patients permanently unconscious. This then led lay writers to question the
overarching and professed principle of physicians that they should not kill, when, the lay
writers argued, the practice of pain relief had the potential to curtail life. Rejecting the
suggestion that the use of pain relieving drags hastened death in any way, nineteenth-century
doctors insisted that patients must wait for death to occur 'naturally'. In principle and often
on religious grounds, it was argued that doctors could not entertain any notion of killing their
patients or hastening their deaths in any way. Pain could be alleviated in its intensity but, it
was argued, the length of a patient's life could not be shortened. It is towards the end of the
nineteenth century that early arguments surrounding what has been described as the concept
of 'double-effect' can be found - the concept where the administration of pain relief is
understood not only to intentionally alleviate suffering, but also to unintentionally end life. It
is also at this time that negotiation between maintaining the principle that the physician
should not kill and the practice of administering potentially life-shortening drugs began. This
thesis explores the history of the argumentative reasoning that began in the nineteenth
century and continued in varying forms throughout the twentieth century, whereby the
medical profession sought to defend the principle that the physician should not kill while at
same time embracing new medical techniques. This defence required ongoing adjustments to
the definition of 'natural' death so as to accommodate new medical practices when treating
patients whilst excluding from these practices any notion of killing.
Thus, the interaction between this first category of principled arguments and the
second category of arguments concerned with the impact of the practice of pain relief is of
particular interest to this thesis. By focusing on 'principles' in relation to 'practices' the
thesis looks at public, medical pronouncements on euthanasia, compared to and contrasted
with public pronouncements relating to changing methods of relieving pain. Of course, both
categories are largely concerned with what doctors say they do rather than what they actually
do on a day to day basis. The pain-relieving practices that I analyse are, after all, practices
that have been translated to the written page for varying readerships. However, this does not
mean that such public pronouncements, when subject to scrutiny, cannot give an insight into
how euthanasia is understood by the medical profession, debated internally within the
profession and presented to the 'outside' world. Indeed, the very tension that exists between
the principle that the physician should not kill and the way in which the practice of pain
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relief is publicly understood, provides a valuable means of examining the rhetorical 'work'
undertaken by the profession in order to maintain an important principle.
I suggest that this first group of 'principled' arguments have, to a degree, been re¬
configured in light of changes in medical practice. Despite this, I do not particularly want to
be drawn into an elaborate debate about the existence or non-existence of Platonic, non-
socially constructed ideas versus a pragmatic view of principles seen as giving practice
coherency and order. That work is being done elsewhere.33 It is enough for the purpose of
this thesis to acknowledge that the principle that 'the doctor should not kill' clearly carries
very real meaning for those who have argued against euthanasia. What I am interested in is
the historical interplay between this seemingly unchanging principle and the other categories
of argument (in particular the impact of pain relief) on principled opposition to euthanasia.
This interplay between the Hippocratic principle of not killing and changing medical practice
and societal values is a key component at the heart of historical debates over euthanasia.
Of course, challenges to deontological, principled arguments revolving round claims
to 'the sanctity of life' have a long history. One need only quote David Hume in his 1777
Essay on Suicide, to realise that the introduction of powerful pain relieving drugs did not
mark the beginning of such debates. Hume challenged that if the "disposal of life" was to be
viewed as at the discretion of God alone, it could not then be claimed that the "preservation
of life" could be legitimated by human intervention.
If I turn aside a stone, which is falling upon my head, I disturb the course of nature;
and I invade the peculiar province of the Almighty, by lengthening out my life beyond
the period which, by the general laws of matter and motion, he has assigned it.34
Debates surrounding the rights and wrongs of human intervention in the course of nature
(and 'nature' is often aligned with the notion of 'divine intention') predate the negotiation
between 'principle' and 'practice' that I have set out. Indeed, in the debates that I discuss,
deontological, principled arguments in favour of and against euthanasia frequently meet each
other head on without any reference to the potentially life-shortening role played by medical
intervention. The introduction of the pain relief dimension to euthanasia debates was not the
first challenge to the principle that it is 'unnatural' to assist in another's death, or in the case
of Hume's challenge, 'unnatural' to take one's own life. My argument is that the
introduction of pain relief added another layer to euthanasia debates, forcing the medical
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profession to think through, defend and re-articulate the principle that 'the physician should
not kill' in order to defend an ideal of 'natural' death.
ii. Justifying Pain Relief
The second category of arguments relates to the management and alleviation of pain.
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, I show how the medical profession had first to
establish the use of new, powerful pain relieving drugs, adopting these drugs into the
repertoire of medical practice when treating the suffering patient, whilst working to uphold a
notion of 'natural' death that accommodated this change. During the nineteenth century, the
medical profession faced opposition to the introduction of new forms of pain relief from
those who argued that such alleviation of pain was 'unnatural' and a transgression of God's
will. Then, having consolidated the position of pain relief in medical practice, towards the
end of the nineteenth century the medical profession faced the first lay demands for patient-
requested death or 'active' euthanasia. If drugs were being used to render patients
unconscious, argued lay supporters of this proposal, then why not use these drugs to end the
lives of those in terrible pain?. In response, the medical profession argued that the
justification of pain relief was not a justification for the physician to intervene in order to end
life - a proposal considered, in the official view of the profession, to imply a wholly
'unnatural' death.
Moving into the twentieth century, the established position of the medical profession
was one that continued to uphold the use of pain relief but contested any legalisation of
'active' euthanasia. Support for voluntary euthanasia by the mid-1930s (now more sustained
and more organised) focused particularly on the case of the terminally ill patient in great
pain. Indeed, the question of pain - whether or not it could be relieved and how it was to be
managed - was another crucial component of euthanasia debates in the first half of the
century. Then in the 1950s, evidence accumulated that showed the poor state of provision of
care for the dying. Somewhat paradoxically, however, this served only to turn official
medical opinion against proposals for legalised, voluntary euthanasia. More had to be done
to relieve the pain of the dying without taking the 'unnatural' step of legitimising deliberate
killing, it was argued. By the mid to late twentieth century, arguments surrounding pain
relief developed into a major force for the dismissal of calls to legalise euthanasia. This new
focus on the pain and suffering of the dying was a means of justifying opposition of
euthanasia. Physical pain could and should be managed so as to render calls for euthanasia
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redundant. The argument against euthanasia was now to be made on a practical, as well as
principled, level.
In the late 1960s the emergence of hospice care offered a bolster against legalised
euthanasia. I consider the way in which the hospice 'movement' strove to establish its own
concept of 'natural' death in a manner that harnessed medical technology with a distinct
ideology relating to death and dying. The relief of pain, both physical and mental, played a
central role in the philosophy of hospices but this philosophy did not always satisfy
proponents of euthanasia, who argued that physical pain could not always be controlled and
that mental pain not always alleviated. Rather than viewing hospices as a means by which
'natural' death might be reclaimed, supporters of euthanasia offered the critique that the
hospice movement functioned by imposing an 'ideal' view of death on those who might not
share this vision. Supporters of euthanasia also made the argument that the medical
profession's justification of pain relief served as a means of tacitly endorsing covert
euthanasia. Though the debates took varying forms, a common fault line between the
opposing parties characterised the arguments over euthanasia in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. This line divided those who argued that pain relief was 'natural' but euthanasia
'unnatural', from those who argued that euthanasia was but a 'natural' extension and
conclusion to the relief of pain.
iii. The concept of 'social death': An added dimension to euthanasia debates
The final category of arguments relates to the concept of 'social' death - the idea that
an individual may cease to 'live' prior to his or her biological death. Debates surrounding
euthanasia and 'social' death are often located against a backdrop of bio-technological
advances in medicine, since, it is argued, "medical advances have forced us to reconsider the
boundaries of life and death and have made it unclear when life begins and when death
occurs".35 Post-Second World War advances in life-sustaining technology and a sceptical
critique of medicine, such as that offered by Illich and Aries, shape this view of 'social'
death, epitomised by the powerful image of the patient in persistent vegetative state.36
Although a significant factor in more recent euthanasia debates, this technologically defined
notion of 'social' death is not a major focus of this thesis.37 Instead, I link 'social' death to an
idea that is not necessarily dependent on the sustained intervention of high levels of
technology, but rather depends on a notion of loss of 'personality' or 'self'.38 This notion of
loss of 'self' weaves its way through the euthanasia debates that I consider, and again, the
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concept of 'social' death is defined by specific medical, religious and cultural imperatives
that alter over time.
Writing in the first century A.D, the philosopher, Seneca, expressed the following
thoughts on disease and death:
I will not depart by death from disease as long as it may be healed and leaves my mind
unimpaired ... But if I know that I will suffer for ever I will depart, not through fear of
the pain itself but because it prevents all for which I would live.39
Given my earlier emphasis on the need to avoid an anachronistic style of analysis, it must be
stated that Seneca's attitude to illness and pain would have been shaped by its own particular
set of cultural values that would have differed from those of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. Nevertheless, this reference to disease preventing "all for which I would live" goes
some way towards capturing the idea of 'social' death. 'Social' death does, to a degree,
overlap with the second category of arguments that I identity in relation to pain relief, but it
also encompasses other ideas that contribute to the perception (on the part of the patient, or
by others) that 'life' lias somehow ceased to be meaningful. The notion that the value of life
can be measured in ways independent of biological existence is a theme that recurs
throughout the thesis. The physical manifestations of illness play a role in shaping notions of
'social' death, but so too do the ways in which these physical symptoms are medically
managed.
For example, throughout the euthanasia debates that I consider, the question of loss of
consciousness and mental alertness is a recurrent theme. In the first half of the nineteenth
century, 'clarity of mind' at the time of death is assigned great value. This was the 'ideal'
Christian death, where the mentally alert man or woman would have time to say final
farewells and time to be reconciled with God.40 Of course, mental clarity could not always be
preserved either because of the illness itself, or because of the need to relieve pain. In this
case, the patient was pacified and rendered unconscious, but the 'ideal' remained that
maintaining the consciousness of the dying individual paved the way for a 'good' death.
Then, throughout the twentieth century, a link was made, largely by those who argued in
favour of legalised euthanasia, between the erosion of consciousness (either through the
processes of disease itself, or as an outcome of the administration of pain-relieving drugs)
and the notion of 'social' death.
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This concept of 'social' death is complex, often connected to the control or lack of
control of physical pain but also embedded within wider social contexts of dying, shaping
notions such as 'loss of self' or "loss of dignity'.41 Defining 'social' death involves a
qualitative assessment of what constitutes a 'good' life, and how this life may be seen to
have ended. For the hospice movement in the latter half of the twentieth century, a 'good'
life and consequently a 'good' death was (and, indeed, continues to be) defined by the
management of physical and psychological pain in order to 'free' the personality of the
dying patient. For proponents of the hospice way of managing death, the concept of 'social
death' is anathema to their philosophy that the patient should never be abandoned in either
physical or psychological pain.
'Social' death is often located at the point when, to use Mike Mulkay's analysis, "the
actor has ceased to be taken as an active agent in the ongoing social world of some other
party."42 This is commonly taken to mean the ability to maintain social relationships - a view
that is articulated in the euthanasia debates in this thesis. However, recent ethnographic
studies of care of the dying suggest that notions of the 'self' can be closely tied to the ability
to physically control one's body. This view also resonates in the thesis.43 If 'social' death
relates to the loss of ability to maintain social relationships and the loss of ability to control
one's body, then it also raises the highly sensitive issue of non-voluntary euthanasia for those
who are perceived as having lost (or indeed as having never had) such capacities.
Arguably, 'social' death requires a notion of a comparative scale on which the value
of life is measured and, as a consequence, the question of non-voluntary euthanasia finds its
way into the debates that I consider, despite the resistance of those who sought to maintain
the focus on voluntary euthanasia. Again, the concepts of 'natural' and 'artificial' death feed
into this third category of arguments surrounding 'social' death. Those in favour argue that
euthanasia serves as a means of limiting loss of 'self' in an increasingly 'unnatural'
medicalised world. Those against argue that it is an entirely 'artificial' means of abandoning
or 'editing out' of those who are not perceived as fulfilling the criteria for a socially
specified notion of a 'good' life.
I have set out the overarching theme of 'nature' versus 'artifice' that appears in this
thesis and have outlined the three categories of argument that I identify in this historical
account of euthanasia debates. The thesis is divided into two distinct parts. The first
examines nineteenth-century attitudes to death and pain relief. The second analyses
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responses (predominantly from the perspective of the medical community) to the campaign
for legalised euthanasia, again with a particular emphasis on the way in which these
responses were filtered through attitudes to pain relief. In the following chapters I aim to
illustrate that, contrary to the prevailing view, current euthanasia debates are neither an
entirely radical departure from previous medical-ethical debates, nor are they a purely a
symptom of a bio-technological age. Contemporary euthanasia debates can, I argue, be
considered as part of a longer historical picture in which changing types of medical
intervention have shaped human experiences of death. Advances in medical technology may
mean that our own experience of death is different from that of generations before us, but
that does not mean that we are the first to be asking questions about where the boundaries
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PART 1
The Nineteenth-Century Euthanasia Debate*
Introduction: Death in the 1800s and a New Model of Dying
Go now my ship, launched on the public sea,
That silently hast grown in secret dock;
Nor axe, nor saw, nor hammer fashioned thee,
Hewn by poetic hand from lifeless block,
Go and expect the mde affronting shock
Of waves and winds, and elemental jar,
Nor shame thy parent soil and British stock,
True heart of oak, hight 'Euthanasia'
Following the bear with sev'n lamps and steadfast star.1
Published in 1866, Erasmus Brodie's poetic eulogy to Sir John Franklin's fated Arctic
exploration is a romantic celebration of bravery, endurance and nationalistic sentiment. It is
also a poem about an idealised model of death. Titled Euthanasia, the later verses of
Brodie's epic describe what the poet terms a 'happy death' for the ship's crew. Frozen in
death and in the Victorian imagination, the conclusion to the lives of the men on board
resembles sleep; it is gentle and serene, their bodies are unblemished. Risking and ultimately
sacrificing life for the sake of expanding human knowledge, for Brodie this was 'euthanasia'
- the good death. It epitomised Victorian virtues of endeavour and fortitude in extremes. It
represented a thirst for discovery and a drive to uncover the secrets of the natural world.
Most importantly, in the mind of the poet at least, it was peaceful.2
The poetic world of Brodie's Euthanasia resonates with a new view of death that was
consolidated in the nineteenth century. Significant shifts in both theological thought and
medical practice contributed to the re-conceptualisation of physical suffering, which in turn
had important implications for the way in which death was understood and medically
managed. The ideal of 'natural' death - a peaceful and easy transition from an earthly world
to a divine kingdom - has origins in the latter half of the eighteenth century but it was in the
nineteenth century that this concept became established as the dominant paradigm of an
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idealised, 'good' death. In this introduction to the first section of my thesis, I examine how
this new model of dying, the 'natural' death, came to the fore during the nineteenth century. I
also contend that this concept of 'natural' death is rooted in a particular, ideological
framework and located within a specific historical context.
The historical context to 'natural' death is important because, as I will argue, the
euthanasia debate that surfaced in the latter stages of the nineteenth century was closely
entwined with the theological upheavals and changes in medical practice that accompanied
the rise of this new ideal of death. As I will contend in later chapters of this section, the
euthanasia debate of the late nineteenth century centred on the contesting of what 'natural'
death meant and how this ideal might be practically achieved. Crucially, it was also during
this period that the word 'euthanasia' itself began to take on a new meaning and became
subject to debate. 'Euthanasia' began to imply not only a gentle and easy death but also a
death that was medically induced by the direct intervention of the doctor at the explicit
request of the dying patient. The twin factors of challenges to established theological
thought and changes in medical practice provided the ideological space that was conducive
to such debate.
It is to these two elements of theological and medical change that I now turn in this
introductory consideration of 'natural' death in the nineteenth century. Prior to the
emergence and acceptance of 'natural' death, a far more terrifying vision held centre stage in
the public imagination. In the seventeenth century the image of death as a dark and terrible
enemy was commonplace. Underpinned by the belief in the physical existence of hell and
eternal damnation, Christian theology cast death as an arbitrary force that lay in the hands of
Nature ('Nature' representing the will of God) and was a punishment for sin. Death was to
be feared and only through religious ritual and repentance might this fear be alleviated. For
Roman Catholics, the emphasis was on repentance at the point of death, salvation by means
of the sacraments, or even a lengthy period in purgatory. For many in the Protestant
denominations however, such 'comforts' in the latter stages of life were treated with scorn.
The hand of God could strike at any time, and it was therefore the duty of the Christian to
prepare him or herself for death on a daily basis. In line with the belief that death resided in
the realm of Nature and Providence, medicine played a limited role in the management of
death, both in theory and in practice. In the case of the dying patient, medicine assumed a
secondary role to religion. Often, the main task of the doctor was to give an honest prognosis
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before withdrawing, to allow the dying man or woman to prepare for death and divine
judgement.1
However, during the second half of the eighteenth century the horror of death
gradually began to recede and in its place emerged the idea of 'natural' death - the concept
that death was a gentle and peaceful transition from one world to the next. Death was
beginning to shake off its terrifying seventeenth-century clothes. An alternative vision was
taking shape, captured by what Roy Porter describes as an image of death as a
"quintessentially natural process".4 Importantly, the literal belief in eternal damnation and
the belief in suffering as a form of divine punishment began to weaken under a growing
weight of theological dissent. This process dramatically came to a head in the Church of
England heresy trials of the 1860s, primarily instigated as a result of the defendants' refusal
to accept the infallibility of the Bible and in particular, the literal existence of eternal
damnation.5
While the Roman Catholic Church and the Evangelical wing of the Church of England
resisted any change to the doctrinal emphasis on damnation, for many other Christians it
became increasingly difficult to reconcile the cruelty of the pains of hell with the redemptive
pains of Jesus Christ. Linked to this debate was a fresh assessment of the religious
justifications for physical suffering. If it was difficult to contemplate a loving God inflicting
an eternity of literal, physical pain on the sinner in hell, it was also difficult to perceive
earthly pain as a form of retributive punishment. Once the connection between eternal
damnation and physical pain had been broken, the established theological values and
meanings attached to human suffering were open to radical question/'
In her comprehensive treatment of the different ways in which pain was understood in
the nineteenth century, Lucy Bending shows how theological arguments about the meaning
of physical pain shifted throughout the century. She argues that in the 1840s, debates
surrounding the understanding of physical pain were closely connected with a rejection or
acceptance of the belief in eternal damnation. However, by the mid-1860s onwards,
arguments had largely moved on to a division between those who fought to maintain a
theological explanation for suffering (pain still had a mysterious divine 'purpose' but was
not necessarily a form of punishment) and those who refused to accept such a view. Part of
this shift, argues Bending, was the manner in which "advances in medical knowledge
breached Christian certitude as they undermined the naturalness of pain and put in its place a
30
bodily function that could be removed or at least alleviated by chemical or surgical
interference."7
Undoubtedly, the nineteenth-century introduction of powerful new pain-relieving
drugs such as chloroform, morphine and ether had a significant impact on the debate over the
meaning of physical suffering. As already discussed, the introduction of new pain-relieving
practices came at a time when there was already theological doubt about the 'value' of pain.
In part medicine moved into the ideological vacuum created by this uncertainty, and in part
medicine helped to fuel the growing sense of doubt that pain could be understood within a
religious framework of reference. In an unprecedented manner, doctors now had the ability
to alleviate and even eliminate pain. Though the capacity to relieve suffering outflanked
medical understanding of its causes, the search for an explanation of pain that centred on
neurology had the effect of linking pain to the human body and to some extent, stripped pain
of its religious connotations. Physical pain was no longer necessarily identified as a 'natural'
manifestation of divine will in a divinely ordered world, but as a morally and religiously
neutral phenomenon that could be medically treated.
In her study of death and dying as experienced by middle and upper class Victorian
families, Pat Jalland charts what she views as the decline of the Evangelical 'good' death
that was, she contends, eroded by the influence of "the forces of secularism, indifference and
unbelief'.8 According to Jalland, such a death ideally took place at home, with the dying
person reconciled to God's will, saying their last farewells to family and stoically bearing
pain "as a final test of fitness for heaven and willingness to pay for past sins."9 Early in the
century, a 'bad' death meant loss of ability to speak, or failure to make final spiritual
preparations or a reluctance to die, or the taking of one's own life. Such a death was
characterised by a lack of faith and an alienation from God. By the end of the century, a
'bad' death was instead characterised by pain and suffering. Jalland argues that the
relationship between religion and medicine played a central role in this decline of the
Evangelical 'good' death. Initially, "Christian doctors shared with the families they treated
many of the same aspirations for the 'good' death. By the time doctors had more substantial
powers ... fewer doctors or patients were Christians."10
As I will contend in the next chapters, the ability of doctors to alleviate pain had
significant implications for the way in which the idea of 'natural' death was construed and
the manner in which the euthanasia debate in the latter part of the nineteenth century was
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conducted. Consequently, medical innovation, specifically in the development of pain-
relieving techniques and practices, is one of the central themes of the chapters that follow.
That being said, there are a number of provisos that require mentioning in relation to the new
methods of pain relief that I discuss at length in the later chapters of this first section.
First, caution needs to be exercised when talking of the role that the medical control of
pain played in 'replacing' religious views of the world. As I will argue, the elite medical
practitioners of the nineteenth century who endorsed the liberal use of pain-relief were
themselves religious men who often justified their actions with recourse to theological
arguments. The alleviation of pain, albeit in powerful new ways, was seen by them as a
Christian, moral duty. Pain and suffering might have been detached from the belief that they
were a divinely intended punishment, but the ability to alleviate suffering in an unheralded
manner did not represent a comprehensive secularisation of the way in which doctors
perceived the practice of relieving pain. Rather, this was a time when religious beliefs were
being re-defined particularly with regard to the relationship between divinity and nature, or,
more narrowly, between divinity and the meaning of pain.
Secondly, though the nineteenth century was clearly a time of important and
significant breakthroughs in pain-relieving techniques, it would be an over-simplification to
read this period as a heroic moment in history, in which the adoption of certain types of
techniques was related solely to a triumphant conquest over pain. The historian Alison
Winter has argued that the introduction of inhalation anaesthesia in the mid-nineteenth
century was as much about the medical community securing the supremacy of this particular
form of pain relief over the rival practice of mesmeric anaesthesia. For a period, mesmeric
anaesthesia was the subject of considerable controversy among physicians, surgeons,
scientists and the public. Ultimately, the practice was discredited and labelled 'quackish', but
not before it had proved a serious challenge to inhalation anaesthesia.11
Flistories of pain relief often neglect to consider the extent to which in the mid-
nineteenth century memerism rivalled inhalation anaesthesia.12 As Winter writes: "typically,
once a dispute has come to a close, the process of negotiation becomes invisible."13 It is
worth noting, therefore, that the adoption of certain techniques for relieving pain as opposed
to others was not a foregone conclusion. Additionally, the professional need to present the
impression of a powerful and united medical community that strategically closed ranks
against potential challenges to authority is also part of the history of anaesthesia in the
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nineteenth century. Although I do not consider mesmeric anaesthesia in the following
chapters, I do discuss how the introduction of inhalation anaesthesia was far from
unproblematic and was associated (especially in the early years of its use) with risk.
Thirdly, although the nineteenth century witnessed the introduction of powerful new
pain relieving practices that had an important impact on debates related to the management
of death, the use of drugs during the final stages of life is not exclusive to this period. It
should be remembered that the eighteenth century was also a time when the use of pain-
relieving drugs was in evidence - so much so that it has even been termed "the anaesthetised
age".14 Stupefying drugs such as opium and its derivatives, as well as laudanum and alcohol
were readily available. Opium and its derivatives were marked by the lack of restriction on
their use and could be either self administered or given by doctors. As Porter significantly
comments, by the late eighteenth century, "many people increasingly died insensible,
stupefied with drugs often medically prescribed". Porter also highlights how the rise of
'insensible death' may be an important factor in understanding late eighteenth-century
anxiety in relation to premature burial.15
It is not surprising, therefore, that the late eighteenth-century ideal of 'natural' death
coincides with an increase in the use of drugs in the sickroom. Drugs such as opium and
laudanum enabled a peaceful, sleep-like death. Indeed, they were an integral part of this
"quintessentially natural process" and their use enabled the dying man or woman's final days
and hours to conform to this new model of death.16 As I will argue, the nineteenth century
was a period in which religious and medical interpretations of pain were officially
articulated, tested and modelled anew. The new range of nineteenth-century pain-relieving
techniques undoubtedly played an important role in this process. Practically speaking,
however, the use of pain relief in supporting the concept of 'natural' death, has, like the ideal
itself, eighteenth-century origins. Although these origins pre-date any official debate over the
meaning of the term 'euthanasia', as I discuss in the following chapters, they mark a time of
increasing medical interest in death among elite late eighteenth-century physicians.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that the following chapters that examine growing
interest in nineteenth-century medical management of the dying are almost exclusively based
on an analysis of official, public pronouncements made by elite practitioners. I am interested
in the way in which these elite physicians translated medical practice into a recognised and
accepted language, giving their actions a sense of order and, latterly, a means of rebutting the
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calls to legalise patient-requested death. As such, the focus of the first section of the thesis is
on the rhetoric of managing pain and death, concentrating on the ways in which the medical
community articulated its official position and how it responded when this position was
challenged.
The references to the interaction between doctors and patients in the first section of
this thesis are largely references that relate to an intimate, one-on-one relationship between
elite practitioners and their wealthy, private patients. Yet as Clare Humphreys identifies in
her excellent study of care of the dying in the nineteenth century, "historians cannot simply
assume that changing attitudes among late Victorian doctors and their wealthier clientele
were transplanted across the social divide to poor, working class patients."17 Jalland's study
of Victorian death is criticised by Humphreys for failing to distinguish between the various
social groups in society. In doing so, Humphreys argues that Jalland's work rests on an
assumption that the growing sensitivity to the needs of middle and upper class dying patients
also applied to other social groups.
Humphreys then highlights how well into the twentieth century, hospitals and doctors
continued to refuse admission to impoverished patients diagnosed as incurable. Many were
left untreated, frequently in the most painful stages of disease. With the impossible task of
meeting fees, the poor had to fend for themselves, often ending up in workhouse infirmaries
where treatment was basic. Although the second half of the nineteenth century saw the
growth of a proliferation of voluntary hospitals, particularly in London, the reality was that,
aside from the Poor Law infirmaries, organised care for the dying poor was thin on the
ground. Incurables and the dying were officially debarred from voluntary hospitals.18
It is important to bear in mind that the following discussion of pain relief and the
management of death, is a debate located at a public, elite level. For many of the poor in the
nineteenth century, death was often a harrowing and protracted experience for the very
reason that they were excluded from the realm of the medically managed and potentially
costly 'natural' death. The ideal of a peaceful and easy death remained just that - an 'ideal'.
Humphreys documents how in the late Victorian era a number of religious hospices were
established, founded specifically for the care of the dying. Between 1879 and 1905 five
homes for the dying were opened in London (and another in Dublin) with the aim of
providing a place of rest and comfort for the dying poor. Three out of the five homes either
had close affiliations with or were run by religious orders.19
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The emergence of such late-nineteenth century care of the dying was, to some extent,
a continuation of the wider picture of changing attitudes to death and pain relief outlined in
this introductory chapter. As already discussed, this was a time when religious attitudes to
death and suffering were shifting, while therapeutic advances were challenging the way in
which pain was both conceptualised and practically managed. Humphreys argues that the
new homes for the dying "responded to, were shaped by, and contributed towards many of
these developments".20 However, she also re-emphasises the point, made earlier in this
introduction, that such re-prioritisation of the management of dying did not necessarily
represent a growing secularisation of attitudes. Clearly, in the case of the religiously run
homes for the dying, spiritual concerns were inextricably bound to the need to provide
physical relief to the dying poor.
Jalland suggests that in the nineteenth century the growing desire and ability to relieve
pain by medical means had the effect of diluting the importance of spiritual concerns at the
deathbed. As I have argued in this introduction and will discuss further in the following
chapters, although there is evidence to support the argument that older religious conceptions
of pain were weakening and being replaced with a medical model, death itself often
remained rooted in a theologically ordered world. Humphreys' analysis adds important
additional weight to this position by placing the nineteenth-century management of death in
an institutional context. She maintains that the 'secularisation' argument fails to take account
of the fact that it was institutions founded by those with strong religious beliefs that "served
as an important refuge to those excluded from hospitals." 21
The following chapters on nineteenth-century arguments over the management of
death focus on public debate, conducted predominantly among the medical elite. My interest
in the institutional provision of care of the dying is in the twentieth century, because, I argue,
this is when the impact of such provision breaks through into publicly articulated euthanasia
debates, becoming part of the official discourse of death and dying. It is important, however,
to acknowledge that institutional provision for the dying did exist in the nineteenth century,
partly as a result of a general growth in interest in care of the dying and partly because there
was a recognised lack of provision for the dying poor. The public debates that I analyse
reflect the former but not the latter of these points. In addition, the importance of spirituality
in the institutional care of the dying that is evident in the nineteenth century is a theme that
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will re-surface in the second section of my thesis when I examine the twentieth-century
relationship between the hospice movement and the campaign for legalised euthanasia.
The following chapters reflect a number of the key themes raised in this introduction.
By setting the medical concerns surrounding the management of death and suffering in their
broader social context, it is apparent that the nineteenth century was a period of both
therapeutic breakthrough and ideological uncertainty. This was a time when doctors were in
a position where death could be medically managed as never before. Although such a picture
did not apply in all instances (given that, in many cases, an individual's particular experience
of death depended on his or her social status), the rise of 'natural' death saw the doctor
placed in a central, managerial role, orchestrating a peaceful end to life. This, at least, was
the 'ideal' vision of death, and doctors were an integral part of this vision.
Challenges to orthodox religious interpretations of pain previously entrenched in
theological thought, and the introduction of new pain relieving strategies into the repertoire
of medical practice, created an environment in which the idea of 'natural' death could
flourish. As will be explored in the following substantive chapters of this first section of the
thesis, this re-orientation of death was neither fluid nor easy. Indeed, it was marked by
controversy. I will argue that the persistence of the powerful ideological view of suffering as
an expression of omnipotent power and human fragility meant that the relief of pain was
challenged in certain religious quarters as an 'unnatural' affront to a divinely ordered world.
By the latter decades of the nineteenth century and at the other end of the ideological
spectrum, voices began to be raised (initially from outside the medical profession) that
contemplated a different role for pain relief. Demands now began to be made for the use of
pain relieving drugs to include the doctor officially and explicitly bringing about the death of
a suffering patient at the patient's own request. If a 'good' death really implied serenity and
peacefulness, it was argued, then surely the use of pain relief to induce death was merely a
natural extension of this new dimension to medical knowledge. It was at this point that the
debate over 'euthanasia' began in earnest. What was meant by the term? What was
legitimate medical practice? How far should the relief of pain be taken? How should the
practice of pain relief be publicly articulated? As the following chapters will show, these
were all questions that surfaced in the latter half of the century.
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Primarily, the main substantive chapters of this nineteenth-century part of the thesis
focus on the arguments surrounding pain relief and how they affected the management of the
dying patient. The focus is largely orientated towards the medical profession: how change in
practice was accommodated and debated within the medical world, and how the practice of
pain relief was articulated to the wider lay community. The first chapter consists of a close
reading and analysis of an Edinburgh medical student's unpublished M.D. thesis on the
subject of the duties and responsibilities of the doctor when caring for the dying patient. The
second chapter widens the frame of reference and examines debates (both within and outside
the medical profession) related to the introduction of new pain-relieving techniques. Chapter
3 looks at the first lay interventions that called for the relief of pain to include the recognised
and official sanctioning of requested death. Chapter 4 considers the medical profession's
official response to this challenge.
The first section of the thesis is predominantly concerned with the first two analytical
categories of argument that I trace throughout the thesis as a whole: the category of
principled arguments for or against euthanasia; and the category of practical arguments for or
against euthanasia based on pain relief. The third category of social death plays a less
significant role, although it does factor into some of the analysis, particularly in the third
chapter on lay contributions to the debate. The overarching theme of 'natural' death provides
a conceptual reference point when analysing these nineteenth-century debates over pain
relief and the management of death.
In his introduction to Euthanasia, Erasmus Brodie argues (somewhat inaccurately it
must be said) that the Victorian age was "not a poetic age", but rather "a great epoch for
practical efforts and results of every sort". However, "poetry is not dead, but sleepeth", he
maintained: "so long as our human nature remains the same ... so long as the world
continues to be a great stage of acting and suffering ... so long will we have poetry."22 The
poet's choice of words is fitting. The nineteenth century, when death was portrayed not as
the enemy but as a sleep-like friend, was a time in which the medical profession and wider
Victorian society was wrestling with the question of how human suffering might be
reconciled with such a 'natural' view of death. As a result of "practical efforts and results" of
the therapeutic kind, the medical profession now had the capacity to make the sleep-like
death a reality.
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As I will argue, for the medical profession, the nineteenth century was a tale of
justifying pain relief, and then of defending a notion of 'natural' death so to exclude any
suggestion that such medical intervention might mean the deliberate and intentional ending
of life on request. The challenge for elite members of the medical profession was to maintain
the image of 'natural' death as an ideal that ultimately lay outside human control and yet
allowed some degree of intervention. However, for those who disagreed, medical
intervention meant that such an understanding of the 'naturalness' of death could not remain
undisrupted. 'Natural' death was not a fixed point of reference but was subject to varying
interpretations. Closely tied to this, I argue, was the emergence of the euthanasia debate in
the second half of the nineteenth century. There was to be no swift resolution to this debate.
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Chapter 1
Death, Suffering and Duty - A Medical Student's Analysis of
Euthanasia in 1854
I. Caring for the Dying: Ethics or Etiquette?
As I have argued, by the late eighteenth century doctors were beginning to play an
increasingly central, managerial role at the deathbeds of their more wealthy patients. With
this grew a desire to acknowledge officially the importance of caring for the dying; a point
acknowledged in John Gregory's Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician
published in 1772. Gregory emphasised the importance of the doctor recognising his duties
to those who were beyond cure: "It is as much the business of the physician to alleviate pain,
and to smooth the avenues of death, when avoidable, as to cure disease."1
Then, in 1794, the reforming physician Thomas Percival published his Medical
Jurisprudence, which in 1803 was re-worked as Medical Ethics: or a code of institutes and
precepts adapted to the professional conduct ofphysicians and surgeons} Commenting on
the personal attributes required by the conscientious physician, Percival remarked: "Every
case, committed to the charge of a physician or surgeon should be treated with attention,
steadiness and humanity."3 For the dying patient there was much the physician could do to
make death easier "by obviating despair, by alleviating pain, and by soothing mental
anguish".4 So when, in 1854, the Edinburgh medical student Hugh Noble submitted his M.D.
thesis titled simply, 'Euthanasia', he was adding to a growing body of writing on the
physician's role in relation to the dying patient.5 This chapter consists of a close reading and
analysis of Noble's thesis in which he considers how a peaceful, 'good' death might be
achieved by medical means. However, before turning in detail to Noble's writing on the care
of the dying, it is important to acknowledge that the literature to which he was adding has
itself been a theme of academic debate and interpretation.
Percival's work was the main contribution to this new body of literature on medical
ethics that emerged in the late eighteenth century and, perhaps as a result, has been subject to
considerable scrutiny from historians and sociologists alike. For some, such as the American
41
sociologist Elliot Friedson, writing in the 1970s, Percival's focus was not on questions of
'ethics' but rather on matters of intra-professional 'etiquette'. His central concern, contends
Friedson, was protecting the status of doctors, both materially and socially.6 According to
Friedson, subsequent medical ethical codes inspired by Percival's writing were designed to
"prevent 'unfair' internal competition" while at the same time "maintaining an impeccable
front of silence to the outside world."7 For Friedson and others who shared his analysis,
Percival's work was primarily about the regulation of fees and the prevention of disputes
between the various interest groups in the medical community.8
More recently however, Percival's writing has been re-considered. Andrew Morrice
argues that Friedson's assessment has "caricatured the content" of Medical Ethics and in
contrast draws attention to the work of John Pickstone that locates Percival's writing in a
wider tradition of Enlightenment ideals of duty, honour, civility and virtue.9 Morrice also
points to Roy Porter's evaluation of the medical ethical writing of Percival and Gregory -
work that Porter suggests was informed by the concepts of gentlemanly duty and Christianity
as conceived by Thomas Gisbourne.10 In part, argues Morrice, Percival's work was
concerned with preventing internal professional conflict - Medical Ethics was written in the
aftermath of a dispute within the medical profession over the control of the Manchester
Infirmary in 1794. As Morrice highlights, the opening chapter of Percival's book is pre¬
occupied with establishing a set of rules that would prevent the repeat of such hostility
within the profession. The subsequent chapters, however, move away from narrow rule¬
making and address the duties of the physician - not only to fellow professionals, but also to
patients."
Part of the difficulty in evaluating such late eighteenth-century medical ethical writing
is the problem of defining 'medical ethics'. Morrice contends that in the aftermath of the
1947 Nuremberg Code and the 1948 Declaration of Geneva, medical ethics shifted to a new
agenda founded on human rights.12 Consequently, academics such as Friedson opted
(mistakenly in Morrice's view) for a "retrospective recategorisation of earlier medical ethics
as 'mere etiquette' with no ethical content."13 According to this "recategorisation", it was
only after the Second World War that 'real' ethical issues (such as questions of patient
autonomy) became subject to debate and prior to this doctors were primarily concerned with
intra-professional relations and standards.
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While it would be misleading to deny that current medical ethical discourse is
radically different from the writing of Percival and Gregory, it is also ahistorical to suggest
that these late eighteenth-century doctors were interested only in matters of etiquette. The
relationship between doctor and patient was being discussed at this time, with a particular
emphasis on the personal qualities required by the dutiful physician. By relinquishing a
twentieth-century view of what constitutes 'ethics' and considering Percival's work in its
entirety, a more balanced picture of late eighteenth-century medical writing emerges. It is
fairer to suggest that both ethics and etiquette were under consideration in Percival's
writing.14 The physician's duty to care for the incurable, dying patient was in integral part of
this discussion.
Certainly, by the first half of the nineteenth century, attention was turning in earnest to
the specific question of how best to care for the dying. In the 1830s, the influential Prussian
physician Professor C.W. Hufeland discussed considerations of death and dying in his Three
Cardinal Means of the Art of Healing and On the Relations of the Physician to the Sick.
Hufeland advocated administering opium as a form of pain relief but also cautioned against
the risks of the patient being in possession of what he termed "dangerous remedies" and
"especially in such quantities that endanger life".1
In 1831, Sir Henry Halford delivered a series of lectures at the Royal College of
Physicians in London, which were published as his Essays and Orations in the 1840s. This
dispersed through the medical community Halford's belief that it was the duty of the
physician to "smooth the bed of death and render departure from this life easy and gentle."16
Halford, a physician to royalty and the aristocracy, counselled that the dying should be given
"such aid as medicine could supply".17 Halford's willingness to administer pain-relieving
drugs to secure the ideal peaceful and painless death for those in his care made him, in
Porter's words, "the most sought after physician of his age precisely because his patients had
confidence that through generous medication he would not let them die in agony."18
Combined with a readiness to relieve pain by medical means was Halford's reputation as a
physician with an exemplary bedside manner. According to his biographer William Munk,
Halford's very presence "often did more for his patients than any drug could affect".19 Munk
described one aristocratic woman who reported that she would rather die as a patient of
Halford than recover and live in the care of a physician considered inferior. The Lancet
described Halford as "a master in all that concerned the management of the dying."20
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In 1854, the same year that Noble submitted his thesis, Sir Benjamin Brodie published
his Psychological Inquiries, in which he considered the mental as well as physical
dimensions of death. Brodie argued that a secure religious faith was the most powerful way
to ease the fear of death. Halford too believed that faith in the afterlife would do much to
secure a peaceful and easy death.21 By combining religious faith, therapeutic techniques and
a scrupulous degree of attention to their patients, these elite practitioners played an
increasingly important role in the stage-management of the ideal 'good' death. Management
of such a death had two dimensions - the practical alleviation of pain and distress and a more
ideological or psychological appeal to the comforts of religious belief. In both instances,
death was deprived of its terror.
This was the medical-ethical backdrop to Noble's M.D. thesis of 1854: a world in
which gentlemanly duty, religious belief and the emergence of pain-relieving drugs were
interwoven, prompting medical men in the first half of the nineteenth century to address the
question of how best to manage the dying patient. In spite of the assured tone of eminent and
established doctors such as Hufeland, Halford and Brodie, their respective considerations of
Victorian death reveal a complex array of preoccupations that did not always co-exist easily.
While, for example, Hufeland recognised the invaluable role of opium in relieving pain in
the incurable patient, this was tempered by his fear that such pain relief might ultimately
endanger life. And while Halford maintained that "medical aid" was required to ease the
suffering of death, this, lie argued, could not supplant the role of religious faith in providing
both bodily and mental calm. It was agreed that the incurable patient should not be
abandoned, but beyond this commitment the intricate web of religious, medical and
professional values meant that decisions surrounding life and death were seldom
straightforward.
Noble's thesis provides a valuable insight into the world of Victorian doctors in the
middle of the nineteenth century. Unlike Hufeland, Halford and Brodie, whose names are
known, Noble appears to have slipped into obscurity.22 All that remains is this glimpse of a
student's concerns in relation to death - concerns that are clearly conditioned by prior
published work on death and dying. That does not mean, however, that Noble's thesis is a
mere derivation of other, more well known work. Writing from the perspective of a medical
student rather than the lofty heights of the medical establishment may well have afforded
Noble a degree of freedom that physicians to royalty and the aristocracy, such as Halford,
did not enjoy. Certainly, there is sense of openness and directness in Noble's writing that is
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refreshing. Unafraid of acknowledging the problematic nature of discussing pain relief with
regard to the dying, he seems willing to countenance uncomfortable issues such as mistaken
prognosis.
While the thesis may seem strange in parts to the twenty-first century reader, with its
references to death from diabetes mellitus and to practices such as "blistering, bleeding and
purging", some of the questions raised by Noble seem familiar.23 He considers the question
of when to treat the dying patient and the question of if and when to take the wishes of the
patient into account. He also discusses the issue of withholding information from the patient.
Though history may have altered the specific context in which the medical dilemmas are
framed, many of these questions have resiliently defied satisfactory resolution. The impact of
new pain-relieving drugs is also a subject of consideration, as well as the related issue of
pain as a positive indicator of disease or an unwanted source of distress. The themes raised
by Noble pre-empt much of the content of the following chapters in the first section of this
thesis. I place particular emphasis on the manner in which I identify the practice of pain
relief as being woven (sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly) into the conceptual origins
of the late nineteenth-century debate over euthanasia.
If the nineteenth century was a time in which change presented new ambiguities for
the medical profession, it was also a time when older, established values and beliefs vied to
maintain their ideological hold. By the end of the century, the medical profession (despite
careful consideration of strategies for palliative care and how these strategies might be
represented) faced a very different challenge from those supporting the ultimate form of pain
relief - requested death. This was, I maintain, a debate about how medical practice was
interpreted and about how the peaceful, serene and 'natural' death might best be achieved.
To begin a history of euthanasia in the nineteenth century allows an analysis of the origins of
this stark interface between old and new debates. A close reading of Hugh Noble's thesis
'Euthanasia' provides a revealing starting point.
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II. 'Delivery at the hands of nature': The withdrawal and withholding of treatment
First coined in the seventeenth-century from the Greek eu and thanatos to stand for
'good death', for the greater part of the nineteenth century the meaning of the word
'euthanasia' would remain faithful to its classical, etymological roots. Euthanasia implied
simply a calm, easy and serene death. As I discuss in the third chapter of this thesis, it is only
latterly, between 1870 and 1890, that the term begins to take on connotations of requested
mercy- killing of a patient by a physician. Noble's 'Euthanasia' reveals a nineteenth-century
medical world that, explicitly at least, rejected any notion of the physician actively bringing
about death. For Noble, in keeping with the medical orthodoxy of his time, euthanasia was
strictly defined as limiting the degree of suffering endured by a dying patient. This definition
rejected any suggestion that the patient's life would be shortened.
Mid-way through his thesis, Noble posed the question: "In regard to the active
measures which may be adopted with the incurable or moribund, it may be asked how far the
practitioner may be justified in interfering for the purposes of modifying or changing the
mode of death?" 24 Such was the extent of suffering endured by some dying patients that
Noble considered it understandable that the physician might wish "that death could triumph a
little easier". Yet because "human life is held so sacred", he argued, "no combination of
circumstances can be imagined in which it would be in the least bit warrantable to seek to
abridge the sufferings of the dying by having any tendency to hasten the close of a fast
ebbing existence." No matter how painful the death or however strongly the patient cried for
death to be hastened, "no one dare dream of using means to shorten the period of his misery,
we are only at liberty to endeavour to lessen its degree."25
The inclusion of this admonition suggests that even if advocating shortening a patient's
life was vehemently forbidden, it was also a matter judged sufficiently important and
relevant to merit (albeit dismissive) consideration. Noble may ormay not have been aware of
the writings of Carl F.H Marx, a German academic, physician and medical historian, who in
1826 published the paper 'De Euthanasia Medica Prolusio'.26 In any event, Noble's thesis
struck a very similar tone to that of his German predecessor. After noting the tendency of the
physician to neglect his patient once cure was judged impossible, Marx urged that the
physician had a duty to provide physical and moral comfort as death approached. While the
use of narcotics to relieve pain was endorsed, this did not imply that the death of the patient
should be hastened in any sense. Marx wrote: "It is therefore the physician's duty to extend
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the span of life in every way, and least of all should he be permitted, prompted either by
other people's requests or by his own sense of mercy, to end the patient's pitiful condition by
purposely and deliberately hastening death." He added: "How can it be that he who is by law
required to preserve life be the originator of, or partner in its destruction?"27
Professor C.W. Hufeland was also opposed to any suggestion of hastening death. He
conceded that in instances in which the patient was in dire suffering and prayed for relief
(Hufeland considered this to be a rare occurrence), the physician might consider whether it
was possible to "rid the miserable sufferer of his burden a little earlier". However, such
considerations could never translate into actions: "a mode of action based on such principles
would be a crime" and the aim of medicine "was to preserve and if possible, to prolong
life".28 It was, according to Hufeland, the "most sacred duty" of physicians to bring about
"the euthanasia" for the dying patient.29
So in terms of forbidding any practice that would actively seek to shorten the life of
the dying patient, Noble, like Marx and Hufeland, was clear in his condemnation. His views
were not an exact duplicate of those of the earlier writers, however, and subtle differences in
tone appear in his own treatise of 1854. Noble used similar language to Hufeland but applied
it in a different context. While Hufeland argued that the law required the physician to
"preserve" the life of each patient, Noble stated that "it would be criminal" not to obviate or
relieve the suffering of the dying. While Marx, Hufeland and Noble shared much common
ground, not once did the latter claim that it was the duty of the physician to "extend the span
of life". Noble's concern was that the physician should not pursue treatment at the expense
of the patient's personal comfort.30 "The mere desire to be doing something more is surely
not a sufficient warrant for pursuing the patient within the very portals of death with
additional cause of distress,"31 he commented. He also suggested that to continue to
aggressively treat might in fact have the very opposite effect to that originally intended: "The
flickering lamp may be sooner extinguished if rudely puffed and poked at, though if
protected and handled gently it might have burned yet a while."32
If, according to Hufeland, the physician was "by law required to preserve life", for
Noble the duty to alleviate the suffering of the dying patient had an equal claim to the
physician's attention. In Noble's view, when hope of recovery was lost the physician often
turned away from the patient, forgetting "that more may be done - that the time has come for
restudying the case from a different point with a new object in view." He would not go so far
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as to repudiate explicitly the 'prolongation of life' opinion. Yet his statement that the dying
patient demanded a comprehensive reappraisal of the physician's strategy suggests that, at
the very least, lengthening the patient's life was not of primary importance. The "new object
in view" was now euthanasia - the calm, easy and peaceful death - and this required
abandoning any curative treatment that might cause the patient pain or distress. He
remarked: "Now remedies calculated to restore the health are to be laid aside and all
available means for smooth passage to the grave are to be sought out and applied."33
While Hufeland argued that it was the duty of the doctor to "preserve and if possible
prolong life", he also maintained that it was the "sacred duty" of the physician to secure "the
euthanasia". If the Prussian physician considered these incompatible aims, he did not share
this concern. Noble, however, with his reference to the need for "restudying the case [of the
dying patient] from a different point of view", was arguably suggesting that the prolongation
of life and euthanasia were not, in fact, necessarily commensurable. According to Noble, the
physician was forbidden from actively seeking to cut short life, but this did not mean that the
attending doctor should strive to prolong the life of a dying patient.
In a remark that would be echoed by Sir Thomas Watson in his 1871 Lecture on the
Principles and Practice of Physic, Noble stated: "Though all men must die, all do not die in
the same manner".34 In diseases terminating in coma, death would approach gradually and
painlessly with the patient unconscious for hours or days. Noble commented: "the patient
seems merely to sleep for some time after the spirit has taken flight." Alternatively, in the
case of death from sudden stoppage of the heart, life ended instantaneously. In both instances
- the gradual, painless death and the sudden death - Noble concluded "euthanasia has no
province, nature in the one set providing a transition from life to death free of pain, and in
the other giving no time for either suffering or interference".36
Sometimes, however, death was a severe and painful experience. Noble listed "the
anaemic form of death as witnessed in post-partum flooding [bleeding to death after
childbirth], mortal wounds and bursting internal anuerisms", but noted that such deaths,
though distressing, were also rapid. Due to the speed of the patient's demise, Noble
concluded there was "little being doing in the way of euthanasia".37 It was in cases of
diseases "which tend to death by asthenia [loss of strength]" that he considered the
physician's role of greatest importance. The gradual debilitation of the patient in this
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situation demanded "the earnest attention of the physician to the means of alleviating the
patient's misery and of securing an easy death".38
For Noble, the most distressing symptom of death, for both patient and onlookers, was
the loss of ability to breathe. He illustrated this with a vivid description: "All the signs of
exquisite anguish are forcibly depicted in the livid and sweat-bedewed features, distended
nostrils, staring eye-balls, and heaving chest; and the hands, wildly tossed about seek in vain
for the heavenly relief which ordinary breathing would bring."39 There was nothing to be
gained, Noble argued, in causing additional pain and suffering to a patient dying in such a
manner.
While acknowledging that the pursuit of futile treatment was at times the result of the
difficulty in making an exact prognosis, he was explicitly critical of the physician who
continued to treat aggressively without due consideration of the individual patient's needs. In
some instances where the prognosis was "as clear as noon", Noble argued that "remedies
have been continued to the last, and much suffering allowed to exist unmitigated, and some
inflicted without purpose." The first step in securing euthanasia for the patient considered
beyond cure, argued Noble, was the "suspension of curative measures", in particular those
considered "painful or distressing". According to Noble, "great relief may often be afforded
by this step alone". Bleeding patients as a cure-all remedy was common in the first half of
the nineteenth century but Noble argued that such a practice, along with "blistering and
purging", be dispensed with as soon as it was judged that the patient would not recover.40
At the time of writing his thesis, Noble may have been using the term 'euthanasia' in
its classical form, meaning simply a calm and peaceful death, but it is clear that his use of the
word also implied the medical management of death. His conclusion that "euthanasia had no
province" in sudden or rapid death, or death after a period of naturally occurring
unconsciousness, suggests that his use of the term applied when the physician had the
opportunity to play an important role in alleviating pain and easing the dying process.
Integral to this was the decision to withdraw treatment when judged appropriate. Noble's
insistence on the "suspension of curative measures" in the case of the dying patient resonates
with the debate over what is now defined (and not without controversy) as passive
euthanasia: that is, when death is allowed to occur through the withholding or withdrawal of
treatment.41 This is distinguished from the definition of active euthanasia, in which death is
intended and caused by direct, deliberate actions.42 To make such comparisons between
49
mid-nineteenth century notions of how to best manage death and a much more recent
medical-ethical label such as 'passive euthanasia' may seem anachronistic. Nowhere in his
treatise did Noble, for example, explicitly use the phrase 'allowing' death to occur; instead
he insisted that "the patient must wait for delivery at the hands of nature."43
However, within this view of 'nature' taking its course was the ideal of the easy and
peaceful death that the dutiful physician was obliged to seek for the dying patient. 'Nature'
might have been viewed as the ultimate arbiter of when death would occur, but this did not
mean that the physician remained passive. Central to this idea of euthanasia, as conceived by
Noble, was the importance of intervention and decision-making tailored to the needs of the
dying patient. The withdrawal or withholding of treatment was part of this process. Noble
stated: "if the physician cannot snatch the victim from the grasp of death, he may at least
intercede to have life taken in the most merciful manner".44 Tellingly, Noble equated the
continuation of futile treatment with failure to secure euthanasia. He argued: "the protracted
perseverance in the exhibition of remedies when the disease is beyond their [physicians']
influence is at least as bad as the neglect of means for securing comfort as far as possible in
the last hours of the dying."45
Clearly, when Noble referred to the moral obligation on the physician to alleviate
suffering, in the case of the dying patient this meant the withdrawal of all forms of treatment
that caused pain and discomfort. However, he consistently stressed that the patient could
expect the physician only to "mitigate the intensity" of suffering, "without interfering in the
protraction" of death.46 Noble maintained that the withdrawal of treatment would not have
the effect of hastening the patient's death. He only cautioned that such a decision be made
carefully, "for it would be well considered whether in withdrawing such remedies we are not
losing some chance of recovery".47
Yet in the latter stages of his thesis, Noble appeared to move away from simply
endorsing the suspension of treatment alone. Describing a patient dying from pulmonary
disease, he advocated not merely the withdrawal of treatment, but rather that active steps be
taken to alleviate suffering once recovery was judged impossible. According to Noble, the
source of the patient's distress arose in such cases from "the disproportionate excess of the
vital fluid over the amount of aerating surface left available in the lung". In a healthy lung
"we would naturally seek to relieve [distress] by paracentesis [surgical tapping away of
fluid]," he wrote, but in conditions where the tissue was destroyed, this was not viable. The
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only remedy for relieving suffering in such a circumstance was "by readjusting the balance
between blood and lung". In this instance, Noble endorsed a course of action that earlier in
the thesis he had ruled as unnecessary in relation to the dying patient - namely the practice
of bloodletting. He wrote: "if we felt certain that the pulmonary lesion precluded the
possibility of recovery, the idea of blood letting would appear to be not unreasonable".48
Eager once again to stress that such a decision would not shorten life, he added: "It
might have the effect of giving some degree of comfort without to any extent precipitating
the fate of the patient." Such a course of action could not be chosen lightly, however, since
the patient would be left severely weakened. "Present relief of symptoms or arrestment of the
disease," Noble argued, "is often purchased at the cost of so much subsequent debility as
disables the patient from struggling with the taxes upon his powers which usually
accompany such diseases." Only in cases "indubitably beyond all chance of cure" would
such treatment be justified.49
What Noble was advocating was not only the withdrawal of any curative treatment
that caused distress for the dying patient but also, in certain circumstances, the active pursuit
of treatment designed expressly to give immediate relief from pain. As already discussed,
Noble argued that bloodletting was, in most instances, an unjustifiable and distressing
procedure when caring for the dying patient. The particular case of pulmonary disease,
however, proved an exception - with bloodletting providing what was judged as the best
available means of relieving pain. In the case of the patient with a lung healthy enough to
have excess fluid drained, Noble thought bloodletting inappropriate. What he considered an
unjustifiable course of action in the patient with a healthier lung was justifiable in the case of
the patient with a lung judged beyond repair. The relief allowed by bloodletting may have
been "purchased at a cost", but in Noble's view this was a subject of concern only if the
patient was believed curable. This points to a new layer of meaning in Noble's 'Euthanasia':
one where, although any action that might "hasten the close of a fast ebbing existence" is
expressly forbidden, Noble endorses pain-relieving treatment that might hinder recovery.
Arguably, bloodletting might also have hastened the death of the patient suffering from
pulmonary disease. If so, Noble was eager to distance himself from this possibility with his
contention that the practice would afford comfort without "precipitating the fate of the
patient."
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In treating the dying patient, Hugh Noble's thesis reveals how the Victorian physician
was faced with critical decisions involving not only the withdrawal of treatment but also, in
certain instances, the choice of active measures intended solely to relieve pain rather than
cure. In the introduction to his thesis Noble described the physician's duty as "alleviating the
pangs of death and sweetening the bitter cup of those who are doomed to await the approach
of dissolution." By the end of the thesis, a far more complex picture emerges. The
importance of valuing the 'sacredness' of life at all times, is now forced to co-exist with the
physician's need to determine whether to concede that the patient was beyond cure. Such a
decision was vital in the case of pulmonary disease, since it shaped and directed the course
of action taken by the doctor. For Noble, the easy and peaceful death necessarily implied a
death in which pain was eliminated or at the very least reduced. The pre-requisite for the
dutiful physician in alleviating the pains of death was, I argue, acquiescence to death itself.
Not only was this manifested in the withdrawal of treatment, but also, at times, in the pursuit
of treatment uniquely tailored to those judged by the physician to be beyond recovery.
III. 'Days of Scientific Advancement': The Wishes of the Patient and the Purpose of
Pain
Along with the withdrawal or withholding of painful or futile treatment, Noble
considered that euthanasia also implied "the accession to any desires on the part of the
patient which may have been inadmissible while recovery was the object of the physician's
care". Careful attention to the dying patient's "expressed wishes", he argued, would help to
make the patient comfortable and was conducive to "tranquillity of mind". It was at this
juncture that Noble again ruled out any suggestion that the physician might hasten the end of
life. He wrote: "however vehemently the wretched patient may cry for the merciful arrival of
death ... no one dare dream of using means to shorten the period of his misery, we are only
at liberty to endeavour to lessen its degree."50 Evidently, Noble considered it a very real
possibility that the physician might be placed in a situation in which he was asked to actively
induce death. This was one desire to which the physician could not submit. He did not
elaborate further on what might constitute wishes "which might have been inadmissible" in
the case of the curable patient. Clearly, though, with his reference to the importance of
securing "tranquillity of mind" in the dying patient, Noble did not view euthanasia simply in
terms of bodily calm - the mind also had to be pacified.
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Addressing the issue of the physician's duty "to the immaterial part of the sick and
dying", Noble stated: "It is not enough to say that his [the physician's] duty reaches only to
bodily complaints. The mind and body are intimately united." The difficulties in dealing with
a diseased body were only heightened further, he argued, by a mind that was distressed. It
was the duty of the physician, therefore, to "secure as far as possible mental tranquillity in
patients under treatment".51 This raised the question of how truthful the physician should be
with his patient. As Noble conceded, it was possible that the prognosis might be mistaken.
The negative psychological impact of the patient learning, mistakenly, that he or she was to
die, could have dire consequences: "the peturbation of mind which such an announcement
might produce would have the effect of accelerating the catastrophe that might otherwise
have been averted."52
The question of what to tell the dying patient preoccupied elite Victorian doctors. Roy
Porter argues that as part of the "more managerial approach to the death-bed", physicians
such as Sir Henry Halford became adept at withholding the truth, instead giving
"prevarications or cheerful prognostications". When physicians such as Halford became
"trusted family advisers and intimates", they adopted a policy of concealment that was only
abandoned in the very last stages of death so as to allow for the patient's final preparations.53
For Porter, this managerial approach (not only to the therapeutic needs of the dying patient,
but also to the flow of information from doctor to patient) is representative of the way in
which death was increasingly becoming a medically defined event.
Pat Jalland interprets Halford's attitude to truth-telling in a slightly different manner
and states that "the truth about mortal illness was divulged in the most considerate way".54
She argues that while Halford considered that the doctor's primary duty was to prolong life
by "all practicable means", he also acknowledged the importance of warning the dying
patient's family of the likely outcome.55 The family was best placed to warn the patient,
Halford advised, because relatives did not completely destroy optimism. If such information
came from the physician, the patient would lose all hope. However, in the absence of family,
Halford counselled that the patient should be made aware of his or her predicament. The
patient was not to be left to die unprepared.
According to Jalland, C.W. Hufeland was the only medical authority to advocate
complete concealment of a dying patient's condition. In On the Relations of the Physician to
the Sick, Hufeland declared that "to announce death is to give death". For the physician
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"employed to save life", the giving of a fatal prognosis was not, he maintained, a sustainable
position.56 Jalland argues that this was an isolated view and that "most Victorian authorities
on medicine and medical ethics advocated telling the truth to dying patients". The
differences in opinion lay in the timing and manner deemed appropriate for disclosure.
While some doctors advocated a favourable prognosis until the end was near, others took a
more cautious view and advised the patient of his or her fate as soon as it was judged
certain.'57
In his thesis, Noble argued that frequently "the probabilities of the patient's fate"
would be discussed before death. However, he maintained that such conversations were
usually concealed from the patient and questioned whether this was always the correct
choice. He elaborated: "I have heard a patient when moribund bitterly complaining that he
had never been made aware that his sickness was to terminate fatally. And does not some
responsibility rest upon those who are best qualified to tell beforehand that a patient is to die,
and who nevertheless neglect to do so?"58 Whether or not the relationship between physician
and dying patient called for complete openness was a question that Noble did not answer
conclusively.
Although there were cases where truthfulness would give the patient the opportunity
to prepare for death, there were also instances where possible recovery would be jeopardised
by such disclosure. Noble wrote: "It cannot be denied that there are cases of extreme
difficulty in which there may indeed be but slender chances of recovery, but what there are
would certainly be destroyed entirely by the fear of death. Whether in such cases the
physician is justified in concealing the fact, or even if ever it is right to prevaricate or deny
the existence of manifest danger I shall not here attempt to address."59
The common link, underpinning the psychological and the physical dimensions of
euthanasia, was the question of the physician's clinical judgement. Noble argued: "It is
obviously a point of very great importance to be able to decide when a given case is beyond
all hope of cure or recovery".60 On the physical level, the physician had to determine
whether the withdrawal of treatment might risk diminishing the patient's chances of
recovery. On the psychological level, the physician had to be sure of the prognosis in order
that the patient's mental wellbeing was preserved. Risks and benefits existed on both sides -
striving for the easy, calm and painless death implied a sureness of clinical decision-making
that Noble would only allude to, but not discuss in detail. Though Noble was clearly aware
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of the great importance that euthanasia placed on the notion of accurate diagnosis, just how
and when such a diagnosis was to be made was a subject left undeveloped in his thesis.
If Noble's silence was conspicuous in relation to the specific details of how and when
a patient should be considered an appropriate case for euthanasia, his consideration of how
the physician should treat the patient in pain also left unanswered questions. He stated: "pain
is a cause of distress which must be combated in endeavouring to afford comfort to the
irrecoverable or dying."61 Yet in the very next sentence, he concluded: "the occurrence of
pain in connection with the existence of most severe and fatal diseases is to be looked upon
as a most valuable circumstance." Without the presence of pain, Noble argued, disease
would be able to progress unchecked. Pain was a much-needed physical signal that
constituted "a safe-guard to warn us of the existence of disease and direct our attention to its
situation".62 Diseases which progressed in an insensible patient or under the cover of less
painful ailments often only revealed themselves when it was too late for any curative
measures to be taken. "However distressing this sign [the presence of pain] might be we
would not wish it to be absent unless the condition upon which it depended were changed,"
he wrote. He then added, "although we could produce insensibility to the pain we would not
desire to do so if thereby we deprived ourselves of a means of knowing how the disease
progressed."63
With regard to the presence of pain in the dying, incurable patient, however, Noble
struck a very different note. In this instance he argued that "pain can serve no good purpose,
and means must be had recourse to for its mitigation as part of euthanasia".64 Rather than
viewing pain in a positive light as in the case of the curable patient, for the dying patient it
was now a malignant source of distress. For such a distinction to be made the weight of
responsibility once again rested with the physician's diagnosis. Was the patient to be left,
unrelieved of pain, in order that the progress of disease could be monitored? Or was pain
relief to be the uppermost priority of the physician, since curing the patient was judged
impossible? How the physician was to determine between these two very different courses of
action was never made explicit by Noble.
Only at one point in his thesis did Noble come close to suggesting how the physician
might make such a decision. He wrote: "the ability to determine when a case is past recovery
is intimately connected with the first indication in the treatment of the dying - namely the
suspension of curative measures, more especially such as are at all painful or troublesome to
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the patient".65 At first glance this appears to be a circular argument. According to his earlier
reasoning, the decision to withdraw treatment was dependent on a prior decision that the
patient was beyond cure. From another interpretive slant however, Noble appeared to be
suggesting that if "curative measures" appeared not to have the desired effect, they should be
withdrawn. If such treatment brought only pain and suffering, this in itself was an indication
that the patient was incurable - the two were inextricably bound together. This was the only
time that Noble fleetingly addressed the issue of when the physician might know that
euthanasia was now a priority.
Despite his reluctance to discuss in detail the intricacies of clinical decision-making,
Noble's analysis of the purpose of pain is revealing. He describes a nineteenth-century
medical world with new pain-relieving techniques at its disposal and supposes that with this
greater technical power comes a fundamental re-evaluation of how pain should be perceived.
According to Noble, "in these days of scientific advancement", surgical procedures
"formerly so terrible in their contemplation and execution" were now "performed upon
unconscious patients", while the pains of childbirth had been "struck from the catalogue of
human suffering". Given this, he asked, "how is it that euthanasia is not made a special
object of the physician's attention?"66 By listing wider developments in the control of pain
alongside the question of euthanasia, Noble made a conceptual connection between the
management of pain in patients who were not dying, and patients at the end of their lives.
When pain was seen to be without purpose, the physician's duty was to alleviate suffering.
This meant confronting pain wherever it was found, with new pain-relieving drugs such as
chloroform playing an important role. Noble argued: "No one now imagines it to be at all
necessary that anyone should be allowed to suffer pain or distress if it can possibly be
obviated."67
However, despite this description of a consensus that the patient should not suffer
unduly, Noble was aware that the use of the new pain-relieving drugs did not go
unchallenged (the debate about pain relief to which he refers is discussed at length in the
following chapter of this thesis). The arguments used to oppose the use of anaesthesia in
childbirth, Noble maintained, "might with as much appearance of propriety be applied to
attempts on the part of the physician to alleviate the pains of dissolution". To this he
countered emphatically: "neither the sufferings of labour nor those of death need be
considered as indispensable elements of the cup of human experience."68 With reference to
how pain relief might be actively afforded, Noble argued that inhalation chloroform was "of
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signal use in many circumstances". Specifically in the case of the dying, he added, "I feel
persuaded that it might be made available far more than it is in the closing scenes of many
unhappy victims' diseases."69
Noble described the case of a man dying from disease of the stomach "with whom
many means of allaying his sufferings were tried without any good result except
chloroform". The patient had been unable to retain or digest any nourishment and was
"literally starved to death". For three days leading up to his demise, the patient was kept in a
state of "imperfect anaesthesia" and as a result, "was doubtless saved much misery by its
use". In Noble's view, chloroform should have been used more frequently in similar cases.
In sparing patients the pain of surgery or childbirth, he maintained, there was the expectation
that the patients would recover. This was not the case with those who were beyond cure.
Nevertheless, in these "days of scientific advancement", Noble argued that pain-relieving
drugs had a significant contribution to make to achieving what he understood as euthanasia -
the easy and peaceful death.
Hugh Noble's M.D. thesis offers an invaluable thematic starting point from which the
historical and conceptual origins of the nineteenth-century euthanasia debate can be mapped.
Written at a time of growing therapeutic power and yet uncertainty about how pain
functioned physiologically, 'Euthanasia' raises as many questions as it provides answers. As
discussed, Noble addressed the problem of knowing if and when treatment should be
withdrawn, the difficulties of accompanying questions of clinical judgement and prognosis
and the issue of telling the truth to the dying patient. He also explored altering perceptions of
the purpose of pain (both physical and mental) and the question of if and when to use pain-
relieving drugs. All these themes are contained within his short thesis on management of the
dying patient. I have considered Noble's thesis in detail because, as far as I can establish, his
writing is unknown and receives no mention in other work concerned with the history of
medical ethics or, more specifically, the history of euthanasia debates. Noble's writing is
important because of the light it sheds on mid-nineteenth century attitudes to caring for the
dying.
Pat Jalland argues that "the question of mercy killing was not debated with any great
urgency in the nineteenth century because doctors did not then possess mechanical aids, such
as cardiac stimulators and mechanical respirators, to prolong a limited form of life in a
terminally ill patient." The question of when to cease life-prolonging treatment of this kind
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was not a Victorian concern, argues Jalland, therefore "avoiding one of the most difficult
aspects of the modern euthanasia debate."70 Yet, as Noble's thesis reveals, mid-nineteenth
century doctors were faced with a range of dilemmas when it came to treating the dying
patient. That these dilemmas were very different from the ones confronted by the medical
profession today does not negate their existence, nor does it support the suggestion that
Victorian doctors somehow 'avoided' critical questions of clinical decision-making.
While hastening death was explicitly forbidden, subtle distinctions were being drawn
between the 'preservation' and the 'prolongation' of life. Elite doctors such as Halford and
Hufeland were eager to stress the duty of the physician to extend life. Noble, however,
appeared less keen to share this view when applied to the case of the dying patient, although
he too shared the view that life could not be 'shortened' in any way. As Noble's thesis
indicates, the principle that the physician should not seek to shorten life was now forced to
accommodate practice that involved making decisions concerning not only the withdrawal of
treatment, but also at times, the choice of active measures intended solely to relieve pain
rather than cure.
The patient was to "wait for delivery at the hands of nature" but at the same time,
great emphasis was placed on the diagnostic powers of the attending physician. Clinical
judgement played a critical role in Noble's formulation of euthanasia and affected decisions
that tailored either curative or palliative treatment to the individual patient's requirements.
Though the term 'euthanasia' was used to imply a calm and easy death and would only begin
to change in meaning towards the end of the century, I argue that medical judgement and
intervention was already at the centre of the debate over how to achieve a 'good' death. As
the following chapter will discuss, many of the questions and concerns raised by the medical
student Hugh Noble in 1854 remained very much alive at the end of the century. Though his
name may be unrecognised and his thesis left unpublished, he appears to have had an
intuitive feel for the important issues that would, for the remainder of the century, preoccupy
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Chapter 2
Justifying Pain Relief - A Nineteenth-Century Ethical Debate
I. Interpreting Pain: Alleviation or Acceptance?
For the Victorian physician, while the exact moment at which death would strike was
perceived as residing in the "hands of nature", it was also seen as his duty to confront and
manage the pain that accompanied death. Integral to the ideal of the calm and easy death was
the notion that pain was not a necessary part of the process of dying. Moreover, securing a
'natural' death for the patient required that the pains of death were viewed with neither
passivity nor acceptance on the part of the physician. The ability of the doctor to alleviate
suffering in the dying patient, was, I argue in this chapter, part of a broader nineteenth-
century debate about the acceptability of relieving pain in other contexts such as childbirth
and surgery. As this chapter will explore, this was a debate that centred on the meaning and
value ascribed to pain: whether its presence served a religious or physiological purpose - or,
indeed, any purpose at all.
Examining this debate over the 'purpose' of suffering and the rise of the medical
paradigm used to explain the various manifestations of pain, adds an important dimension to
understanding how the euthanasia debate at the end of the century took shape. By
questioning the inevitability of pain and championing the power to alleviate suffering, the
medical profession was exposed to challenges that urged that this justification of pain relief
be extended to include the merciful killing of the suffering patient. Of course, for centuries
drugs have been used (with varying degrees of success) to control pain.1 In addition,
arguments pertaining to the rights and wrongs of ending life have a long history that pre¬
dates the nineteenth-century use of pain relief.2 The euthanasia debates I examine cannot be
solely explained by an argument based on technological determinism. That is to say, the use
of powerful pain-relieving drugs was not the only reason for the emergence of a novel set of
concerns regarding the management of death in the nineteenth century. However, I do
maintain that the introduction of particular kinds of pain relief, such as chloroform and
morphine, added a new element of complexity to the ethical questions at stake. The
deliberate and swift obliteration of pain under medical supervision and control was
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achievable as never before. These drugs also allowed the patient to be rendered unconscious
for hours or even days - a factor that would prove significant in the late nineteenth-century
euthanasia debate discussed in the third chapter of this thesis.
The present chapter is concerned with the debate over pain relief that preceded the
euthanasia debate at the end of the century. The introduction of anaesthesia in the mid-
nineteenth century had a profound impact on the medical profession and on society as a
whole. The administration of pain relief meant that previously inescapable suffering was no
longer viewed as an inevitable feature of human experience. For the physician, the new pain-
relieving drugs brought an unparalleled level of professional power that, as this chapter will
examine, transformed the encounter between doctor and patient. Pain-relieving techniques
were, I argue, absorbed into routine practice in such a way that the concept of a divinely
ordered 'natural' world was left undisrupted. However, this was not a straightforward
process. The authority of those who endorsed pain relief and who discerned and interpreted
this natural order in such a manner was a matter of dispute. Whether or not pain should be
accepted or alleviated was the subject (at least in the initial aftermath of the introduction of
anaesthesia) of considerable controversy.
The following three sections of this chapter consider the impact of anaesthesia in a
number of ways. First, the introduction of chloroform in childbirth contributed to a
comprehensive assessment of the purpose of pain, sparking disagreement between those who
supported the use of pain-relieving drugs and those who rejected their use on theological
grounds. While it would be misleading to portray this debate in a manner that juxtaposes
medical with theological interests (after all, many physicians held firmly religious beliefs), in
broad terms, this first debate saw the medical profession closing ranks against those who
were religiously opposed to pain relief. Anaesthesia in childbirth provides an extremely
revealing example of the way in which those on either side of the debate drew on conflicting
concepts of 'nature' to strengthen their respective positions. Those who opposed the use of
pain relief in obstetrics argued that God intended pain to be part of childbirth. Interfering
with this pain, they maintained, was interfering with God's will and with nature. Supporters
of the use of pain relief in childbirth argued that the very ability to suppress pain in powerful
new ways was testimony to the God-given capacity of humans to expand their knowledge
and understanding of the world. The ability to triumph over suffering was not a challenge to
divine will or to nature, but rather an expression of God's intention that unnecessary pain be
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alleviated. This, in turn, meant distinguishing between 'necessary' and 'unnecessary' pain,
and once again, the emphasis was placed on medical judgement.
There is an important link to be made between the alleviation of pain in childbirth and
the medical management of pain in the dying patient. In simple terms, both rested on a
justification of pain relief based on argument in which the physical suffering in question was
viewed as serving no constructive purpose. Hugh Noble made this connection when he
stated: "If half the arguments were valid that used to be made and may still be made against
the use of anaesthesia in childbirth, I suppose they might also be applied to attempts to
alleviate the pains of dissolution." As I argue in the second section of this chapter, the
justification of pain relief in childbirth had important implications for the defence of pain
relief at the end of life.
The third and fourth sections relate to an another debate about the introduction of
anaesthesia that was conducted within the medical community. While religious opposition to
pain relief was largely dismissed, this intra-professional debate revealed another set of
concerns. Although generally physicians did not oppose the use of pain-relieving drugs in
principle, there were worries among medical men about the effects of the practical
application of such drugs when administered in childbirth and in surgery. Here, concerns
centred round differences that stemmed from conflicting views of how pain should be
understood physiologically and anxiety relating to the safety of the new drugs. As the
century progressed, worries emerged in relation to the safety of anaesthesia - particularly in
the case of chloroform. Despite these concerns, such were the pain-relieving benefits of the
new drugs that they continued to be administered (both in surgical and non-surgical
medicine) even though anaesthetic death was a recognised danger. "I will not give a deadly
drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make suggestion to this effect" states the
Hippocratic Oath and yet the potential 'deadliness' of chloroform was a risk worth taking in
the view of many nineteenth-century physicians.
The pain endured by the dying patient is clearly different from the pain endured by the
sentient patient under the surgeon's knife. In the first instance, pain is a physical
manifestation of illness, in the second pain is intentionally inflicted with the aim of securing
the patient's recovery. The introduction of new pain-relieving drugs challenged the notion
that either type of pain was inescapable. However, when viewed in the context of the
nineteenth-century medical world, the use of anaesthesia in the case of the dying patient
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reveals a number of interesting ambiguities when compared with descriptions of its use in
the case of the non-dying patient. As I will discuss, while the medical community was
willing to contemplate the dangers of anaesthesia when used in obstetrics and surgery, when
considering pain-relief for the dying, emphasis was placed on the ability to sustain and even
prolong life.
As well as considering the debate over chloroform, I look at the medical discussions
relating to the use of morphine. By examining the arguments that accompanied the
introduction of this drug, again, a picture of pain relief versus potential risk is revealed. In
the case of morphine, the need to alleviate pain was weighed against the risk of requiring
increasing (and potentially dangerous) doses to achieve a constant level of relief. I have
widened my assessment of pain relief to consider not only medical practice in relation to
death, but also in the context of childbirth, surgery and chronic illness. As I have outlined,
this serves two purposes. First, it allows an examination of how the meaning of pain was the
subject of debate and interpretation and second, it reveals an alternative medical discussion
of pain relief that contrasts with accounts given by elite Victorian physicians when
considering the dying patient. In contrast to statements about the prolongation and
preservation of life, what emerges is a more complex equation in which the relief of pain
incurs risk and possibly even death.
II. 'Natural' Birth and Chloroform: The Response to Religious Objections
Her Majesty was safely delivered of a Princess, at a quarter before two o'clock, on
Tuesday afternoon last. The pains of labour commenced in the morning of that day
between the hours of two and three, at which time the medical attendants and the great
officers of the state were summoned. The labour was in every respect natural, as was
the presentation, but the pains were somewhat lingering and ineffective. About half-
past eleven o'clock, it was thought desirable that chloroform should be administered,
which was continued by Dr. Snow at short intervals to the time of delivery. The
anaesthetic agent perfectly succeeded in the object desired. Her Majesty has since
progressed favourably, not a single unpleasant symptom having appeared. The infant
Princess is in good health.3
The above announcement reporting that Dr John Snow had safely administered
chloroform to Queen Victoria during the delivery of her daughter, Beatrice, appeared as a
discreet and somewhat unremarkable paragraph in the Lancet of 18 April 1857. This public
announcement, however, marked a significant moment in obstetric pain relief. According to
John Bonica, the announcement was "tantamount to moral, medical, and even religious
sanction of alleviation of the pain of childbirth".4 Four years earlier, the same Dr Snow, a
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pioneer in anaesthesiology, had also successfully given chloroform to the Queen,
administering intermittent doses on a handkerchief.5 The Queen's obstetrician, Sir James
Clark, wrote to inform Sir James Young Simpson - Simpson having first administered ether
during childbirth in January 1847, then substituting chloroform in November of the same
year. Opposition from the editor of the Lancet, Thomas Wakley, meant that the first
administration of chloroform to the Queen during childbirth was not publicised.6
Of particular interest, given the focus of this thesis, is how this first public
announcement of chloroform use in 1857 was presented as part of a 'natural' and yet
medically managed birth. In a manner that resembles the medical discussion surrounding the
use of pain relief and 'natural' death, the notion of 'natural' birth saw new pain-relieving
techniques being admitted as accepted practice while preserving the idea that childbirth of
this kind "was in every respect natural". However, as I have suggested, the use of pain relief
during labour was not uncontroversial. Rooted in a literal reading of the bible, nineteenth-
century religious opposition to the use of anaesthesia in childbirth cited Genesis 3:16: "Unto
every woman, I will multiply thy sorrow and thy conception; in sorrow shalt thou bring forth
children."7 Opponents of obstetric anaesthesia considered the pain of childbirth to be God-
given and not a matter for earthly, human interference. To attempt to interfere in the pains of
childbirth by suppressing suffering that was divinely intended, was an affront to God's will.
The pain of childbirth served as a continual reminder of Eve succumbing to temptation and
therefore to the fallibility and weakness of mankind.
There was an additional element to this argument. The pains of childbirth were also
seen as providing an intermediary link between God and man. To remove the suffering of
labour would be to destroy this divinely intended connection. In her study of obstetric pain
relief in the mid-nineteenth century, Mary Poovey convincingly argues that this debate
centred on the social position of medicine in relation to religion or, more narrowly, the
nature of women and their position in relation to medicine. Poovey maintains that whereas
childbirth was "previously seen as natural territory presided over by women", the
introduction of chloroform as a means of relieving pain was seen by some as a threat to this
'natural' order.8 She argues that those sharing this view were highly suspicious of what they
perceived as an attempt to shift childbirth from "the no-man's land of 'nature' ... into the
social realm", thus breaking the link with God that the pains of labour supplied.9
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Such was the force of opposition to obstetric anaesthesia that one month after first
using chloroform to alleviate the pains of childbirth, James Young Simpson felt it necessary
to address his critics in his Answer to the Religious Objections advanced against the
Employment of Anaesthetic Agents in Midwifery and Surgery.10 Rather than appealing on
secular, scientific grounds, Simpson countered with the passage from Genesis in which God,
wishing to provide a companion for Adam, makes him drowsy in order to remove one of his
ribs - a reference to what Simpson termed "the first surgical operation on man"." He added:
"even if we were to admit that woman was, as the result of the primal curse, adjudged to the
miseries of pure physical pain and agony in parturition, still, certainly under the Christian
dispensation, the moral necessity of undergoing such anguish has ceased and terminated".12
This latter statement is an example of Simpson appealing to Christian thought that rejected
the notion of physical suffering as a 'punishment' from God. As I have discussed, for many
Christians it was becoming increasingly difficult to associate the concept of a benevolent
God with the idea that pain was deliberately inflicted. Simpson's reference to "Christian
dispensation" suggests a rejection of literal interpretations of the Old Testament, with an
emphasis placed instead on the redemptive powers afforded by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ.
The idea that pain is divinely intended has a long history. For medieval Christians it
afforded a connection with God and a source of visionary experience in which physical
suffering might be conquered by spiritual commitment.13 In the early Victorian period, as I
have outlined, the Evangelical revival encouraged fortitude in the face of suffering. Though
pain was not to be actively sought, it was considered an essential part of life, to be
confronted rather than avoided.14 Simpson's defence of the use of chloroform revealed a
different view of pain that rejected its inevitability and endorsed its medical alleviation on
religious grounds. Yet older, religious rationales for the pains of childbirth and the 'purpose'
of pain remained part of the debate over anaesthesia, at least until the middle of the
nineteenth century.15
It would be overly simplistic to view the debate as polarised between the medical
community and religious bodies of opinion outside of medicine. For example, Poovey
highlights the rejection of chloroform by an American doctor, Meigs, who argued that "to be
in natural labour is the culminating point of the female somatic forces". She then cites a
clergyman's description of chloroform as "a decoy of Satan ... it will harden society and rob
God of the deep earnest cries, which arise in times of trouble".16 It is possible, then, to find
examples of medical and religious opinion united in their rejection of chloroform use. What
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is interesting is the way in which those both in favour and against administering chloroform
in childbirth marshalled the concept of 'nature' in defence of their positions. Those who
maintained a similar position to Meigs tended to stress that the use of chloroform was an
affront to nature rather than to God, but the biblical overtones in their language reveals a
collapsing of any distinction between 'the natural' and 'the divine'. In an appeal to notions
of the natural and the divine, Meigs stated: "There is in natural labour no element of disease
... I should feel disposed to clothe me in sackcloth, and cast me in ashes [should a patient die
from] such meddlesome midwifery."17 This was also a warning about the risks of anaesthetic
death, a point to which I will return in detail later in this chapter.
From an alternative perspective, an interesting letter to the Lancet in April 1857 is
illustrative of how many in the medical community were able to reconcile changing medical
practice with religious beliefs by insisting that medicine was an extension of nature, rather
than a challenge to it. Criticising Sir John Forbes' publication Nature and Art in the Cure of
Disease, Alfred Collinson, M.D, M.R.C.S, objected to what he viewed as Forbes' desire to
undermine the medical profession's true claim to interpreting a divinely ordered natural
world.18 In drawing attention to the deficiencies in the geographical distribution of medical
care, Forbes had argued that that in rural areas many had "to rely on the old crones of the
village with their herb teas from vegetables". Significantly, he concluded, "a large proportion
of the patients recover".19 Collinson saw this as an irresponsible defence of the "delusion
called Homeopathy" and countered that "our art possesses something more than an old
crone's simples". If, he argued, "a man of great ability who wears our colours" could
challenge the medical profession, what was to be expected from "the querulous and
suspicious communities who depend on us for council?" Medicine, Collinson maintained,
"does by God's blessing, retard the hand of Death himself, ministering in a thousand ways as
a helper to Nature in the relief of pain, the checking of fatal issues of various kind, and to the
happiness and blessing of our species".20
Thus, rather than challenging the divine order, medicine was viewed as an extension
of God's work. Human capacity for learning and the acquisition of scientific knowledge did
not distance medical men from God; rather, it brought them closer to understanding the
world God created. This Deist view had taken hold during the Enlightenment when the very
orderliness of the world made the notion of Design, and therefore a Designer, reasonable.21
The nineteenth century saw a continuation of this view with superstition and "delusions"
seen as the product of credulous ignorance that thrived without the light of reason. For
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medical men such as Simpson, the religious justification and acceptance of pain on the basis
that it was a manifestation of the will of God was testimony to the continuing influence that
'unenlightened' beliefs continued to wield. The debate over anaesthesia was not a battle
between non-believers and believers, but a debate about who had the authority to interpret
and uphold competing notions of a divinely ordained 'natural' order. For many in the
medical profession, the physician, rather than the priest, was best placed to determine
whether physical pain served any purpose.
Conceptualising pain as a function of the body in distress, to be medically understood
and if necessary alleviated, led to the nineteenth-century formulation of physiological
theories attempting to explain the link between pain and the body. It is not my aim here to
explore these medical theories in any detail (Roselyn Rey's history of medical
understandings of pain provides a highly effective analysis), but their development, I
suggest, played an important role in consolidating the position of the medical paradigm used
to explain suffering.22 The growth of experimental physiology, given impetus by the work of
Charles Bell and Francois Magendie on sensory nerves, encouraged the study of sensation
and its role in relation to pain. In the 1840s Johannes Miiller elaborated on this connection
between sensation and pain with his theory that information from the nerves was carried to
the brain via energy specific to each sensation. The rise of physiological understandings of
pain led to a movement away from observational methods of research and a turn towards
anatomical knowledge and vivisection.23
Yet despite this growth in pain theories, remained sizeable gaps remained in
understanding the function and purpose of pain. As Lucy Bending comments, "classifying
pain as a neurological phenomenon did not imply an understanding of the nature of this
classification".24 By the end of the nineteenth century explaining pain was the subject of
intense controversy as physiologists lined up in opposition to psychologists and philosophers
who maintained that the nature of pain lay in an explanation of its affective rather than its
sensory qualities. As Noble's thesis suggests, and as I argue in later chapters, medical
understandings of pain may have shifted to physiological territory but when it came to
individual clinicians and the management of pain in dying patients, the influence of the mind
on the body was still considered of vital importance.
The decline of traditional religious explanations for suffering and the rise of
physiological explanatory models did not mean, however, that broader cultural explanations
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for pain were abandoned. Bending writes: "As one referent for pain lost its value as a
framing discourse, something had to be found to fill its place. Pain simply as pain - a
meaningless bodily suffering - was not to be endured and sufferers had to find news ways of
contextualizing their suffering."25 The medical profession's commitment to anaesthesia in
the face of external opposition was, in part, based on a wider belief that advancements in
pain relief were the mark of a society becoming ever more civilised. As one surgeon
remarked in 1879: "The higher nervous sensibilities of nineteenth century life render the
administration of anaesthetics more necessary than they would have done in what I may call
rougher times, or amongst peoples less civilised than ourselves." He illustrated his point with
an analogy: "Compare, for instance, the rough cart-horse with the high-bred race-horse. The
former seems to heed not the crash of a falling house; the latter is terrified by a clap of the
hands."26
In other words, as society became more advanced, so too was sensitivity to pain
judged to be refined. To relieve pain by using anaesthesia was the "duty and privilege" of the
medical profession and according to such a view the fundamental tenets of Christian belief
were not shaken by such an understanding of God's world. Man's capacity for rationality
and learning were, after all, part of divine intention. For a physician or surgeon to deny a
patient anaesthesia - "a great benefit to humanity" - would be to deny the God-given gift of
man's ability to learn and improve.27 The link between pain and 'civilised' sensitivity is
complex and explored at length by Bending and Martin Pernick.28 Sensitivity to pain was
judged according to an individual's race, gender and social class, which in turn influenced
the calculation of quantities of drugs required for anaesthesia.29
Related to this idea that sensitivity to pain was a mark of civilisation was the notion
that pain was the legacy of evolutionary processes. This marked a departure from previous
justifications for pain relief such as that of James Young Simpson in which religious
language had been used to counter religious opposition to anaesthesia. In the latter half of the
nineteenth century the pains of childbirth were cast in terms where they were viewed as a
remnant of the change in humans from quadrupeds to bipeds. As one contributor to the
Lancet wrote:
Man has not gained the upright posture and his cerebral development without paying
heavily for these distinctions. These two factors are responsible for most, if not all, of
the obstetric difficulties which woman experiences over and above the normal pains of
parturition (if such there be).30
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Thus, despite the decline of older religious explanations for suffering, the multiple meanings
and competing interpretations ascribed to pain persisted. What was evident was the medical
profession's commitment to suppressing pain by what were judged to be the most effective
means. This commitment related not only to new conceptual understandings of pain, but also
to the expansion of medical power that anaesthesia afforded.
Nineteenth-century pain relief transformed the encounter between the medical
professional and the patient. After the publication of Simpson's Answer to Religious
Objections the debate over anaesthesia had largely shifted from theological to medical
concerns, effectively silencing those who claimed that God would be denied the "deep and
earnest cries that arise in times of trouble". Yet anaesthesia implied another kind of silencing
- that of the patient. Alongside his religious objections to the use of chloroform, Dr Meigs
argued that the patient's response to the question: "Does it hurt you?" was worth "a thousand
dogmas and precepts". For Simpson, however, removing pain from the patient's
consciousness meant the patient was compliant and more readily accessible to inspection so
that "the quiet and unresisting" would not shrink from "the introduction of the hand into the
maternal passages".31
As Mary Poovey writes, "the traditional relationship between a doctor and a patient,
which privileged the patient's own experience of the body over any abstract theories the
doctor might possess" was now replaced with "a detailed consideration of how a doctor
could read his patient's silenced body".32 Not only would God be denied the 'earnest cries'
of a body in pain but, by employing anaesthesia, the doctor too would be unable to hear such
sound. What remained was a body that was laid out for interpretation giving the doctor's
prior knowledge and understanding of sublimated pain a new level of importance. From the
mid-nineteenth century onwards, anaesthesia was to become firmly established both in
surgical and non-surgical medicine, contributing to what Pernick describes as "the
medicalisation of suffering".33 As well as bringing the alleviation of pain, anaesthesia also
often implied loss of consciousness on the part of the patient. For the dying patient, this
meant the doctor was left to manage the final hours and days of the unconscious patient's
life. This transference of control, as I will argue in chapter three, had implications for the
euthanasia debate in the latter half of the century.
The medical profession's justification for pain relief in situations other than the
management of the death reveals how the profession defended the use of anaesthetic drugs
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when faced with external theological opposition. This defence functioned on a number of
levels. First, it challenged the view that pain was a 'natural' state to be borne with stoicism.
Instead, chemical intervention to suppress pain became accepted practice and established as
an extension of a perceived 'natural' order. Second, the uptake of pain relief was tied to the
perception that society was becoming more civilised and therefore more sensitive. The
medical profession was at the forefront of the response to this perceived heightened
sensitivity. Third, allied to the pain-relieving properties of the new drugs themselves, was the
increased power that their use brought to the profession. In obstetrics, surgery and in caring
for the dying patient, medical expertise was of central importance when managing pain. Pain
itself was understood in a variety of ways and yet the medical community maintained a
largely united front (with vocal exceptions such as Meigs) in its commitment to anaesthesia.
However, within the confines of the professional journals, salient divisions remained over
the practical use of pain relief. It is to these divisions that I now turn.
III. Risk in Victorian Medicine
What emerges from the mid-nineteenth century onwards is a story of calculated risk-
taking in the Victorian medical community. Though journal literature from the latter half of
the century indicates that anaesthesia was widespread, this did not preclude doubts being
expressed about the safety of the drugs in question, particularly in relation to chloroform. If
religious opposition to anaesthesia had been dismissed in principle, there remained division
over the practical application of drugs and concern relating to unanticipated dangers -
dangers that included precipitating premature death. Drugs that had initially been hailed as a
breakthrough in pain relief were now being viewed with far greater caution. Anaesthesia was
in fact a double-edged sword: bringing much needed alleviation of pain but also threatening
unwanted side effects and even death.
Though clearly a significant moment in the history of pain relief, Bonica's description
of the successful administration of chloroform to Queen Victoria in terms of "a moral,
medical and even religious sanction" overstates the case. Only a fortnight before the
announcement of Princess Beatrice's birth, the Lancet published the clinical research on
chloroform of M. Chassaignac, surgeon at the Lariboisiere hospital and professor of the
Faculte de Medecine de Paris. The surgeon was plainly in the practice of using chloroform
during childbirth, yet he raised concerns about its possible negative impact on both the
mother and the child.
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Chassaignac described the case of one of his patients, a woman in her fifth month of
pregnancy judged to require three operations in a short period of time, "accompanied by the
use of chloroform, and followed not withstanding by severe pain". He questioned whether
the hysteria and uterine pains which followed the second operation "depended on the
chloroform or the operation itself'. He concluded: "as to the hysteria which followed nearly
immediately after the employment of the chloroform, it appears to us rational to attribute
them to this agent". The uterine pains, he argued, "did not come on until after the third day
after the operation" and that "we ought to attribute them much rather to the results of the
operation, and to the vulvar pains than to the action of the chloroform". Despite the success
of the operations, Chassaignac stated, "we would be far from concluding that this agent can
always be employed with impunity... on the contrary, we ought not lightly and without
serious motives to have recourse to anaesthesia during pregnancy". 34 Also discussed by
Chassaignac was the potential harm to a child breast-feeding from a mother administered
chloroform whilst being treated for abscesses of the breast. The surgeon wrote, "in two
cases, the infants suckled by women who had inhaled chloroform, were seized with a
drowsiness which lasted for several hours". It is the duty of the doctor, argued Chassaignac,
"not to forget in certain cases the child suffers from the anaesthetic influence".35
Chaissaignac's report was not an isolated caution, nor were concerns restricted to the
administration of anaesthesia in childbirth. For example, an 1871 editorial in the British
Medical Journal called for greater discussion within the medical community about the use of
anaesthetics and invited surgeons and other practitioners to share their experiences. The
editorial described how the Senior Surgeon of the Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, a Dr
Gillespie, had contacted the BMJ, "expressing a doubt which probably others share, whether
it is desirable to give statistical information regarding deaths from anaesthetics in a medical
journal". An earlier BMJ article documenting deaths of patients while taking chloroform had
been reproduced at length in some of the leading Edinburgh newspapers; "this it has been
suggested, is likely to cause an unwholesome dread of both hospitals and chloroform". 36
Gillespie's view was rejected by the BMJ in the most strident terms: "A professional
bias, perhaps, induces us to entertain the conviction that utter frankness and complete
publicity are, in all such matters as this, the most healthy and the wisest course". The
editorial argued: "a dread of chloroform, for example, based upon actual knowledge of the
proportion of deaths which arise from its inhalation, is less likely to be unwholesome than
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blind trust, often rudely dispelled, or an exaggerated fear, in which mystery magnifies the
actual danger". Greater familiarity with chloroform had, according to the BMJ, "made us all
the more enamoured of its manifold blessings - its rapidity of action, convenience of
administration, and perfect anaesthetic powers". However, the editorial cautioned, "although
daily recognising it more and more as a priceless boon to humanity, we have also learned to
fear it as more deadly than at first wished to believe it to be".37
Bound up with Gillespie's suggestion that any open discussion in relation to
anaesthesia would lead to "an unwholesome dread of both hospitals and chloroform" is a
wider set of nineteenth-century medical relations and practices. Pernick draws attention to
the importance of anaesthesia in allowing what he terms "the rountinised functioning of large
hospitals". According to Pernick, the new pain-relieving techniques eliminated "the wild,
disorderly pre-anaesthetic scenes of screaming and brutality" and permitted "the eventual
emergence of a controlled, efficient, rationalised operating room, in which the quiet is
broken only by the rhythmic whoosh of the anaesthetist's air bag".38 Yet there was also
public fear of institutionalised medicine and rising anxiety about death attributed to
anaesthesia. Though chloroform and ether (ether was first used in 1846) offered an escape
from suffering, there remained, as the BMJ editorial of 1871 indicates, a simmering
suspicion of hospitals and the medical professionals who administered pain relief.
While concern for the lives of patients was, of course, important, the BMJ was clear
that its call for open discussion of the dangers of chloroform was made in the interests of the
medical profession with the aim of securing public confidence. The journal stressed that its
interest was not in pointing an accusatory finger. Indeed, an editorial of 13 May 1871 opened
with the remark that Gillespie had given "a full and satisfactory account of the recent cases
of death at the Royal Infirmary".39 In addition, the previous week's editorial stated: "the
occurrence of deaths in persons taking chloroform or any other form of anaesthetic ... should
by no means be considered as involving a priori, any kind of blame".40 Nevertheless, despite
this outward show of solidarity from the BMJ for all members of the profession, throughout
the mid to late-nineteenth century and continuing through the turn of the century, the journal
provided a recognised forum for debate and dissent with regard to the administration of
anaesthesia.
Weaving its way though the journal discussion of the potential dangers of anaesthesia
was a debate concerning the safest method of delivering the drugs. What is interesting is the
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way that the debate was distanced from the patient and focused instead on that which could
be quantified, such as levels of dosage, and technical aspects of administration such as the
various designs of chloroform-inhalation apparatus. One of the most common forms of
administering chloroform was to give the patient a proportion of the drug, inhaled to a
maximum of five per cent, diffused through inhaled air. It was on this principle that John
Clover's apparatus for the inhalation of chloroform was designed, and employed, according
to the BMJ, "by leading surgeons ... in their private operations, where their individual sense
of responsibility is greatest".41 This apparatus was considered superior to the simple
chloroform compress. However, at a meeting of the Medico-Chirurgical Society in May
1871, Thomas Skinner M.D. rejected the graduation of dose method as a "wholly useless
formula". Clover's method was judged to be "altogether wrong" by Skinner while the
supporters of "the Snow school" (John Snow advocated that chloroform be administered in a
similar manner) were deemed "misguided".42 The alternative method - advocated by Skinner
and supported by James Young Simpson - was that chloroform be administered in as close
to pure form as possible from the outset.
Skinner was to prove a regular contributor to the letters pages of the BMJ, vigorously
defending the use of chloroform but rejecting the idea that, for reasons of safety, it should be
diluted. He argued that in America and France medical men had frightened their patients
"into fits about imaginary doubts about the dangers of chloroform". According to Skinner,
they then complained "of the refractoriness, and the fearfulness, and the prejudices" of those
in their care. Skinner laid the burden of responsibility of deaths under chloroform on those
who were not sufficiently skilled in administering the drug. "No man has a right to condemn
chloroform simply because he does not know how to apply it, or has not seen it used in
skilful hands," he wrote.43
Although the correspondence in the medical journals of the nineteenth century reveals
a range of opinions and experiences, simply speaking, the medical community can be seen as
divided into three broad schools of thought regarding the administration of anaesthetics.
First, there were those such as Thomas Jones M.D., who favoured alternatives to chloroform.
"I am quite sure that, if fairly tried, ether will soon replace chloroform in this country as the
anaesthetic in general use," Jones wrote, adding: "nothing would induce me to take
chloroform".44 Ether and nitrous oxide were generally considered safer anaesthetic agents
than chloroform, a view illustrated by the BMJ editorial of 6 May 1871 that concluded: "the
sooner our almost exclusive preference for chloroform is reconsidered the better".45
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However, switching to alternatives implied additional difficulties. Chloroform was often
chosen because it was deemed more convenient, could be handled more easily and could be
readily administered in a variety of medical contexts. According to the BMJ editorial of 13
May 1871, there remained "the quest to find a yet unattained agent, as safe as nitrous oxide,
and as portable, convenient, and continuous in its effects as chloroform".46
Second, there were those such as Clover and Snow who stressed the importance of
limiting the concentration of chloroform and believed that by skilful measurement and
calculation, risks could be minimised and benefits maximised.47 Finally, there were those
who sided with Skinner and Simpson in advocating that chloroform be administered at
almost full strength for successful anaesthesia, placing great importance on the individual
expertise of the anaesthetist. It is also apparent from the medical journal literature that
despite grave concerns about the possibility of bringing about premature death, worries about
public confidence and differences over technical practice, administration of chloroform and
other anaesthetic agents continued. When the advantages of relieving pain and rendering the
patient insensible were weighed against potential risks, the ability to suppress pain was
judged more important than risking life. As the BMJ editorial of 6 May 1871 tellingly stated,
"The fear of present pain is so much greater than that of remote danger."
Anaesthetic agents clearly introduced a new element of risk into Victorian medicine.
Roselyn Rey gives the number of deaths attributed to anaesthesia in England and Wales
between 1846 and 1946 as exceeding 25,000, with approximately one quarter of these deaths
grouped around 1880. "Pain had to be totally unacceptable if an individual would choose to
put his life at risk," she argues.48 From the perspective of medical professionals, the
opportunity to relieve pain in a manner previously unknown was also too great a prize to
relinquish.
This brings into focus two arguably incompatible ethical models that also come to the
fore in debates over euthanasia: one which values the preservation of life above all else and
one which considers the absence of pain of greater importance. Although not discussed in
such an overt manner, the arguments relating to anaesthesia could be interpreted as a
utilitarian debate, in that the benefits of pain relief to the many were considered more
valuable than the risks to the few. Alternatively, the debate could be interpreted as a dilemma
that focuses on the encounter between the individual patient in anguish and the medical
professional in charge of his or her care. Should the patient's suffering be alleviated with a
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potentially dangerous drug? At what point (if any) would the doctor or surgeon's
intervention to relieve pain compromise a commitment to preserving life?
It would be an oversimplification to suggest that the new pain-relieving drugs marked
the advent of 'risk' in medicine. In the case of surgery, the risk of death brought on by shock
in an operation carried out in the absence of anaesthesia was great. Indeed, as Pernick writes:
"Anaesthetics, many nineteenth-century physicians claimed, could lessen or avert the
physical damage done by pain - damage that allegedly included shock, infection, chronic
disease, and death."49 Quite apart from the relief of suffering, these perceived physical
effects of unrelieved pain also contributed to the assessment of the benefits of anaesthesia.
However, this was a time when the concept of pain was undergoing a thorough re¬
appraisal, both in terms of how it was understood and how it might be medically managed.
Anaesthesia meant that suffering could be alleviated in powerful new ways but this brought
sharply into focus the tension between the elimination of pain and the potential risk of death
as a direct result of medical intervention.
When it comes to discussion of the use of chloroform in the case of the dying patient,
the medical journals appear remarkably silent. There is evidence to suggest, however, that it
was indeed the practice of physicians to administer chloroform as a means of relieving pain
in the final stages of life. In his thesis Hugh Noble referred to a dying patient being kept in a
state of "imperfect anaesthesia" and as a result being "saved much misery by its use". In
addition, as the following chapter will discuss, when the first calls for 'active' euthanasia
emerged in the 1870s there was a presumption that physicians were already administering
chloroform to the dying. The demand was that the patient should be able to direct the levels
of dosage given, "so as to destroy consciousness at once, and put the sufferer to a quick and
painless death".50 If those outside the medical profession were aware of chloroform's ability
to cause death, then physicians seemed wary of discussing the dangers of using the new
pain-relieving drug in the case of the dying patient.
It is particularly interesting that the BMJ of 7 July 1866 could publish an article by
Joseph Bullar, M.D., in which he advocated using chloroform to alleviate pain in the dying,
but judiciously noted that it was not his intention to shorten the life of his patients. Such
interventions, he maintained, prolonged life rather than hastened death.'51 Yet in the same
edition, the journal reported premature deaths as a result of the administration of anaesthesia
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in surgical situations. It seems that outwardly, doctors maintained that their role elevated the
preservation of life above all else, whilst privately, they acknowledged that the relief of pain
and increased levels of power over the bodies of their patients incurred a level of risk.
Moreover, in the nineteenth century critical decisions were being made about when it
was justifiable to relieve pain even when knowingly risking death and when to condemn the
use of pain-relieving drugs for ends that were judged improper. "It is said that one death in
ten thousand cases is sufficient enough grounds to condemn chloroform on moral grounds,"
argued a manual on anaesthetics in 1859.52 Such a rejection of any utilitarian approach to
anaesthesia positioned itself at the extreme end of what was a broad spectrum of medical
opinion in relation to pain relief. However, although unwilling to use such forceful language,
many medical men remained unsure of just how much benefit was required to justify the risk
of fatality.
Again, Rey's work on the history of pain sheds light on the conceptual shifts involved
in understanding pain. She argues that although pain was attacked in myriad ways during the
eighteenth century, it was also considered to be evidence of continuing life and vitality. By
the nineteenth century, however, she considers that pain had become an issue "to be weighed
up in the same light as life and death".53 As I have discussed, the introduction of anaesthesia
in the mid-nineteenth century was part of a profound reassessment of the way in which pain
was perceived. If theology had provided explanations for the role of suffering in human
existence, so too had earlier physiological thinking in which pain was conceived as an
essential part of the biological processes of life. The concept of pain as proof of vitality
stemmed from a long-observed association between insensibility and death. According to
eighteenth-century thought, pain was directly linked to healing and recovery.54
By the middle of the nineteenth century and with the advent of anaesthesia, attitudes
to pain were being reformulated. The medical profession had the means of relieving pain and
the concept of purposeful suffering was being challenged. However, the eighteenth-century
notion of insensibility meaning loss of vitality had a strong residual hold on nineteenth-
century medical thought - a point on which I will elaborate in the following section of this
chapter. "It is not the particular agent, it is the condition of insensibility, however produced,
that puts the patient into such peril," stated a BMJ editorial in 1858. By the mid-nineteenth
century, though pain itself was not viewed as necessarily purposeful, loss of sensibility was
still often associated with the risk of death. Thus, the nineteenth-century physician had to
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decide between what he perceived as the advantages and risks of using anaesthetics in a
context in which older medical perceptions of suffering overlapped with new understandings
of pain.
Pernick details the rise of the mid-century doctrine of conservative medicine that
sought to legitimate the use of anaesthetics with recourse to a formalised cost-benefit
analysis of the drawbacks and benefits of pain relief; what he calls "a calculus of
suffering".55 This medical conservatism claimed to occupy a moderate, middle ground
between heroic dosing and non-intervention and also sought to account for what were
viewed as individual differences in reaction to drugs and sensitivity to pain. The amount of
anaesthetic required was judged on the basis of a set of particularised rules depending on the
social position of the patient in question (for example their gender or race) and the nature of
their illness and pain. The aim was to strike a preconceived 'proper balance' between art and
nature, non-intervention and suffering, or pain relief and risk of fatality.56 Yet despite the
existence of the 'calculus', Pernick notes, "the practitioner still had to decide whether that
advantage [pain relief through administration of anaesthetics] was worth the costs. Which
was the lesser evil - the harm likely to be caused by pain or the harm that might be caused
by the painkiller?"57
When the journal literature of the British medical community is combined with
Pernick's portrayal of the "calculus of suffering", what emerges is a lively and at times
vigorously contested debate over anaesthesia. The picture is complex, with changing
theological and physiological perceptions of the role of pain adding to questions of best
practice, professionalism and safety. What is clear, however, is that despite dissent and
reservations, anaesthesia was in widespread use from the mid-nineteenth century onwards
and that as a method of pain relief, it firmly established itself in a remarkably limited space
of time. Crucial decisions were being taken to risk life for the sake of relieving suffering.
Practice was far from standardised and individual doctors held contrasting positions, yet in
broad terms, "the fear of pain" was indeed judged to be "so much greater than that of remote
danger". While the introduction of anaesthesia had manifold implications for both the
medical profession and patients, above all else it signalled the growing legitimacy of
renouncing pain - even if this implied possible death.
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IV. 'A balancing of evils nearly equal': The debate overmorphine
The balancing act between the suppression of pain and the risk of perceived dangers
brought into sharp relief by the debate over chloroform also resonated strongly in nineteenth-
century discussion of the use of morphine. Frederick Setiirner's isolation of morphine (an
alkaloid of opium) in 1816 and the development of the hypodermic syringe by Charles
Gabriel Pravaz and Alexander Wood in the early 1850s meant that potent analgesics and
anaesthetics could be administered in accurate doses and by a means where their action was
rapid. Conceptually, with the use of drugs that penetrated beneath the skin, the way was
opened for physicians to command unprecedented levels of control over the bodies of their
patients. Initially at least, the twin 'discoveries' of morphine and the syringe were met with
alacrity. Roy Porter, for example, cites an ill Florence Nightingale as declaring: "Nothing did
me any good but a curious little new fangled operation of putting opium under the skin
which relieved one for twenty four hours."58
Simplicity of use, efficiency and greater safety all led a new medical journal of the
time, The Practitioner, to announce in 1868 that "a country doctor should never start his
rounds without a syringe and a bottle of morphia solution".59 Yet in 1870 the journal
published an article by Dr Clifford Allbutt (physician to the Leeds Infirmary and later Regius
Professor of Physic at Cambridge University) that offered a more cautious view.60 "I have
certainly felt it a great responsibility to say that pain, which I know to be an evil, is less
injurious than morphia, which may be an evil," argued Allbutt. 61 Again it seemed that the
relief of pain would come with a price. Although The Practitioner debate over the use of
morphine was more restrained, it carried all the hallmarks of the parallel debate over
chloroform. As with chloroform there existed the same worry over patient fatality but similar
concerns were also voiced over the safest means of delivering morphine. These concerns
combined with wider anxieties regarding the physiological impact of sustained use that
brought withdrawal symptoms and possible dependency.
The preface to the first monthly edition of The Practitioner, launched in July 1868,
offers a valuable insight into the general values and concerns of nineteenth-century
physicians. Read retrospectively, it also raises concerns that would soon figure in the debate
surrounding morphine. With the journal's publication came an explicit commitment to open
discussion of therapeutics and the practical application of drugs in the treatment of disease.
In the preface to the first edition, the then editor, Dr Francis Anstie, wrote that while
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understanding of disease had made considerable progress, "therapeutics, or the science of
healing, has remained very nearly where it was when Rousseau exclaimed, 'Laissez moi
mourir, mais ne me tuez pas.'" Anstie went on to acknowledge that physicians possessed a
number of valuable remedies "such as cod-liver oil, chloroform, iodide of potassium", but
qualified this by stating: "it is none the less certain that an exact knowledge of the mode of
handling these remedies does not exist".62
Wary that he might be accused of exaggeration, Anstie cited the "highest authority" of
the Professor of Medicine at Kings College, London, Sir Thomas Watson, who had argued
that there were sizeable gaps in therapeutic knowledge.63 "We know tolerably well what it is
we have to deal with, but we do not know so well, nor anything like so well, how to deal
with it," argued Watson. Only by controlling or directing "the natural forces of the body"
could the physician reasonably hope to govern disease, he maintained, adding, "to me it has
been a lifelong wonder how vaguely, how ignorantly, and how rashly drugs are often
prescribed".64 Echoing this view, Anstie concluded that the medical profession was in great
need of a journal devoted expressly to "the intercommunication of ideas respecting the action
of remedies".65
This rallying call for open and transparent debate surrounding the operation of the new
therapeutic drugs pre-empted the later BMJ editorials on anaesthesia that followed in the
early 1870s. Though general in nature, these opening remarks from The Practitioner could
equally have been applied to morphine. While recognising the contribution of the drug to the
medical repertoire of pain relief, there remained uncertainty surrounding how exactly the
drug affected the body and mind. There were also suspicions, as Watson's remarks suggest,
that the drug was being used "vaguely and ignorantly". With Anstie's preface as a backdrop,
articles on the hypodermic injection of remedies (with particular reference to morphine)
would dominate the first year of the new journal's publication. Indeed, from July 1868 to
October 1874, a succession of leader articles appeared on the subject of subcutaneous
injection.
The advantages and disadvantages of injections of morphine as viewed by the
nineteenth-century physician are distilled in two Practitioner articles written by Anstie, the
first following on from his preface to the first edition in 1868 and the second in March 1871.
While the first of these articles was buoyant in tone, the second was more cautious and
reserved. In 1868, prompted by a Report of the Committee of the Medico-Chirurgical
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Society, Anstie concluded that his experience of the subcutaneous injection of remedies had
convinced him of the "satisfactory working of the method".66 He elaborated: "I infrequently
meet practitioners who will not admit that there can be any particular advantage in this
method which the old way of giving medicines does not offer, and who are, moreover,
possessed with a great dread of the dangers which they think that it must involve."67
In a tone similar to that adopted by Skinner in the debate over chloroform, in which
expertise in handling was given great emphasis, in the case of hypodermic method, if
properly executed, Anstie stated: "as to the question of danger, let me say positively that
there is absolutely none". He then listed a large number of drugs which he had personally
administered by syringe successfully, one of which was morphine.68 "The advantages of the
hypodermic injection of morphia over its administration by the mouth are immense,"
declared Anstie. When given by syringe morphine was more powerful, he argued, and "the
majority of the unpleasant symptoms which opiates can produce are entirely absent". Taken
by mouth, morphine "disorders the function of the stomach," Anstie concluded, but this
unpleasant symptom was lost when morphine was injected. He commented: "In acute
diseases, we ought never to use opiates by the mouth when subcutaneous injection of
morphia is possible." The hypodermic use of morphine, argued Anstie, could transform the
life of a patient "from being a horrible and intolerable burden" to being "not cheerful indeed,
but comparatively peaceful and calm".69
By March 1871, in a leader article titled 'On the Effects of the Prolonged Use of
Morphia by Subcutaneous Injection', Anstie had revised his position somewhat. He
concluded: "that the morphia syringe has been greatly abused cannot be doubted; indeed, I
possess ample evidence that it has been employed with a carelessness that is almost
impossible when one remembers the powerful nature of the drug."70 After warning of the
dangers of patients administering opium and morphine to themselves, Anstie noted, "even
within the limits of its employment under direct medical orders, the prolonged use of mophia
injections has produced, I fear, considerable mischief'.
Large amounts of morphine given by syringe were not simply the result of patients
independently indulging in what Anstie termed "the special delights and special dangers" of
the drug. Physicians too were in the business of administering large quantities of morphine,
unaware of or perhaps unwilling to face the consequences of prolonged use at such a level of
dosage. Anstie drew attention to the gradual but pervasive effects of hypodermic morphine
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use that, over time, left the patient addicted to the drug. "So far it must be considered amuch
smaller evil than the constitutional habit induced by the old-fashioned forms of opium
excess," he argued, but warned: "it is as fatally effective as the latter in weaving a chain of
habit." According to Anstie, the patient would either be permanently trapped by such a habit,
or would only be weaned from the drug "by efforts involving much distress".71
Opium was widely used, beginning in the late eighteenth century and reaching a peak
in the first half of the nineteenth century (though its use continued throughout the 1800s). It
relieved pain in a variety of contexts - from minor complaints such as headaches (aspirin
only became available in 1899) and stomach cramps to the severe pain of incurable disease.
Initially, the drug was freely available and was commonly self-administered. The "old
fashioned forms of opium excess" to which Anstie refers relates to the change in attitudes in
the second half of the nineteenth century, resulting from fears of what were perceived as the
destructive and addictive qualities of the drug. As historians Virginia Berridge and Griffith
Edwards have documented, restrictions on the availability of opium were introduced in 1868
and 1908 in an attempt to prevent easy access and unregulated use of the drug.72 The growth
of controls on opium use and greater precision in delivery of morphine by syringe meant that
once again, pain relief became an increasingly medically managed event - though it should
be stated that Drs Anstie and Allbutt both refer to the dangers of patients injecting
themselves.
Yet as Anstie's leader article of 1871 reveals, concerns remained about the potential
risks of morphine use, even when administered by medical men. According to Anstie, a
failure to regulate the use of morphine could lead to pain relief that the physician initially
instigated giving way to a permanent state of addiction. He cautioned: "Narcosis, it can
never be too frequently repeated, is a depression of nervous life." Initially, he argued, this
depression was slight and temporary, "but if the morbid process be repeated too frequently
and too strongly, then there is no recovery, or only a partial one".73 Anstie concluded that the
prolonged effect of morphine use was a disruption of the nervous system so that eventually
the patient could not function "without the constant presence in the blood that feeds of it, of
a calming and regulating agent like morphia". The effect of morphine, he argued, disturbed
both the body and mind, dragging the patient downwards to a life that was impossible
without the presence of increasing doses of the pain-relieving drug on a daily basis.
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Through sustained use of morphine, Anstie maintained, the patient became
hypersensitive to pain, with trivial sources of irritation causing more suffering with each day
that passed. "The pain returns with an agony incomparably more severe than that which
would attend the disease when uncomplicated by the results of the prolonged use of
morphia," he concluded.74 Thus, with the hypodermic use of morphine, a new "calculus of
suffering" was established. Presented with an efficient and rapid means of relieving
immediate pain, the physician had to consider whether he was establishing a pattern of drug
dependence that would disrupt what Anstie termed "the vital forces" of the patient.
This reference to "vital forces" relates to late eighteenth-century and earlier
nineteenth- century medical theories in which sensibility was perceived as an important
feature of health and recovery. Sensibility (or irritability) was viewed as a measure of
animation in muscles and nervous tissue - indeed, as an indication of life itself.77 In Anstie's
writing the influence of this theory lingers in his concern that morphine somehow depressed
life by encouraging insensibility. Pain relief was welcomed, but anxiety remained about the
long-term use of a drug that was seen to dull the senses and perhaps even hinder recovery.
Moreover, the initial benefits of intervention with morphine had to be weighed against the
type of life that the patient might lead after such medical intervention.
Anstie's endorsement of the hypodermic method of morphine use and subsequent
statements of reservation regarding its use established a pattern that was evident in the
writing of other clinicians discussing this new form of pain relief. Clifford Allbutt echoed
Anstie's views in two articles - 'On the Hypodermic use of Morphia in Diseases of the Heart
and Great Vessels' published in The Practitioner in 1869 and 'On the Abuse of Hypodermic
Injections of Morphia' published in the same journal in 1870. In the first of these, Allbutt
could only praise the benefits of morphine given by syringe, arguing that it was "likely to
bring great comfort to many sufferers". He added: "anyone of my readers who has watched
at the bedsides of those who have died of heart disease or thoracic aneurisms will never lose
sight of the painful memory of their sufferings, or forget that of all the modes of death, these
are perhaps the most terrible."76 Allbutt noted that in the latter stages of such diseases, the
dying patient often maintained "a clear head and good stomach". Despite this, the patient
could "only cling convulsively to a life he would willingly lose, and with gasping breath, a
striving heart, and swollen limbs, hardly finds a moment of rest from torment". In treating
the patient in the latter stages of heart disease, Allbutt remarked: "I believe in the morphia
syringe we have found an invaluable ally." So confident was Allbutt of the benefits of
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hypodermic morphine that he found himself "justified in using it fearlessly in any form and
in any stage of heart and aortic disease". He argued: "No matter how swollen the limbs, no
matter how agitated the pulse, ... I now never hesitate to inject morphia, and scarcely ever
fail, even up to the time of the dying agonies, to give relief decided enough to earn the warm
gratitude of the patient." It was at times such as this, that Allbutt felt "the blessings of being
a physician".77
Revealingly, many of the instances in which Allbutt praised the pain-relieving
qualities of morphine by syringe involved repeated references to the final stages of disease,
when the death of the patient seemed imminent. Allbutt's reference to the pacifying
influence of morphine "even up to the dying agonies" further indicates that morphine was
used when hope of cure was lost. The priority in such circumstances was the relief of pain
and, importantly, Allbutt made no suggestion that morphine use would in any way shorten
the life of the patient. He only stressed the "unspeakable solace of the patient" once given the
drug, adding: "the patient who has been tossing and turning in misery, feels the first tranquil
sleep that he has enjoyed for weeks." As Allbutt indicated, the hypodermic administration of
morphine was used to facilitate a peaceful, medically managed death. In such circumstances,
in which the patient was judged beyond cure, the relief of pain was the physician's priority
and morphine was used freely without suggestion that the onset of death was accelerated in
any way.
By December 1870, Allbutt, like Anstie, had modified his confident assurance that
morphine could by administered by syringe "fearlessly". Now, Allbutt judged that it was the
duty of those who used morphine to consider the dangers as well as the virtues of morphine.
Keen to portray himself as a medical conservative who did not hastily administer the drug,
he commented: "although I may seem to have used morphia extensively, I cannot compare
myself with those practitioners of whom the syringe and phial are as constant companions as
was the lancet to their fathers." While physicians now knew much of the benefits of
morphine when administered under the skin, "little or nothing has been said of any harm
which may result from it, or the evils which may come of its careless use", argued Allbutt in
this later article.78
Allbutt maintained that his fears relating to morphine had been simmering for some
three years, during which time he had written his initial article in praise of the drug. In 1869,
however, he felt that his "fears were indefinite, I felt the time had not yet come for me to
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speak". Now he believed that his experience was greater and "the uncomfortable fear of
mischief was growing not diminishing". He could call to mind nine patients who had been or
continued to be under his care, on whom the hypodermic use of morphine had been
constantly practised for periods varying from nine months to three years. Allbutt termed this
"the formulation of a new class of patient" whose suffering was only alleviated by daily
injections of morphine. When the effects of the injections were no longer felt, "pains which
do not appear to be intractable" returned with "a wearisome obstinacy".79
Allbutt was willing to acknowledge that he administered morphine wherever intense
pain presented itself, so that "a substantive sensation of well-being, of conscious activity,
and of cheerfulness" was restored. He was also willing to concede that he had himself been
faced with the dilemma of balancing the need to relieve pain with the potential risks that
such intervention potentially brought. He wrote: "here lies to me, the anxious responsibility
of the medical adviser. Is he to withhold the relief of pain, which restores appetite, which
encourages activity and promotes ease and cheerfulness? I honestly confess that, during a
long period, I could not see my way to forbidding the repetitions of morphia."80 In a further
remark that shows how pain relief was traded against risk, he argued: "injected mophia
seemed so different to swallowed mophia, that no-one had any experience of any ill effects
from it." Injections of morphia brought "peace and comfort" while pain was "certainly the
forerunner of wretchedness and exhaustion". Only in time, argued Allbutt, did the important
question arise: "Does morphia tend to encourage the very pains it pretends to relieve; or if
not, does it at any rate induce in those who use it constantly, an artificial state which makes
its further use a necessity?" 81
With Allbutt's question left unanswered, the dilemma over the subcutaneous use of
morphine continued, feeding into a wider nineteenth-century ethical debate that saw the
relief of pain juxtaposed with potential risks to the physical and mental wellbeing of the
suffering patient. Morphine undoubtedly brought much-wanted calm to the patient but it also
brought worries that chronic pain would become a daily burden that was only fed by the very
drug that was administered to bring relief. Once again, the fear of immediate pain had to be
balanced against potential dangers and again, the physician was left to decide whether to
intervene to alleviate pain or whether the use of morphine carried unjustifiable risks. For one
nineteenth-century physician, George Oliver, the question was whether in relieving pain,
morphine stood in the way of giving "nature the most favourable opportunity of restoring
some of the damage done and of effecting her own cure". In Oliver's view, the choice
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between unrelieved pain and the risks associated with morphine was a "balancing of evils
nearly equal".82
That morphine use might have impeded healing and recovery is particularly
interesting when contrasted with Allbutt's admission that morphine was used to secure
tranquillity and calm in the dying patient - a notion that fitted with the ideal of the 'natural'
death. Allbutt did not explicitly use the term 'natural' death, this is my inference, but again,
it is notable that there was no discussion of risk when using morphine to pacify the dying
patient. This may well have been because the arguments relating to the dangers of creating a
morphine 'habit' simply did not apply in the case of the dying patient, in which the use of the
drug may not have been over a prolonged period, as for the chronically ill patient. However,
the arguments concerning potential dependency and the potential need for increased levels of
doses of morphine have proved highly relevant in twentieth-century euthanasia debates. As I
will discuss in the second section of this thesis, the twentieth-century doctrine of "double-
effect" (based on the argument that pain relief required increasing doses of morphine that
ultimately led to death) is, I argue, pre-empted by the nineteenth-century discussion of risk in
morphine use. Tellingly, these risks were seldom discussed in the context of the dying
patient in the nineteenth century.
In this chapter I have widened the focus to look at pain relief in a variety of situations
and have not restricted my view simply to discussion of the alleviation of suffering in the
dying patient. At first glance, some of the nineteenth-century arguments over pain relief do
not immediately appear connected to the management of death, or, for that matter, to
euthanasia. Other histories of euthanasia have acknowledged the role played by new
developments in pain relief in the conceptual origins of the debate, but have argued that the
medical profession played a minimal role in discussing the ethics of hastening death or
prolonging life. Nicholas Kemp states that the nineteenth-century medical debate "was
essentially a philosophical enterprise in which the medical profession played no part".83
Jalland, meanwhile, argues: "Victorian doctors were not faced with the same degree of
difficulty in addressing this ethical question [prolonging life], for they lacked the
technological means."84
Up to a point, these are legitimate arguments. In the nineteenth century the medical
profession was not involved in a heated debate over the rights and wrongs of hastening death
or prolonging life and certainly, none of the technology associated with contemporary
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medical-ethical debates was available. However, there was an important debate over the
ethics of pain relief versus potential risks to life being conducted within the medical
profession in the second half of the century. There is already a great deal of scholarship in
this area, but so far, the idea that this debate might be linked to nineteenth-century medical
attitudes to the management of death has been little explored.
It was a debate that centred on professional values and the negotiation of both
principles and practices. In public, the profession maintained that new pain-relieving
techniques could be absorbed into a notion of a calm, peaceful and 'natural' death. Indeed,
the argument was that life was often prolonged by such intervention. The principle of the
sanctity of life remained undisrupted. Internally, however, the profession was less united -
almost universally committed to pain relief, but uncertain about how best to administer the
new drugs and anxious of the risks such practice entailed. This discussion of risk was rarely
mentioned when elite Victorian doctors wrote about death, but this silence does not
necessarily imply that the ethical issues at stake were straightforward.
Moreover, many aspects of the arguments over pain relief and risk that later fed into
nineteenth and twentieth century euthanasia debates were being discussed by Victorian
medical men - albeit not explicitly in relation to the dying patient. As I examine in the
following chapter, the influence of debates about the meaning of pain, the justification of
pain relief, the medical management of suffering and the preservation of life versus potential
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Chapter 3
Explicit Calls for 'Active' Euthanasia
I. 'Euthanasia': A Shift in Meaning
While discussions over the benefits and costs of pain relief continued between medical
men, outside the profession another debate was taking shape. The widespread use of new
pain- relieving techniques such as the inhalation of chloroform and subcutaneous morphine
played an important part in opening the way for a wholly new type of discourse. What was
now being called for was 'active' euthanasia in which the physician would intervene with the
explicit intention of ending life at the request of the dying patient. I use the term 'active'
euthanasia so as to distinguish this use of the word 'euthanasia' from its older meaning
implying 'good death'.
In his survey of the nineteenth-century origins of debates over euthanasia, W. Bruce
Fye also uses the term 'active' euthanasia, defined in his paper as "an intervention that
shortens the life of a patient who is suffering from a painful, incurable disease".1 Fye argues
that during the first two hundred years of its use in both medical and non-medical literature,
the word 'euthanasia' "did not imply the shortening of life". He calls this earlier use of the
term, "spiritual" euthanasia, where the meaning of euthanasia was characterised by an
emphasis on the dying patient's state of mind. "The dying patient was supposed to be
tranquil and the means by which this was supposed to be achieved included physical comfort
and moral support," he argues, adding: "this was essentially a passive process that was
largely independent of the physician".2
This contrast between what Fye describes as "spiritual" and "active" euthanasia is
arguably misleading. As I have discussed, historical evidence supports the idea that from the
late eighteenth century onwards, rather than assuming a passive role, the physician was
becoming increasingly involved in the management of death. Though an emphasis was
indeed placed on the patient's mental preparedness, it was the doctor who, giving the
assurance that suffering would be alleviated by medical intervention, often supplied the
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"physical and moral support" to which Fye refers. Fye's description of "spiritual" euthanasia
more accurately portrays a period that predates the rise of the professional, medical-
management of death in which the physician played a significant role in alleviating pain at
the deathbed of the wealthier patient. Yet Fye seems to suggest that his particular definition
of "spiritual" euthanasia is applicable up until the late nineteenth century. While the word
'euthanasia' found a fixed point of reference in the notion of the 'good death', this did not
mean that the ideas that contributing to this ideal remained unchanged over two hundred
years or that medical influence and intervention at the deathbed was always limited.
As Fye correctly identifies, it is important to draw attention to the shift in the meaning
of the term 'euthanasia' that took place in the latter stages of the nineteenth century.
However, his definition of "active" euthanasia as an "intervention that shortens the life of a
patient" requires further explanation and clarification. Certainly, in the nineteenth century
and into the first half of the twentieth century, the suggestion that the physician might in any
way shorten the life of a patient was strongly resisted in official statements issued by the
medical profession. Gradually, however, it became accepted that medical intervention to
relieve suffering might have the effect of shortening life, but that this accepted practice of
relieving pain was not a way of legitimating claims that the dying patient should be able to
legally request his or her own death.
In the second section of my thesis I examine the medical profession's accommodation
of the idea that pain relief might potentially shorten life while simultaneously rejecting any
moves to legalise 'active' euthanasia allowing the incurable and suffering patient to request
death. At this point, I simply wish to highlight that Fye's definition of 'active' euthanasia
poses difficulties when applied in the second half of the twentieth century because "an
intervention that shortens the life of a patient" has become, under certain conditions,
accepted medical practice. However, "medical intervention with the explicit intention of
ending life at the request of the patient" (my definition of 'active' euthanasia) has
continually been resisted in Britain. Setting aside the later twentieth-century debate
regarding the accommodation of pain relief and potential shortening of life, it is, in any case,
a definition that more accurately describes the meaning that lay writers attached to the word
'euthanasia' when it took on a new meaning in the 1870s and 1880s.
Ethical arguments about suicide for the terminally ill and those suffering from extreme
pain were not new but the suggestion in 1870 that death might be deliberately induced by the
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doctor at the patient's request was novel. Those in support of 'active' euthanasia may have
drawn on philosophical ideas that pre-dated nineteenth-century innovations in pain relief, but
it was the use of these drugs that allowed the advancement of a particular notion of painless
death. The term 'euthanasia' was now used to describe a situation in which the patient's
consciousness was voluntarily extinguished (with a drug such as chloroform) to achieve a
rapid and pain-free death. Non-medical writers who held a very different idea of what the
medical management of death should imply were now giving euthanasia a radical new
meaning. For the first time, 'euthanasia' was being used in a manner that implied the doctor
deliberately ending the life of a patient.
In this chapter I focus primarily on the role that changes in pain-relieving practices
played in contributing to this new formulation of the meaning of euthanasia. However, in
setting the scene for this late nineteenth-century debate, it must be acknowledged that the
arguments involved were drawn from an assortment of influences and ranged outside the
bounds of developments in medical techniques. As I have argued, throughout the nineteenth
century the meanings and values ascribed to pain were undergoing dramatic upheavals. The
rejection of suffering as a necessary part of life influenced the growth of diverse social
movements such as those opposed to vivisection and slavery.3 Different fields of interest
shared common ground, where an ideological rejection of the inevitability of pain led to an
intersection of arguments uniting seemingly disparate causes. Thus, the opposition of anti-
vivisection campaigner Frances Power Cobbe to the notion of eternal punishment was linked
to her rejection of the deliberate infliction of pain on animals.4 Similarly, the socialist and
birth-control campaigner Annie Besant also dismissed the idea of eternal damnation and
simultaneously advocated 'active' euthanasia for those suffering terrible pain on earth.3 I
discuss her writing at length in this chapter.
Another influence on the late nineteenth-century euthanasia debate was the impact of
social Darwinism. In his paper on the historical origins of 'active' euthanasia, Fye illustrates
the power of social Darwinism by quoting Charles Singer's observation that Darwin's work
"was soon extended also to man's habits customs, religion, social organisation, even ways of
thinking".6 Making a similar conceptual connection between evolutionary and social thought,
Kemp points out that the calls for 'active' euthanasia came around the same time as the
publication of Darwin's Origin of Species (1859) and Descent ofMan (1871 ).7 As my earlier
discussion of pain relief suggested, in the latter half of the century evolutionary ideas were
influencing certain medical views. The pain of childbirth, for example, was perceived as a
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legacy of the transition in women from quadrupeds to bipeds. In the case of advocacy of
'active' euthanasia, Kemp argues that the contribution of Samuel D. Williams (a
schoolteacher from Birmingham who called for patient-requested death) was "replete with
evolutionary thought".8
By the 1880s, evolutionary ideas (whether endorsed or rejected) were firmly
established as a key influence on intellectual debates. It would be oversimplifying matters to
characterise the arguments in the 'active' euthanasia debate in terms of religious versus
evolutionary doctrine. Nevertheless, the notion that man had evolved from animals rather
than being created in the image of God had profound implications for the 'sanctity of life
position', which was often religiously upheld. In addition, conceptually, the impact of social
Darwinism widened the scope of the euthanasia debate so that as well as being concerned
with arguments relating to pain, it also took on a dimension where discussion turned to
evolutionary concepts of the 'fit' or 'unfit' and the 'weak' or 'strong'.
Although I do not explore the impact of social Darwinian thought or eugenic ideas on
nineteenth-century euthanasia arguments in great detail here (other historians and
sociologists have already tapped this rich source of influence) the part that they played in the
debate cannot be ignored.9 In 1868 the German social Darwinist, biologist, eugenicist and
'active' euthanasia supporter Ernst Haeckel praised the ancient Spartan practice of killing
deformed and weak children in his book Natiirliche Schopfungsgeschichte (The History of
Creation). Haeckel contrasted this Spartan custom with nineteenth-century medical practice,
characterised by what he termed "anti-selection", in which "modern civilised nations by
means of their perfect art of healing" encouraged "artificial medical breeding".10 Haeckel's
influence can be traced in the origins of Monism, a German anticlerical movement rooted in
Darwinian ideology, in which the 'survival of the fittest' maxim was distilled into a simple
goal: the triumph of the 'strongest' members of the human species and the elimination of the
'weakest'."
In 1904 Haeckel elaborated on his thoughts in relation to 'active' euthanasia. Nature
continually sacrificed individuals in the struggle for life, therefore it was cruel to permit
suffering in those who had to die anyway, he argued. "Many hundreds of thousands of
incurables, especially mentally ill patients, lepers and cancer patients, are kept artificially
alive in our modern civilised nations, and their unending ills are carefully prolonged, without
any consideration of themselves and society," Haeckel stated. "What a tremendous sum of
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pain and grief for the unhappy patients, what an immense amount of sadness and sorrow for
their relatives, what losses of property, private and public," he continued. Much of this loss
could be saved, he argued, if only a decision was made to "release" the incurable with a dose
of morphine.12
Late nineteenth-century writing, in which social Darwinian and eugenic thought
converged, was to pre-empt early twentieth century discussion of euthanasia in Germany. In
1913, for example, the Monist League's publication, Das Monistische Jahrhundert, founded
by Haeckel, considered whether the doctor should end the life of the incurable patient in
suffering. Examining the connection between eugenic ideas and 'active' euthanasia, Ian
Dowbiggin comments: "Not everyone in the Monist League agreed that there was a right to a
speedy, pain-free death, but there was little disagreement with the theory that all suffering
diminished the individual by restricting his or her contribution to the community."1'1
Clearly, Haeckel's ideas and those of his Monist League contributed to a further layer
of meaning in the interpretation of the term 'euthanasia'. That the physician would intervene
with the intention of ending life was evident; what was less clear was whether this would
always be at the expressed wish of the patient. Haeckel stated that he wanted to restrict such
a form of euthanasia to those who formally requested that their lives be ended, yet his
reference to what he perceived as the burden placed on society by the mentally ill raised the
question of how such patients could give their consent. Mention of mental illness also moved
the issue of 'active' euthanasia away from the focus on physical suffering and introduced the
notion of a comparative scale measuring the worth of human life, even in the absence of
pain. 'Suffering' was no longer restricted to the pain of the terminally ill, but was also
applied to those judged to be leading mentally 'inferior' but quite possibly pain-free lives.
This brings me to the sources to which I give detailed consideration in this chapter.
The late nineteenth-century euthanasia debate in Britain centred on the contributions of a
small group of non-medical writers who stressed that their proposals entailed that death
should come only at the expressed request of the incurable, terminally-ill patient suffering
unnecessary pain. The supporters of 'active' euthanasia defended their respective positions
(and they were drawn from a variety of backgrounds) by challenging the validity of the
'sanctity of life' principle and by arguing that their arguments were simply an extension of
new pain-relieving medical techniques that were already widely practised. Their proposals
did not consider the case of the patient who could not give consent, nor did they consider the
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case of the patient who was mentally ill. However, reference was made to the declining
"usefulness" of the terminally ill patient, not only to him - or herself, but also to society as a
whole. As I argue when I consider the third category of arguments that I trace throughout my
thesis - those that relate to 'social death' - the influence of ideas that stretched beyond the
simple desire to eradicate pain can be detected in the writing of those who advocated 'active'
euthanasia. The contributors to the euthanasia debate in Britain also, at times, employed the
language of social Darwinism. In doing so, they left themselves open to the charge that
'active' euthanasia would leave the weakest in society most vulnerable.
The word 'euthanasia' may have shifted to new ground in the 1870s, but ambiguity
surrounded just what this new use of this new term meant and to whom exactly the proposals
applied. As I have argued, this is not to suggest that prior to this semantic change, decisions
surrounding how best to medically manage death and relieve pain were uncomplicated and
subject to standardised decision-making. However, the new use of the term 'euthanasia'
presented a set of questions about the practice of pain relief that were now, to a greater
extent than before, open to public scrutiny. Yet this was not just a debate about the
alleviation of incurable suffering. Different writers proposing that the doctor intervene to
bring about death continued to use the word 'euthanasia' in different ways - sometimes these
variations were subtle, at other times, as in the case of Haeckel, there seemed the distinct
possibility that euthanasia might imply the non-voluntary killing of the mentally ill.
Even within the British debate, there were those who argued that the terminally ill
patient should decide when he or she wanted to die while simultaneously stressing the
burden such an individual placed on the community. This suggested that factors other than
the patient's own experience of illness and pain contributed to proposals that the doctor
should induce death at the patient's request. This uncertainty in relation to the exact meaning
and scope of late nineteenth-century formulations of the term 'euthanasia' was to remain a
hallmark of future debates as they continued and intensified in the twentieth century.
In this chapter I examine in detail three main contributions in support of 'active'
euthanasia: that of S.D. Williams, whose essay of 1870, titled 'Euthanasia', was first to use
the term in its newly formulated sense; the philosopher Lionel Tollemache's article 'The
New Cure for Incurables' that was published in 1873; and an essay by Annie Besant, also
titled 'Euthanasia, published in 1875. I consider the three categories of argument that I
identify in my thesis - principled support of euthanasia, practical arguments in support
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concerned with the practice of pain relief (the central focus of the chapter), and finally, the
third category relating to 'social' death. At the end of the chapter, I look at the response to
the proposals - a response that initially came from non-medical publications and then from
an editorial in the Lancet that endorsed the "shortening of pain" but not the "shortening of
life". This emphasis on the importance of professional palliative care was to prove another
hallmark of future euthanasia debates.
II. 'A very ingenious essay': Samuel D. Williams and 'Euthanasia'
In 1870 the Birmingham Speculative Club published a collection of essays on a
number of diverse themes dealing with philosophical and social issues.14 Although none of
the contributors to the collection was a professional writer and the circulation of this volume
of essays was initially limited, it was, as Kemp observes, "brought to the attention of a much
larger audience by the scholarly periodicals which were enjoying their heyday during the
1870s".'5 The late nineteenth-century witnessed a flourishing of "higher journalism"
characterised by a proliferation of publications that often debated and reviewed the work of a
growing body of amateur philosophers otherwise employed in trades or professions.16 This
meant that essays, published by literary and philosophical societies and distributed locally,
were later reprinted in better known journals and magazines, reaching a wider readership.
University reform and expansion played a part in providing a market for such literature
cultivating what Kemp describes as "a new calibre of reader and contributor".17
One of the contributions to the Birmingham Speculative Club's publication was an
essay by a teacher, Samuel D. Williams Jun., in which he concisely spelt out anew proposal:
... in all cases of hopeless and painful illness it should be the recognised duty of the
medical attendant, wherever so desired by the patient, to administer chloroform, or
such other anaesthetics as may by and by supercede chloroform, so as to destroy
consciousness at once, and put the sufferer at once to a quick and painless death; all
needful precautions being adopted to prevent any possible abuse of such duty; and
means being taken to establish beyond any possibility of doubt or question that the
remedy was at the express wish of the patient.18
Of particular significance was the name of Williams' article. Like Hugh Noble's thesis of
1854, it carried the title 'Euthanasia'. In this instance, however, the term 'euthanasia' was
used in a very different way. No longer did it simply mean a death that was calm and
peaceful. It now implied a situation in which the physician would take active steps to
deliberately terminate life if asked by the incurable and suffering patient. Also significant
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was Williams' use of the word "duty" to describe the moral obligation he placed on the
physician when presented by such a request. This was the first time that the "duty" of the
nineteenth-century doctor had been formulated in such a manner. It is worth considering
Williams' essay in detail because his proposals included what would become some of the
most consistently raised and well-rehearsed arguments used by advocates of 'active'
euthanasia in future debates. Viewing the essay in its historical context, it also reveals how
older arguments relating to the ethical permissibility of taking life were combined with
arguments that drew on the new methods of relieving pain, setting the scene for a revision in
the meaning of the term 'euthanasia'.
Beginning with Williams' challenge to the 'sanctity of life' position, it is interesting to
note that he questioned the very existence of such a principle. "It may well be doubted if life
have any sacredness about it," he wrote, "apart from the use made of it by its possessor."
Nature knew of no distinction between the supposed "sacredness" of human life and the
value of any other form of existence, he argued, adding: "a man's life in Nature's eyes, is of
no more value than a bird's".19 Williams also depicted Nature as a cruel and savage force.
"For let it be borne in mind, death by disease is always death by torture and the wit of man
has never devised torture more cruel than some of Nature's methods of putting her victims to
death," he wrote. Nature was a "dread power, working with a blind force" manifested in
great beauty in the world, but also in scenes of great suffering and torment.20
Using language that resonated with the influence of social Darwinism, Williams
described life as "a field of mortal struggle" in which "a universal preying on the weak by
the strong is incessant".2lAs society advanced, the vulnerable were increasingly protected so
that "Nature's provision for stamping out the weak is thwarted", Williams maintained.
Setting aside the medical "remedies and alleviations" that challenged Nature, "the fact
remains that man's existence, like that of other animals, is rooted in pain", he wrote. Pain
was "the one primordial fact lying at the root of existence in all its forms", and at the end of
life lay "fierce suffering terminating in death".22 Williams argued that a society that was
"less cruel, less indifferent to inflicting pain on our fellow man and more desirous of
shielding the animals we make use of from wanton torture", should also be a society that
permitted quick, painless and easy death. Left in the hands of nature, death was often brutal
and terrifying, but there were now the means available to modify this situation. "Let the
medical attendant bring the relief of swift and lasting unconsciousness; since we must die, let
us, at all events, have the consolation of dying by the least painful death that beneficent skill
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can compass for us," he stated.21 The "real alleviation" of pain was "the greatest service
which man can render to man".24
Williams also challenged the 'sanctity of life' principle by arguing that life was
sacrificed when waging wars and killing for "national or political passions". In this context,
he concluded, "man shows as little sense of value of human life as Nature herself'.25
Anticipating religious objections to his proposals, Williams was equally forthright.
"Submission to God's will has no meaning for us," he wrote. Every human intervention in
the world was an attempt to alter and improve the surrounding environment. If the phrase
"submission to God's will" was to have any real meaning, then the whole of human history
was in "systematic opposition to the will of God".26 What those who used the phrase really
meant, he argued, was that pain be endured without complaint. Death was an inevitability
that could not be escaped - in that sense, he conceded, men and women did submit to the
will of God. Yet, Williams argued, there was nothing worthy about submitting to "fruitless
suffering", and the rejection of such submission was "only carrying out the principle that has
lain at the heart of every useful act; that of struggling to the utmost to remedy whatever lies
within reach".
Though emphasising that he had no interest in offering a general defence of suicide,
Williams allowed himself a side-swipe at religious opposition to those who took their own
lives. Religious condemnation of suicide was "the fruit of ecclesiastical, not Christian
discipline; and one of the legacies of the Roman Catholic Church", he argued. Williams
maintained that suicide often required bravery - to brand the individual who took his or her
own life as a "coward" was wrong until all the circumstances and reasons for the particular
case were known. However, he stressed that the arguments in his essay were expressly
directed towards the case in which there was, in his view, justification for the medical
attendant to take the life of the patient "stricken with fatal and painful disease". This, he
contended, was simply allowing such a patient to take "advantage of the palliatives won for
him by man's genius".27
This proposal - that pain relieving drugs be administered to end the life of a suffering
and incurable patient - added a novel emphasis to Williams' point that all human
intervention in the world effectively rendered meaningless the phrase, "submission to God's
will". His arguments (which in many ways resembled those offered by Hume in the essay On
Suicide) were given a new slant when he considered the practice of administering anaesthetic
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drugs. When pain relief was given, the principle of "sacredness of life" was regularly "set
aside by medical men", he maintained, then elaborated:
The very medical attendant who would revolt from the bare idea of putting a suffering
patient to death outright, though the patient implored him to do so, would feel no
scruple in giving temporary relief by opiates, or other anaesthetics, even though he
were absolutely sure that he was shortening the patient's life by their use. Suppose, for
instance, that a given patient were certain to drag on through a whole month of
hideous sufferings, if left to himself and nature, but that the intensity of his sufferings
could be allayed by drugs, which nevertheless, would hasten the known inevitable by
a week:- There are few, if any medical men who would hesitate to give the drugs;
few, if any, patients, or patient's relations or friends, who would hesitate to ask that
they should be given. And if this is so, what becomes of the sacredness of life?28
By arguing that the practice of pain relief left the 'sanctity of life' principle unsustainable,
Williams advanced his case for 'active' euthanasia. While officially the medical profession
endorsed the use of pain relief but maintained that the dying patient's life was not shortened
by such use, Williams maintained that the administration of pain relief did shorten life.
Further, he argued that no distinction could be drawn between cutting life short because of
the desire to alleviate pain, and his proposal that life be ended at the explicit request of the
patient. Those who administered pain relief and in the process shortened life could not then
appeal to "the inviolability of life" when met with his proposal. "You have already violated
it [the sacredness of life] and rightly violated it; and the same reasoning which justifies what
you have already done," argued Williams, "will justify further violation."29
Williams described the anaesthetic properties of chloroform as "one of the greatest
practical benefits which science has hitherto conferred on mankind". He then reminded the
reader that chloroform's introduction was initially opposed by those who viewed the drug as
what he termed "evidence of impatience with the ways of Providence". However, such
objections, he argued, had "given way" once chloroform's "clear, undisputed benefits" were
recognised and there was no longer resistance to its use in childbirth or surgery. He was sure
that his proposed use of chloroform for the incurable patient in pain would be considered
"too outrageous" to merit serious discussion and yet predicted that the arguments of those
who objected would not be "one whit better founded than were those earlier protests".30
Williams found it difficult to understand why chloroform was used, rightly in his
view, "to render less painful the naturally painful passage into life" and yet "it should almost
be an offence to so much as suggest a like recurrence to it in the still more painful passage
out of life". Here, Williams was perhaps overstating his case because as I have already
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discussed, doctors were in the habit of administering all kinds of pain relief to dying patients.
By the late nineteenth-century this included, for some doctors at least, an open admission to
using chloroform (as discussed in Chapter 2, III) when caring for the dying. It was not so
much the "recurrence" to chloroform that Williams' opponents were likely to find
"outrageous", but more the particular use to which he wished the drug be put - namely a
swift and painless death at the request of the patient. After all, Hugh Noble used the same
argument, about chloroform being initially opposed by some and then absorbed into medical
practice, to defend his proposal that the drug be used more frequently to alleviate the pain of
dying. Noble did not, of course, advocate that the drug be put to the same use as described by
Williams.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note how Williams' arguments shared a degree of
common ground with the medical defence of anaesthesia made earlier in the nineteenth
century. Just as in Simpson's defence of chloroform use, Williams challenged orthodox
religious interpretations of God's will, while his conclusion that "custom-ridden folk" would
see "moral and physical evils" in his proposal is reminiscent of Alfred Collinson's remark
that "querulous and suspicious communities" required the medical profession's guidance
(Chapter 2, II). By and large, the medical profession's support of anaesthetic drug use had
been based on an argument in which the concept of a divinely ordered 'natural' world was
left undisrupted by the practice of relieving pain. As discussed in Chapter 2, the alleviation
of pain was absorbed into routine medical practice so that a painless death, managed
medically, was viewed as entirely 'natural'. This view located the exact timing of death
beyond human intervention - placing it instead in the realm of God's will. Yet while it was
forbidden to shorten a patient's life, it was acceptable to alleviate pain. Rather than
challenging the notion of a divinely willed 'natural' order, this was seen as an expression of
God's intention that unnecessary pain be relieved through the human application of God-
given knowledge, revealed in growing medical expertise.
While Williams shared the view that pain should not be borne with acceptance, his
essay was a direct challenge to the medical profession's official interpretation of a 'natural'
order. For him, nature was often brutal, cruel and terrifying, particularly during death. Nature
operated outside the influence of any beneficent, divine force; therefore, to talk of death
residing solely in the hands of God was misconstrued. All men and women had to face death,
and Williams conceded that this might be interpreted as a manifestation of the supremacy of
God's will. However, in his view, 'natural' death was often nasty and brutish but far from
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short - inflicting on the dying patient a protracted period of suffering that could be
immediately ended if only sufficient quantities of pain relief were administered to bring
about death. Williams advanced his proposal as the most rational and civilized response to
the question of how best to manage the dying patient. In doing so, he challenged the
authority, not only of religious calls that the process of dying be seen as "a submission to
God's will", but also medical authority that claimed that pain relief neither shortened life nor
disrupted an appeal to the "sacredness of life". There was no such principle as the
"sacredness of life", argued Williams, adding: "life is a thing to be used freely and given
freely".31As in the medical defence of anaesthesia, Williams linked what he perceived as a
growth in society's civility with an increasing sensitivity to pain. This 'sensitivity', however,
related as much to a rejection of witnessing others' suffering as it did to the individual's own
capacity to feel pain. "Indifference to others' pain", he wrote, was an "unheroic quality".32
It was Williams' emphasis on the relationship between the incurable patient in pain
and other members of society that, I argue, introduced the notion of 'social' death into his
arguments. While the patient's own experience of pain was clearly a central factor in his call
for 'active' euthanasia, another element was added to justify his proposal when he described
the impact that such suffering had on society. Life could only be described as "sacred", he
argued, "in so far as the word may signify the duty laid on every man of using his life nobly
while he has it". Yet in the case of the patient Williams had in mind, life had ceased to be
'useful' in what he judged as any meaningful sense:
There is no question here of making a noble use of life, for, by the supposition, all the
uses of life are over, and nothing remains to its possessor but to bear its pains; and
again, as there can be no violation of the sacredness of property when it is laid aside
with the owner's consent, so there can be no violation of the sacredness of life, when,
with the consent of the sufferer, a life is taken away that has ceased to be useful to
others and has become an unbearable infliction on its possessor.33
Here, the suggestion was that the 'worth' of a patient's life be judged in two ways. The first
depended on the patient's own relationship with pain, when the individual judged that life
had become what Williams described as "an intolerable burden". The second was the
perception that the patient's life had diminished in its usefulness to society. Indeed,
throughout 'Euthanasia', Williams scattered references to the dying patient's life being "no
longer of use to others".
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There might have been a blurring between these two ways of measuring the 'worth' of
life - after all, a patient's experience of suffering and desire to die might have been
heightened by a sense of burdening family and friends. However, Williams' claim that the
incurable, suffering patient could no longer make "a noble use of life" suggests that the
dying patient's life was no longer considered as making a contribution to the wider good of
society. The patient might have been biologically alive, but was no longer 'living' in a
purposeful way that benefited others. 'Active' euthanasia, it seemed, was not just a means of
ending life characterised by intolerable pain, but also a means of ending life considered
'useless' to society. This ending of life, was, of course, to be with the patient's express
consent and with the assumption that the patient would share the view that his or her life was
so diminished in value as to be no longer worth living. However, quite apart from the ethical
controversy linked to Williams' proposal that the physician end life at the request of the
patient, this emphasis on the comparative 'worth' of human life to society supplied an
additional target for Williams' critics. I discuss the objections to his essay later in this
chapter.
We can thus find in Williams' essay the three analytical categories of argument that I
trace throughout the euthanasia debates examined in this thesis. Williams' defence of
'active' euthanasia, I argue, rested on an attack on the principle of the 'sanctity of life', on
arguments that related to the practice of pain relief, and on arguments that alluded to a notion
of 'social' death. These three strands of argument continued in the contributions of others
supporting 'active' euthanasia. Williams, however, was the first nineteenth-century writer to
set out his ideas in such a comprehensive manner. Within three years, 'Euthanasia' was on
its fourth reprint and was described by the journal The Saturday Review (though not
supporting Williams' proposal for 'active' euthanasia) as both "remarkable" and as "a very
ingenious essay".^ Further writing that expressed very similar ideas to those found in
Williams' essay soon followed.
III. Lionel Tollemache and Annie Besant
Three years after S.D. Williams' essay was first published, the Hon. Lionel
Tollemache wrote an essay for the Fortnightly Review in which he voiced similar views to
those found in Williams' 'Euthanasia'. Tollemache was a Balliol graduate, philosopher,
writer and member (like many of the academic elite) of London's exclusive Athenaeum
Club.3 In his essay, 'The New Cure for Incurables', Tollemache argued that doctors were
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already giving powerful doses of drugs to alleviate the agony of disease and that attitudes to
pain and suffering were changing.36 "I am told on medical authority that in the last stages of
cancer it is now not uncommon to give strong narcotics, which no one would have dreamt of
giving half a century ago", he wrote. 37
Supporting Williams' proposal that the patient should be able to request death,
Tollemache maintained that the same arguments that justified use of drugs in childbirth also
justified the administration of pain relief during the process of dying. He argued that drugs
should be given in sufficient quantities so that, if the patient desired, pain was not merely
temporarily alleviated but permanently put to an end by means of death. This, wrote
Tollemache, was the consistent application of an already established precedent that allowed
medical intervention to mitigate pain. "As Williams argues, all suffering is represented as the
effect of sin, especially the suffering of childbirth," he stated, adding that "Evangelicals were
quite consistent in the opposition that they raised to the use of chloroform in confinements,
until fortunately public opinion became too strong for them."38
While rejecting the religious objections that had been made to any medical
intervention that sought the relief of pain, Tollemache argued that this, at least, was a
position that did not deviate from the (albeit misguided in his view) principle that it was
wrong to interfere with divinely intended suffering. If this position was to be abandoned, it
could not be done so partially. Once the medical alleviation of suffering was permitted at all,
then this could not allow for degrees of intervention in which pain relief was allowed in
certain circumstances, but not in cases where the physician was asked to end life in order to
extinguish pain. Thus, in 'The New Cure for Incurables', Tollemache questioned whether it
was possible to speak coherently of a principle of 'sanctity of life', given the impact of the
accepted practice of intervening medically in order to relieve pain. The main focus of
Tollemache's argument was what he identified as the unsustainable idea that life and death
were subject to divine control, in spite of examples of human intervention that to him
obviously undermined this position. However, he also duplicated another of Williams'
arguments by making passing reference to what he perceived as the shortening of life that
occurred when doctors administered pain relief. In addition, throughout his essay
Tollemache used the term 'euthanasia' in its re-formulated sense to mean the doctor
deliberately bringing about a quick and painless death at the patient's request. This reflected
the change in meaning that the word 'euthanasia' was undergoing in the late nineteenth-
century.
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In March 1871 an editorial in the Spectator had strongly condemned Williams' essay,
warning that his proposal would not allow the patient to change his or her mind. The
editorial questioned what would happen if chloroform failed to instantly render the patient
unconscious and the patient had a change of heart. The patient would be left to "vainly beg
for the life, which it would then be impossible to restore".39 Tollemache took the opportunity
to address this objection in his own writing:
I apprehend that after any decisive step in one's life - marriage for example - it is a
sad thing if one repents when it is too late. But a wise man will first determine what
suits him best, and then will not much trouble himself much about the possibility of
future repentance ... Also, between marriage and euthanasia there is a difference: the
husband of a scold may have to bemoan his lot through many long years, while in the
other case the time available is somewhat limited.40
Clearly, Tollemache was adopting a rather more irreverent tone than that of Williams. More
serious, however, was his suggestion that the friends of the dying patient were exposed to a
"sort of moral suicide" - an indication that he considered 'active' euthanasia a source of
release, not just for the dying, but for those who had to witness suffering. His reference to
the impact that suffering had on others apart from the patient suggests that wider social
factors extending beyond a concern for the individual in pain contributed to his arguments.
On this point, Tollemache's essay provoked its own response from the Spectator. An
editorial in 1873 stated: "Tollemache's new cure for the incurable has certainly no claim to
be represented as sanctioning only the powers of sufferers to take their own destinies into
their hands." According to the editorial, Tollemache's proposal allowed, "on far stronger
grounds, the right of bystanders to take the destinies of sufferers into their own hands". This,
the editorial argued, would lead to "impatience of hopeless suffering rather than tenderness
towards it". Moreover, the Spectator judged that 'active' euthanasia, if permitted, would
foster the growth of a social climate in which any standard used to measure the 'worth' of
lives deemed a burden to society would be continually lowered. It would be difficult to avoid
"a sort of moral pressure on poor invalids to demand the right of ridding the world of
themselves".41
The language employed by Tollemache strongly supports the suggestion that his
advocacy of 'active' euthanasia was underpinned by more than a concern about
extinguishing the pain of the suffering individual. There is clear textual evidence in 'The
106
New Cure for Incurables' supporting the argument that Tollemache considered the suffering
patient no longer useful to society and he judged this a legitimate consideration when
supporting Williams' proposal. In a section of his essay with distinctly social Darwinian
overtones, he wrote:
Modern science informs us that in an overcrowded population there is a sharp struggle
for existence, so that an unhealthy, unhappy and useless man is in a manner hustling
out of being, or at least out of means of enjoyment, someone who would probably be
happier, healthier and more useful than himself.42
This statement points to more than a concern that intimate friends and relations were spared
the ordeal of witnessing the pain of someone they knew. Rather, it suggests that the patient,
though biologically alive, was no longer contributing to society and was standing in the way
of those considered by Tollemache as "happier, healthier and more useful". The Spectator
concluded that Tollemache's arguments encouraged ending the lives, not only of the sick but
also of those judged to be "the cause of more pain than pleasure to others". In a letter to the
Spectator, Tollemache countered by stressing that he rejected the notion of "relief ever being
given without the dying man's express consent", and in later years he retreated somewhat
from his original energetic support of 'active' euthanasia.43 In collecting a number of his
essays to form a book, he admitted to hesitating when considering the inclusion of 'The New
Cure for Incurables'. He decided to do so, he explained, because "my article is philosophical
discussion, it is not revolutionary propaganda".44
"Philosophical discussion" it may have been, but the response to Tollemache's essay
in the editorial and letters pages of the Spectator suggests that the potential practical
application of his ideas caused considerable concern. Interestingly, this concern hinged, not
so much on a defence of an absolute principle of 'sanctity of life', but rather on the danger of
exposing vulnerable members of society to the judgement that their lives were without
worth. Kemp describes this late nineteenth-century concern as "the first concrete example of
the 'slippery-slope' argument".45 The thrust of this argument is that, if allowed, 'active'
euthanasia would not be restricted to the consensual ending of the lives of those dying in
pain, but would descend into the killing of other vulnerable members of society such as the
elderly or the mentally ill. The 'slippery-slope' argument has been a constant feature of
twentieth-century euthanasia arguments and I return to this theme in the second part of the
thesis. However, it is important to acknowledge that the late nineteenth-century debate over
'active' euthanasia revolved, not only round questions of pain relief, but also round questions
of what constituted a 'worthwhile' life.
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While the contributions of Williams and Tollemache provoked discussion and debate,
another essay on the subject of 'active' euthanasia does not appear to have elicited a similar
response. Euthanasia, by Annie Besant, was one of a number of short papers published as
part of a series of theological and philosophical essays in 1875. Again, Besant used the word
'euthanasia' in its new sense, proposing:
... that where an incurable disorder is accompanied by extreme pain - pain, which
nothing can alleviate except death - pain, which only grows worse as the inevitable
doom approaches - pain, which drives almost to madness, and which ends in the
intensified torture of the death agony - that pain should be at once soothed by the
administration of an anaesthetic which should not only produce unconsciousness, but
should be sufficiently powerful to end a life, in which the renewal of consciousness
can only be simultaneous with the renewal of pain.46
Like the earlier writing of Williams and Tollemache, Besant (who referred to
Williams in her own essay) advocated that in cases of incurable suffering the patient should
be able to ask for what she termed "the mercy of a speedy death instead of a protracted one".
She argued that such a request should come "without the dangers of the penalties of
manslaughter being inflicted on the doctors and nurses in attendance".47
On the principle of 'sanctity of life', Besant criticised what she perceived as the
unevenness of its application. While "the ordinary man or woman" advocated that life was
sacred and any objection to this position was branded "wrong and dangerous", she
maintained that such a line of argument, though common, was the product of "the
inconsistency of the thoughtless". Those who defended the sanctity of life in one set of
circumstances, would swiftly abandon the principle and "glow with passionate admiration at
some noble deed" in which life was sacrificed out of a sense of duty or honour. Patriots died
for their country, martyrs gave up their lives for beliefs that they would not deny - these,
stated Besant, were examples of life being given for principles judged more worthy than an
absolute commitment to the principle that life was, at all times, sacred.48
"That life is sacred is an undeniable proposition; every natural gift is valuable and is
not to be lightly destroyed," she wrote, but added: "it is not the most sacred thing on earth."
The question for Besant was "whether there are present, in any proposed euthanasia, such
conditions as overbear considerations for the acknowledged sanctity of life". While life was
not to be voluntarily abandoned "without grave and sufficient cause", she concluded that in
the case of the incurable, suffering patient for whom 'active' euthanasia was intended, the
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'sanctity of life' principle could be justifiably set aside.49 In a similar fashion to Williams
and Tollemache, Besant introduced the idea that such a patient was no longer a 'useful'
contributor to society. "They have become a burden to themselves and all about them and
have in reality outlived themselves," she stated.50 She even maintained that those caring for
the dying and witnessing suffering were themselves at risk of shortening their lives as a
result of anxiety and fatigue. "Has the nurse the right to sacrifice her own life - and an injury
to health is a sacrifice of life - for an absolutely unequivalent advantage?" she asked.
Such an emphasis, again, appeared to open up an area of argument in which 'active'
euthanasia was linked, not only to the incurable patient's experience of pain, but to the
perception that such a patient negatively affected others and indeed, society as a whole.
Besant was sensitive to the earlier criticism that had suggested that the proposals for 'active'
euthanasia left the vulnerable in society exposed to the danger of non-consensual killing. "It
is sometimes thoughtlessly stated that the supporters of euthanasia propose to put to death all
persons suffering from incurable disease - no assertion can be more inaccurate or not or
more calculated to mislead," she argued. Misleading criticism or not, the notion that the
worth of an individual's life be measured in relation to others in society was a common
theme in the writing of those who proposed 'active' euthanasia.
Having stated her objection to those who attacked the idea of 'active' euthanasia on
the grounds that it might be abused, Besant drew her argument back to the issue of the
patient experiencing pain at the end of life. There was nothing noble or honourable in
enduring such suffering, and it was wrong to view pain as "a remedial agent inflicted by
God" which was to be borne patiently, she maintained. "Pain as pain has no
recommendations, spiritual or otherwise, nor is there the smallest merit in a voluntary and
needless submission to pain," she wrote.'' Rejecting the view that physical suffering was a
manifestation of divine power, Besant utilised an argument already rehearsed in the writing
of Williams and Tollemache:
If God is directly acting on the sufferer's body and is educating his soul by racking his
nerves, by what right does the doctor step between with his impious anaesthetic, and
by reducing the patient to unconsciousness, deprive God of his pupil, and man of his
lesson? ...if this argument be good for anything at all, we must henceforth eschew all
anaesthetics, we must take no steps to alleviate human agony, we must not interfere
with this beneficent agent, but must leave nature to torture us at will.52
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According to Besant, the established practice of medically intervening in order to relieve
suffering undermined any argument that the pain of dying had to be accepted as God's will.
As discussed in Chapter 2, many nineteenth-century medical men would have shared the
view that pain should not be interpreted as an expression of divine intention that was to be
left unchallenged. Yet for Besant, to allow one type of medical intervention in order to
alleviate pain and not another was wholly inconsistent. If pain relief was at all permissible
when caring for the dying patient, then the logical extension of such practice was 'active'
euthanasia, she maintained. Besant described how a common utterance by those at the
bedside of a recently deceased patient was "It is a mercy God has taken him." She argued
that this "mercy" should extend to 'active' euthanasia so that "man should be allowed to give
man, when human skill and tenderness have done their best, ... a speedy and painless
death".53
Although a footnote in Euthanasia stated that Besant "expressed no opinion" on
theological questions concerning the existence or non-existence of a God, the author's own
biographical history provides revealing contextual detail to her writing. The daughter of a
doctor, Besant was married at the age of nineteen to member of the clergy, but after
questioning her religious beliefs and refusing to attend communion she was ordered out of
the family home by her husband. A legal separation followed and by 1874, a year before
writing Euthanasia, Besant had renounced Christianity completely to become a leading
figure in the National Secular Society. Although, as far as I can establish, there is no
published evidence to suggest that her essay provoked any substantial response, by the late
nineteenth-century Besant's name would have been widely recognised.
In 1877 Besant and Charles Bradlaugh, the leader of the secular movement in Britain,
published a book promoting birth control. Both were found guilty of publishing an
"obscene" text and were each given six month prison sentences that were later quashed at the
Court of Appeal. Besant subsequently produced another book in support of birth control.
Helped by the negative publicity this second book attracted, in a high-profile case her former
husband won custody of their daughter who had been living with her mother in London.54
Later in life, Besant returned to religion but in a very different form. In the 1890s she
became a follower of Theosophy, a religious movement based on the Hindu ideas of karma
and reincarnation.55
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The details of Annie Besant's life offer more than interesting biographical colour
when considering her writing. It is telling that Besant advocated 'active' euthanasia in the
aftermath of abandoning her Christian faith. Unlike religious medical men who defended the
use of pain relief for the dying patient but maintained that the exact moment of death
remained the province of God, Besant was, I suggest, ideologically predisposed to
constructing an argument in which the timing of death was considered the province of man.
That is not to argue that religious beliefs necessarily preclude support for 'active' euthanasia.
As I consider in the second part of this thesis, a number of leading religious figures were
vocal advocates of legalised euthanasia in the twentieth century. Similarly, opposition to
'active' euthanasia need not be motivated by obvious religious concerns. As discussed in this
chapter, some of the nineteenth-century criticism of Williams and Tollemache's writing
related to fears that 'active' euthanasia would be abused and extended to non-voluntary
killing. This criticism was not necessarily dependent on a religious commitment to the belief
that God alone could take life.
My argument is simply that Besant's writing is a striking example of the nineteenth-
century negotiation over how forms of medical practice, viewed as legitimate or illegitimate,
should be articulated when applied to the management of death. The introduction of
powerful new pain-relieving drugs added a new layer of complexity when it came to
demarcating the boundary between acceptable and non-acceptable forms of medical
intervention. Where this boundary was drawn was subject to a range of influences that often
involved the accommodation of different systems of belief and ideology. Interestingly, when
Besant returned to religion in the later years of her life, her description of pain and its
purpose was re-cast in a way that radically differed from her previous statements on
suffering.
In 1894, addressing a meeting of fellow followers of Theosophy, Besant spoke of pain
as "... an instrument that the Soul may use. Pain becomes the surgeon's knife that cuts away
the spot of danger. Therefore, pain is no longer to be resisted as the enemy, but is to be
welcomed as a friend."56 Without documentary evidence it is impossible to know if Besant's
position on 'active' euthanasia had changed by the 1890s. However, her description of pain
written in 1875 stands in stark contrast to her later pronouncement - exemplifying, I suggest,
how wider beliefs and ideologies could impact on the explanations offered for suffering.
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Clearly, multiple influences were at work when Williams, Tollemache and Besant
wrote in support of 'active' euthanasia in the 1870s. Concern for the individual in pain was
combined with a form of utilitarian argument based on the view that the incurable and
suffering patient burdened society. The very meaning of the term 'euthanasia' had embarked
on a process of negotiation and redefinition, albeit outside the confines of the medical
profession. It was left to a non-medical journal, the Spectator, to provide a forum for
discussing the idea that the doctor should end life at the request of the patient. That is not to
say, however, that the debates over pain relief taking place within the medical profession had
little to do with the calls for 'active' euthanasia from lay writers. Without the developments
in anaesthesia, Williams, Tollemache and Besant would not have been able to conceive of
'active' euthanasia in the manner in which they did. Moreover, if within the medical
community questions of life, death and the meaning of pain were being worked through, then
a similar process was occurring in the non-medical world. Of vital importance, therefore,
was the public response of the medical profession to the proposal that the doctor should
explicitly and deliberately end life.
IV. A Medical Response
When William's essay was quoted at length and reviewed in detail in an edition of
Popular Science Monthly in 1873, it reached an audience that included scientists and
physicians.57 However, it would be nearly two decades until the first medical journal, the
Lancet, would publicly address the proposals for 'active' euthanasia. In an editorial titled
'Euthanasia Secundum Artem', the journal struck a tone that, initially at least, seemed not
altogether hostile to Williams' position. The editorial began by quoting a Dr. B.W.
Richardson - "the inventor of the lethal chamber for the painless extinction of the life of the
friend of man, the dog".5" In his address, 'Euthanasia for the Lower Creation', delivered
before the Royal Society of Arts, Richardson had argued "that man could never hope to
secure for himself so painless and happy a death as had thus come through the hand of
science to the lower animals of the kingdom".59 From this sympathetic reference to suffering
animals being painlessly put to death, the Lancet then considered the proposals set out by
Williams. "He [Williams] urged that man ought, as a being of free will and judgement, to
claim the right when death was inevitable, to have the act of death made painless," stated the
editorial. However, the proposal that the physician, if asked, should administer quantities of
anaesthetic so as to end life was rejected and condemned.
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Though the Lancet conceded that Williams was a "very able and observant man", as a
teacher he "had not the practical knowledge of the subject to enable him to work it out in
such a manner as to carry conviction of sufficient quality to institute a practice". Demands
that called for the physician to actively shorten life at the request of the patient failed to
appreciate the moral and legal implications that accompanied such proposals, the journal
maintained. Moreover, lay writers who called for the deliberate ending of dying patients'
lives turned to the medical profession in order to "settle the difficulty". The editorial
continued: "The doctors are to be the men to give the coup de grace to writhing or flickering,
or hopeless men, women, and children ... and the profession very wisely - nay, even
humanely - withdraws from the proposition."60
Doctors were against administering drugs to end life, because, argued the Lancet, the
purpose of the medical profession was to sustain life, even when this appeared to be
impossible. On this point the editorial elaborated:
The members of the profession feel that it is their duty to prolong life in a very large
number of instances to the very last flicker. They sometimes see by this action life
restored when all has seemed to be lost. They have in fact, no correct measure of death
itself, and there are cases where death seems actually to have taken place in which
there is doubt whether an inappreciable spark of life may not remain and once more
declare itself. Such facts as these have ever stood, and promise long to stand, and
thwart the practice of euthanasia secundum artem as a system, if the professors of
medical science and art are to be the administrators.61
For the medical profession to become involved in administering doses with the intention of
ending patients' lives would only serve to precipitate the "criticism of suspicious relatives
and friends". Further, such a move would unquestionably lead to "many serious legal
inquiries". In the event of any proposal to change the law in order to allow for 'euthanasia
secundum artem , the Lancet considered that the medical profession "would undoubtedly
have a powerful voice for or against".
The journal concluded that even if the law ever did change, the medical profession
would remain resolutely against any suggestion that physicians deliberately administer fatal
doses. "There is no more reason that a representative of medicine should take part in the
production of the euthanasia than anyone else," stated the editorial. The diagnosis of a
physician might determine that a patient would die from disease and "his evidence might be
required to determine that death had taken place". However, it was for the State alone "to
determine the mode of death and the manner in which it should be carried out".62 In the event
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of Williams' proposals becoming law, the State would have to appoint a legal administrator,
or would have "to permit the applicant for relief from life to take the cup, like Socrates, and
wilfully seek his own dissolution".63
These editorial remarks were largely located in the realm of hypothetical debate and
there was little suggestion that the journal saw any change in the law as either a real or
imminent possibility. Williams was portrayed as a man of genuine intentions but whose lay
intervention into the explicitly medical world of managing death was made with neither
sufficient knowledge, experience nor expertise. Nevertheless, the journal conceded that the
issue of 'active' euthanasia was "to some minds very important".64
The emphasis of the editorial was on the professional implications of the introduction
of Williams' proposals rather than the moral connotations of deliberately ending life. While
the medical profession would play no active part in this revised formulation of euthanasia,
there was the suggestion that the physician might play a consultative role should the State
ever see fit to legalise the proposals. Particularly interesting is the Lancet's statement that the
medical profession had "in fact, no correct measure of death" and that patients at times
recovered, apparently against all odds. According to the editorial, this was an important
argument against 'active' euthanasia. Yet as discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, prior to
the interventions made by Williams and Tollemache considerable weight was already placed
on the question of accurate diagnosis when it came to formulating appropriate treatment for
the dying patient. As Noble's thesis illustrated, both the withdrawal of treatment and, in
certain instances, the particular choice of treatment, were determined by decisions relating to
clinical judgement - and this often involved deciding whether or not a patient was likely to
recover. There was no mention of such difficult decision making in the Lancet editorial.
What the Lancet did propose, however, was that "if the physician or surgeon may not
shorten life methodically even under the most pressing circumstances, he may shorten pain
and make inevitable death easy and tranquil". Palliative care of this sort was "a divine and
blessed art at the discretion of every medical man", argued the journal. This, of course, was
the same line of reasoning adopted by medical student Noble in 1854 - that life could not be
shortened in any way, but that pain could and, indeed, should be alleviated in the dying
patient by every available medical means. At the end of the editorial, the Lancet endorsed the
work of Dr William Munk whose newly published work on care of the dying also carried the
title Euthanasia, but used in its older, classical sense, free from any association with patient-
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requested death. According to the Lancet, Munk had successfully "put into a nutshell the
duties of the medical profession in regard to euthanasia, in a style as simple as it is classical".
The journal warmly recommended Euthanasia as a guide to doctors on how they far they
could ethically aid in securing easy and painless deaths for their patients. According to the
Lancet, the duty of the doctor was to ensure that the end of life was peaceful and to "alleviate
acute suffering without hastening death". "To this extent," stressed the journal, "medical art
may go no further." 65
This argument, that emphasised the comfort and relief afforded by palliative care but
rejected the suggestion that the physician should deliberately end life, was to form the
centre-piece of the medical profession's public position in later debates over 'active'
euthanasia. It is not surprising that the Lancet directed its readers to the writing of William
Munk. His assessment of how the end of life should ideally be medically managed
comprehensively set out the position of the late nineteenth-century medical profession in
relation to the dying patient. While the principle that the physician should not end life was
left unchallenged, the practice of relieving pain was wholeheartedly embraced. The
following chapter considers in detail Munk's contribution to late nineteenth-century medical
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Euthanasia by William Munk - Pain Relief for the Dying
I. 'Administering the resource of the medical art': Risk Taking or Benign Influence?
This chapter brings together a number of the themes and theoretical concerns raised
earlier in the thesis by considering the public position of the medical profession at the end of
the nineteenth century with regard to the dying patient. Again, the articulation of medical
attitudes and medical practice in relation to pain and death provides a central point of
reference for my analysis. As discussed in Chapter Three, the medical community played a
marginal role in the explicit debate over 'active' euthanasia in the 1870s. However, the years
between Hugh Noble's thesis of 1854 and the Lancet's 1887 response to lay demands that
the physician deliberately end life on request, saw a continuation of intra-professional
discussion on caring for the dying patient.
When, in 1862, Dr C.J.B. Williams (a physician at the Brompton Hospital for
Consumption and Diseases of the Chest) delivered his Lumleian Lecture at the Royal
College of Physicians, London, he drew attention to the importance of medical care for the
incurable patient in the latter stages of life. "I speak of the Prolongation and Utilisation of
Life, and the Alleviation of Suffering. These may seem very subordinate at first [to curative
medicine], but often they are far from being so in the estimation of the patient," he wrote.1
According to Williams, it was when the patient was faced with death that life frequently
assumed the greatest value. "More gratitude is often testified to the physician when he
succeeds in achieving the minor triumph of prolonging life and relieving pain," he stated,
"than in the case where he may have accomplished a perfect restoration of health and ease."
While Williams stressed that medicine could not "confer immorality ... or conquer death, or
triumph over all forms of disease", he maintained that the nineteenth-century physician "may
be expected to say what he can cure, what he cannot cure - to recognise and define the limits
of his powers".2
Williams' lecture is revealing in a number of respects. First, it exemplifies the
nineteenth-century medical view that successful care of the dying consisted of "prolonging
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life and relieving pain". Williams portrayed the two aims as entirely compatible. The
principle that the physician should not kill was interpreted in such a way that, certainly in
public statements on managing the dying, the practice of alleviating pain was often seen, not
only as commensurable with the "prolongation of life", but as the means by which such
"prolongation" was secured. Secondly, Williams' reference to the importance placed on the
physician "to recognise and define the limits of his powers" points to a wider mid to late
nineteenth century debate concerning the position of the medicine in society, or, more
narrowly, the position of the doctor in relation to the patient. When it came to publicly
articulating the practices involved in managing death, "the prolongation of life" and the
"alleviation of pain" were established as twin goals. Given these aims, the question, then,
was how medical practice was defined in relation to the dying patient, particularly with
regard to the administration of pain-relieving drugs.
Martin Pernick describes the nineteenth-century endorsement of pain relief as "a new
willingness to take risks purely for the relief of suffering".3 Pat Jalland, who unlike Pernick
specifically considers medical practice in the context of the dying patient, views the medical
management of pain somewhat differently. Though acknowledging that the role of the
medical professional at the deathbed became of greater importance in the nineteenth century,
according to Jalland, the physician's presence was a "benign influence".4 Whereas Pernick
stresses the risk-taking dimensions of administering pain relief, Jalland frames the role of the
nineteenth-century doctor in terms that emphasise "a very limited power to cure disease"
which was, as a result, "compensated by a remarkably good record of terminal care, comfort
and palliative management".5
One Victorian doctor in particular pre-empted the interpretative slants given by
Pernick and Jalland to the nature of nineteenth-century pain relief, incorporating them into
his influential textbook on the best management of the dying patient. Published in 1887, Dr
William Munk's Euthanasia: Or Medical Treatment in Aid of an Easy Death drew on
Munk's own experience, combined with that captured in the writing of other elite physicians
such as Sir Benjamin Brodie, Sir Henry Halford and Professor C.W. Hufeland (see Chapter
1, I). Euthanasia offered a comprehensive guide to medical treatment of the dying,
discussing, as Jalland suggests, the comfort and assurance afforded to the patient when pain
was relieved, but also, as I will argue in this chapter, implicitly acknowledging the risks
associated with administering powerful drugs.
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The Lancet endorsed Munk's book in glowing terms and described the author as "a
thoughtful and experienced physician".6 According to the journal it was "high time now to
recall the practitioners of our art to the fact that their place in the social system of today is
conceded to them in the virtue of their office as healers of the sick and ministers at the
bedside".7 Munk's contribution to medical literature on the management of death was timely.
In joining a discussion that had been going on for some time and in drawing on the writing
of established names such as Halford and Hufeland, Munk was effectively setting out and
consolidating the position of the medical profession at the end of the nineteenth century.
Whether or not Munk was aware of the interventions made by Williams and Tollemache on
the subject of 'active' euthanasia is unclear. There is certainly no reference to their proposals
in his book. What is evident, however, is that the Lancet viewed Munk's consideration of the
care of the dying as a fitting response to lay calls that the physician should deliberately end
life on request.8
"Much has been ably written on death and the physiology of the various modes of
dying," stated Munk in the preface to Euthanasia, "but little has been written on the medical
management of the dying, or on the Euthanasia, to which such management should
contribute."9 The whole subject of "the Euthanasia" (Munk's formulation) was in need of
special and systematic treatment, he stated. Here, of course, Munk was using the term
'euthanasia' in its classical sense implying a calm and peaceful death, rather than evoking
any sense of mercy killing or requested death. According to Munk, caring for the dying was
not specifically taught in any medical school, and on entering the medical profession the
young doctor was left unsupported to learn "what to do and what not to do in the most
solemn and delicate position in which he can be placed". In attending the dying patient, the
importance of "administering the resource of the medical art in aid of an easy, gentle and
placid death" was not to be underestimated, he argued.10
Just as I began this nineteenth-century section of the thesis with a close reading of a
treatise on the management of death, I conclude with a detailed consideration of another
treatise on the same subject. Unlike the first, the work of medical student Hugh Noble,
Munk's Euthanasia is the work of an established and experienced physician, perhaps writing
with a heightened sense of awareness of the judgement of his peers who would read his
book. However, there are continuities between the two. Both are concerned with how best to
relieve pain in the dying patient and with how this practice of pain relief fits into the notion
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that death cannot be hastened in any way. Both seek to define the limits and powers of
medical practice in relation to care of the dying.
In this chapter I consider Munk's writing on the alleviation of both physical and
mental suffering. The final section then discusses Munk's emphasis on unwritten knowledge,
that could, I argue, only be gained through the individual clinician's own repeated
experience of managing death. In concluding the chapter, I illustrate how the language used
by doctors played such an important part in defining the relationship between pain-relieving
practices and the medical management of death.
II. Calming the Body: Acceptable Intentions
Invaluable in relieving pain and calming the bodies of dying patients, stated Munk,
was opium. "Opium here is worth all the rest of the materia medica," he wrote." The Lancet
was in agreement. "It is simply a neglect of duty, and a fault in our conduct of the last days
and hours of many patients to withhold the inestimable boon afforded by opium in full
doses," the journal stated. Illustrative of the medical view that pain relieving-drugs were an
integral part of securing a calm and peaceful death, the journal criticised doctors who
neglected or were reluctant to give opium in the latter stages of life. "We have no right to
stand aside and withhold our skilled labour in this direction, and we rather suspect such a
promotion of euthanasia is not uncommonly neglected, or but imperfectly carried out in
many cases," argued the Lancet.12
Yet Munk was clear that the physician's reasons for administering opium had to be
strictly defined. He argued that it was to be given as an anodyne to relieve pain, or as a
cordial to ease "the sinking feeling and anguish about the stomach and heart that is so
frequent in the dying and is so often worse than pain, however severe". Rarely, if at all,
should it be administered "as a mere hypnotic, or with a view to enforce sleep". To do so,
Munk stated, "would be to risk throwing the patient into a sleep from which he may not
wake".13 Interestingly, the intentions of the physician were deemed extremely important
when administering opium. To give the drug with the objective of inducing sleep in the
patient was rejected, whereas if opium brought about sleep "indirectly", as Munk stated it
often did, then this was judged the "kindest way" of relieving the pain and discomfort that
often made sleep impossible.
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While Munk explicitly demarcated the acceptable range of intentions that the
physician might have when administering opium, he did not consider the possibility of the
patient failing to wake from opium that had induced sleep "indirectly". The distinction
between opium as an unacceptable hypnotic as opposed to an acceptable source of pain relief
was not at all clear. Munk's writing appeared to conflate conceptual ethical 'intentions' on
the part of the physician, with physiological outcomes in the patient being treated. In other
words, if administered in the "kindest way", rather than expressly as a hypnotic, there
seemed the implicit assurance that pain would be alleviated without the patient slipping into
permanent unconsciousness.
In Munk's experience it was rare for the administration of opium to cause mental
confusion. Where this did occur, he attributed it to "idiosyncrasy" on the part of the patient.
Yet Munk's discussion of the acceptable intentions on the part of the doctor administering
opium might be read as an acknowledgement that the drug carried the risk of inducing coma
in the patient. Clarification of the physician's intentions was necessary if pain relief was to
be justified without raising the question of the physician hastening death. If the issue here
concerned levels of dosage, with opium given in greater strength when the intention was to
induce unconsciousness rather than simply alleviate pain, then this was not discussed.
Interesting also was Munk's statement that opium should "rarely" be used with a view to
enforcing sleep, suggesting that there might be isolated cases in which such an action would
be appropriate. Just when opium might be used as a hypnotic agent was an issue that, again,
was not addressed by Munk, but the suggestion was that he did not rule it out in all instances.
Even in the most hopeless case when the patient was troubled by "unspeakable
inquietude", Munk argued that opium, if given for reasons judged acceptable, would provide
the patient with relief "without dying at all sooner". However, though maintaining that
opium could be used safely to relieve the pain of the dying patient, Munk's writing suggests
an awareness of the risks of precipitating a death deemed premature. Death as an unwanted
by-product of opium administration might be avoided, Munk argued, by scrupulous
examination of the patient. "So long as the air passages are clear of secretion, so long as
there is neither lividity nor duskiness of the face, opium, if indicated, may be given in the aid
of Euthanasia, but if they are present, it is hazardous and might even hasten death," he
explained.14 Thus, Munk's treatise on care of the dying supports Jalland's argument that late
Victorian medicine was concerned with "comfort and palliative management". However, it
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also reveals a sub-text in which risk, or at least the avoidance of risk, was a matter of
consideration.
Munk stated that opium "if judiciously and freely administered ... is equal to most of
the emergencies in the way of pain that we are likely to meet with the dying".15 Yet he also
maintained that there were times when non-intervention was most appropriate. "All that the
dying person then requires, is to be left alone and allowed to die in peace," he wrote.16 His
position was that of the medical conservative, advocating pain relief for the dying patient
when required, but rejecting any heroic-style therapies that pushed for cure. The case of each
patient, argued Munk, should be treated as unique. "No medicine should be given without a
distinct - I had almost written urgent - need for it; and the physician should form a clear idea
of the special requirements of the case before him," he stated.17 In many cases he maintained
that there was no need for medicine of any kind and that light nourishment sufficed.
Munk emphasised that when death approached, the doctor should "dismiss all
thoughts of cure, or the prolongation of life", to concentrate instead on the "relief of pain and
discomfort". It is significant that in the case of the dying patient he ruled out "the
prolongation of life", while C.J.B. Williams had argued that such "prolongation" was one of
the central aims of medically managing death. Again, as in the case of Hugh Noble's thesis,
the subtle distinction between 'preserving' and 'prolonging' life was raised. Munk drew on
the writing of Henry Halford and C.W. Hufeland who both explicitly spoke of the doctor's
duty to prolong life, even if death seemed imminent. Yet Munk appeared to reject such a
view. It might be argued that this was purely a question of differences in the use of language
as opposed to evidence of variations in medical practice. However, I suggest that these
semantic variations point to the importance of individual clinical judgements that were far
from standardised and that these differences were detectable even in public statements on
caring for the dying.
Munk's Euthanasia was more than a call for the fastidious use of pain-relieving drugs.
It was a wide-ranging consideration of all the factors that the author deemed important when
relieving suffering and making the dying patient as comfortable as possible. The question of
suitable nourishment at the end of life was viewed as requiring special attention in order to
facilitate bodily calm. Well-meaning errors in feeding were, Munk stated, "the cause of
much of the disquietude and many of the sufferings that attend the dying". He maintained
that it was frequently assumed that the dying patient was able to eat as normal and that
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medical attendants forgot that "the stomach shares in the exhaustion, and has lost its tone -
and in great part, if not wholly, its power of digesting". Food was often given in too large
quantities and too frequently caused the stomach to distend and to be distressed, argued
Munk. "The dying patient is induced to take food or stimulants against which nature and his
stomach revolt ... the difficulty in swallowing and retching which eating induces is really a
salvation from what under the circumstances is an act of cruelty," he wrote.18 Munk
cautioned that the "wishes of the patient" should be taken as a correct indication of how food
should be administered.
Similarly, when the ability to swallow stopped, Munk counselled that the giving of
liquids should not be zealously pursued. "If after rubbing the lips with a spoon of the spout
of a feeding vessel, no evident or distinct act of swallowing persists, it is useless and it may
be cruel to persist," he stated.19 Without the ability to swallow, liquid would only block the
mouth and impede the breathing of the dying patient. Munk advocated giving such a patient
ice to dissolve in the mouth, or at most, a spoonful of ice water. For patients who were still
able to swallow, he considered distilled or fermented alcohol highly appropriate since it was
seen to pass quickly into the blood, stimulate the heart, promote circulation and aid
digestion. Another suggestion was Henry Halford's "celebrated mixture" of brandy with
sugar and the yolk of an egg.
Central to Munk's analysis of the most appropriate forms of giving nourishment to the
dying patient was the view that physical indications were the best guide when judging when
to feed or give liquids. He advocated a regime that was not to be seen as a prescriptive set of
rules, but was instead attuned to the individual needs of each patient through scrupulous
observation, discretion and care. For example, alongside his discussion of appropriate
feeding of the dying patient, he considered the impact of the patient's environment on his or
her comfort. "Many of the sufferings of the deathbed are not naturally or necessarily incident
to the act of dying," he remarked, pointing out that much restlessness was often due to the
weight of bed-coverings. Such discomfort could "at once be removed", he stated, adding that
difficulty in breathing was often relieved simply by allowing fresh air into the room and "by
change of posture and by pillows carefully adapted to the efficient support of the trunk and
body".20
Yet such attention to the feeding and nursing of the dying patient, in which the
"wishes of the patient" were seen as providing the best and most "correct indication" of how
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to treat, focused on the physical, bodily manifestations of pain and discomfort. Though
Munk placed the individual patient at the centre of his prescription for deathbed calm, the
physician was ultimately responsible, I argue, for reading and interpreting the patient's body.
Thus, when Munk referred to the "wishes of the patient", he was using language located at
the physical level, discussing, for example, the bodily rejection of food that represented the
visible draining away of life. That a patient might reject food and renounce life when the
body remained willing, was not a subject of consideration. Such a wish on the part of the
patient was simply not a consideration in Munk's repertoire of palliative language.
Moreover, "the Euthanasia", as he termed the peaceful and easy death, was not possible with
bodily calm alone. Mental quiet at the end of life was of as much if not greater importance,
and for this spiritual devotion and commitment were required.
III. Calming the Mind: The painlessness of death and the importance of religion
Munk contested the view that death was always a painful and difficult process. "In
fact, all of the best and most direct evidence that the subject admits of, goes to show, that as
a rule, the immediate act of dying is in no sense a process of severe bodily suffering," he
stated. He maintained that "suffering at the time of death is rare, physicians, the clergy and
intelligent nurses - all, indeed, who are practically conversant with the dying testify to the
truth of that statement."21 In support of this argument, he described how Henry Halford had
"expressed his surprise that of the great number of whom it had been his professional duty to
administer in the last hours of their lives, so few exhibited signs of severe suffering".
Similarly, Munk quoted Benjamin Brodie's belief that "the mere act of dying is seldom, in
any sense of the word, a very painful process". This view was supplemented further by a
quote from the surgeon William Savory, who had argued that "except in extreme cases, the
actual process of dying is not one of intense agony, or indeed for the most part even of pain".
Munk's final anecdotal example of the painlessness of death were the words of the
obstetrician William Hunter whose last utterance before death was reported as being, "If I
had strength enough to hold a pen, then I would write how easy and pleasant a thing it is to
die."22
The idea that death was frequently an experience free from pain stood in stark contrast
to the descriptions offered by those who had argued in favour of 'active' euthanasia. While,
for example, Annie Besant wrote of the "intensified torture" and "agony" that accompanied
death (see Chapter 3, III), elite practitioners such as Halford and Brodie challenged this
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image by arguing that death was frequently a peaceful experience. Within the nineteenth-
century medical community the opinion was commonly expressed that death was not nearly
as terrifying as often thought. For example, in 1840, the surgeon Forbes Winslow argued that
the notion that death was agonising and painful was "erroneous". Again, Winslow
maintained that the medical men who witnessed death testified that it was not a painful
process. "In some delicate and irritable persons, a kind of struggle is indeed sometimes
excited when respiration becomes difficult - but more frequently the dying obviously suffer
nothing and express no uneasiness," he wrote.21 Munk's Euthanasia was effectively a late
nineteenth-century restatement of this view that death was often painless and peaceful.
Though Munk conceded that there were isolated instances in which the dying did
suffer greatly, he argued that these cases were extremely rare and were not to be used as the
basis of any general perception of the experience of death. Occasional terrible cases of
suffering during death fixed themselves in the public imagination and came to be "regarded
as but extreme instances of what is assumed to be the universal and inevitable lot of the
dying", he stated. Munk maintained that this fear of death was misplaced. Evidence
supporting his conclusion was provided in his consideration of several cases of apparent
drowning, which, he stated, "differed only from actual death in the possibility of re-
animation under the influence of external treatment".24 According to Munk, instances of
apparent drowning carried "far greater weight than the observations and conclusions of
medical men no matter how eminent" in demonstrating the painless nature of death. The
personal testimony provided by those who had been "restored" to life offered reassuring
proof, he argued, that the approach of death was painless, "or at the most attended with a
feeling of oppression across the chest".
Munk stated that such near death experiences, though varying in their specific details,
revealed a common element in which "although the mind was keenly active throughout,
there was an entire absence of pain or other bodily suffering". He then quoted the words of a
young admiral who, on board a ship in Portsmouth, had fallen into water and was unable to
swim. The admiral recalled:
From the moment all exertion had ceased, a calm feeling of the most perfect
tranquillity superseded the previous tumultuous sensations ... I no longer thought of
being rescued - nor was I in any bodily pain. On the contrary, my sensations were
now rather a pleasurable cast, partaking of that dull, but contented sort of feeling that
precedes the sleep produced by fatigue. Every past incident of my life seemed to
glance across my recollection in retrograde succession ... and each act was
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accompanied by a consciousness of right and wrong, or by some reflection of its cause
and consequence.25
According to the admiral it was only on being rescued and resuscitated that he was "tortured
with agony" instead of being "absolutely free from all bodily pain as in the drowning state".
For Munk this was clear evidence that death itself was, for the most part, painless and that it
was the process of recovery that was often one of great bodily suffering. Thus, the notion of
pain and vitality as inextricably bound, a concept established more than a century before and
discussed earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 2, IV), maintained its presence in Munk's
Euthanasia. Earlier writing on death again influenced Munk's view that death was often a
painless draining away of vitality. C.W. Hufeland had argued that "man can have no
sensation of dying, for to die means nothing more than to lose vital power; and it is the vital
power which is the communication between the body and the soul."26
However, despite going to considerable lengths to establish the idea that death often
occurred in the absence of physical pain, Munk maintained that death was as much a
psychological process as it was about bodily pain and suffering. "The Euthanasia" required a
calm mind and for Munk, who in 1842 converted to Roman Catholicism, such tranquillity
was to be found in Christian faith. It was through religious belief that the dying patient
would reconcile him - or herself with the life they had led and would find comfort in the
certainty of a future after death. According to Munk, a peaceful and calm death was
extremely difficult to achieve for those who did not share such faith. "If I may trust myself I
should say that in the aggressive disbeliever, as in the mere passive agnostic, doubt and
anxiety as to his future is sure to obtrude on his last moments, disturb them and render such a
euthanasia as we contemplate impossible," he wrote.27
What Munk described as "the influence of religion on the mind" was deemed an
essential element in securing calm at the end of life. Such an influence took time and
preparation, however, and would only be effective after an initial period of shock when the
patient learned that he or she was going to die. This brought Munk to a discussion of how
information regarding prognosis should best be shared with the patient. As already
considered earlier in this thesis (see Chapter 2,111), the question of what to tell the dying
patient was a subject that preoccupied elite Victorian physicians. For Munk, the question of
'truth-telling' took on a distinctly religious tone. For him the issue was not so much that the
physician might be mistaken in giving an unfavourable prognosis, but rather than the doctor
not only had the power, but also the moral duty to foster hope in life itself. The mental and
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physical states of the patient were seen to be intertwined, so much so, that improvements in
the patient's physical condition were often considered by Munk to be the results of giving an
optimistic prognosis. If in Christianity the dying patient was able to find hope in the belief of
an afterlife, in the physician the patient invested hope of a different kind - the hope that life
might be saved. This created a tension that Munk acknowledged. "I think it my first duty to
interpose myself between him [the patient] and everything that may possibly aggravate his
danger. And unless I shall have found him averse from doing what was necessary in aid of
my remedies, from want of a proper sense of his perilous situation, I forbear to step out of
my province in order to offer any advice which is not necessary to promote his cure."28
In a view that echoed Henry Halford's position on telling the truth, Munk stated that
the best way of giving an unfavourable prognosis was to allow friends and family to tell the
patient that he or she was dying. He stressed, however, that this was to be done under the
strict supervision of the physician. The relationship between doctor and patient would then
be left undisrupted and the patient could maintain a sense of hope by placing faith in the
doctor. According to Munk, this faith would be shattered if the doctor gave the gloomy
prognosis and pronounced "a sentence of death against which there is no appeal". In the
absence of friends or family, however, he argued that it was the responsibility of the
physician to be honest with the patient as it was "lamentable to think that any human being
should leave the world unprepared to meet his Creator". Drawing on his own experience,
Munk described how in such instances he had "departed from strict professional duty" and
had "apprised my patient of the great change he was about to undergo".29
The psychological state of the dying patient was clearly considered by Munk to be
extremely important, with mental calm and religious faith acting as lynchpins that supported
a bodily sense of quiet. No amount of opium could adequately substitute for Munk's "firm
belief in the mercy of God". Yet in spite of his argument that religious belief secured a
peaceful death, even the most faithful of patients were viewed as requiring hope that was
based, not only on the prospect of an afterlife, but on the belief that their own physical
survival on earth was a reai possibility. Thus, at the end of life "faith" operated in two
different ways, being first invested in the salvation of God and secondly, in the salvation of
the bedside physician. What emerges from a close textual analysis of Euthanasia is an image
of a late nineteenth-century physician attempting to position himself between God and the
dying patient - between nature and the physician's art. According to Munk, "nothing but
good" would come of the patient being allowed to prepare for death, and yet the news that
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death was imminent was to come, whenever possible, from family and friends. The role of
the physician was to prompt and direct the giving of such a prognosis so that information
might be released without "faith" in the medical practitioner being in any sense weakened.
Moreover, the physician's role was not only concerned with interpreting and responding to
the physical manifestations of illness and pain, but also involved the management of the
dying patient's psychological state.
IV. Hippocratic Principle and Unwritten Practices
It was not only a formal medical education that informed the judgement of Victorian
physicians when deciding how to treat the dying. In Euthanasia there were implicit and
explicit references to the importance of the physician's own experience that could only be
afforded by multiple encounters with death. Munk stated in the preface to his book that he
considered it a shortcoming of medical training that the management of death was not taught
to students. However, although Munk's writing consolidated and expanded upon the existing
literature on dying, there was much in Euthanasia that relied on what can arguably be
described as the intuition and discretion of the individual clinician. For example, Munk
stated that opium should be administered "judiciously and freely" and yet he also stated that
there were instances in which "all that the dying patient requires is to be left alone". He
declared it his duty to "interpose" himself between the patient and "everything that may
possibly aggravate" the patient's condition, while maintaining that "the act of dying is so
easy, that nature herself sometimes provides the perfect euthanasia".
As in the case of Hugh Noble's thesis, Munk's Euthanasia revealed a complex picture
in which the nineteenth-century physician was portrayed in some instances as battling
against nature and at other times allowing nature to run its course. Munk gave some
suggestion as to how such judgements might have been made in his comments on the
physical manifestations of approaching death - for example, the bodily rejection of food. For
the most part, however, he was no more explicit than stating that "in almost all cases, at a
certain period of their course [referring to the patient], the less of these [food and
nourishment] that is given the better". Indeed, though clearly offering a guide as to how to
manage the dying, Munk was less clear on the question of when such decisions should be
made.
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Jalland argues that Munk's Euthanasia was "the authoritative text on medical care of
the dying" in the late nineteenth century. I would not dispute this, but an interesting issue is
to consider the nature of the ground on which this authority was anchored.30 The silences and
omissions in Munk's treatise also have much to say about the way in which the relationship
between the doctor and patient was perceived in the nineteenth century - a relationship that
relied heavily, I argue, on the doctor's own experience and judgement. As the historian
Christopher Lawrence writes: "Between the science and the art [of medicine] the only
mediator was experience. In this regard experience took on a mysterious, indefinable quality
that made it the touchstone of all the physician's judgements."31 Tellingly, Lawrence gives
the example of one physician who believed it was not possible to communicate (either orally
or in writing) the knowledge gained by years of practising medicine. Only clinical
experience could provide the basis from which the individual doctor could form and perfect
medical judgement.32
In an 1883 edition of The Practitioner, a book review praised the publication of a
series of lectures intended for the training of nurses. According to the journal, the lectures
were based "on the excellent principle, that if you want a thing to be well done, you must
explain to the doer not only the how but the why". The journal continued: "the author is,
therefore, not afraid that the nurse should know too much of what is properly the doctor's
business. It is an inadequate smattering of this knowledge which makes the ill-trained nurse
presume beyond her true sphere."33 Yet perhaps paradoxically, when it came to demarcating
what was "properly the doctor's business" and defining the "true sphere" of the physician's
knowledge, the underlying emphasis in much of the nineteenth-century medical literature on
death was on unwritten practices and the experiential nature of clinical judgements. Though
the book review from The Practitioner appeared to convey an image of the medical
profession in possession of a body of knowledge that might be released with discretion to
nurses and other bedside attendants, the picture was more complex.
As discussed earlier (see Chapter 2, III), the scientific breakthroughs in pain-relieving
therapies left uncertainty with regard to the physiological action of new pain-relieving drugs.
In addition, however, there was uncertainty over the question of professional identity. Was
medicine to be grounded in the codified and scientific? Or was it an 'art' with foundations in
observation, experience and intuition? In treating the dying patient, nineteenth-century
physicians embraced scientific developments in pain relief, but both in practice and in the
articulation of practice an indefinable element was involved. As Lawrence suggests, clinical
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medicine "needed the ineffable wisdom and experience that came only with advanced years
... and the bearing of a gentleman".34
In Euthanasia Munk offered a detailed consideration of how to treat the dying patient,
drawing on the work of other leading nineteenth-century physicians in cautioning that, once
death approached, "we dismiss all thoughts of cure". Yet on the question of determining
when the physician should acknowledge that death was approaching Munk drew, not on the
work of his peers, but on Hippocrates. "It is often difficult to determine when the act of
dying really begins - the Father of Physic is still perhaps our best guide," he stated. The
patient approaching death would have "eyes that sunk into their orbits" and a face that "was
pale, livid or black" but before such a stage was reached Munk gave little specific indication
of how the young physician might come to a decision that curative measures should be
stopped.
Euthanasia did not present the inexperienced doctor with a codified set of rules that
determined decisions on when to intervene or when to let nature take its course. The newly-
qualified doctor would have found much of value in Munk's book, but only through
knowledge of unwritten and accepted practices would he become fully acquainted with the
management of death. This knowledge was gained through direct experience. In many ways,
despite Munk's contribution to medical literature on the management of death, the physician
remained alone, deciding in Munk's own words "as best he may, what to do and what not to
do, in the most solemn and delicate position in which he can be placed".
Munk's position might best be described as 'conservatively progressive'. While
willing to use pain-relieving drugs in order to secure a peaceful and calm death for the
patient, there was an explicit rejection of the idea that life could be shortened. If Munk
referred to Hippocrates when looking for signs of imminent death, the Hippocratic oath that
prohibited the doctor from ending life provided the principle by which his statements on the
management of death were guided. In considering the role of the physician in relation to the
dying patient, Munk endorsed the use of pain relief but also reasserted established values
such as the importance of religious faith. The strength of bedside physicians such as Munk
lay in the ability to offer palliative care that provided both physical and psychological
comfort.
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In order to divest death of its terror, nineteenth-century doctors adopted a number of
rhetorical strategies. First, death itself was described as often being 'naturally' painless and
easy, secondly, the importance of religious faith was emphasised as a source of indispensable
support; and thirdly, medical intervention in order to relieve pain was assured. However,
beyond the commitment to the principle that it was wrong for the physician to end life lay a
more subtle picture in which an awareness of the risks associated with the practice of pain
relief and a reliance on the physician's own clinical judgement fed into clinical decision
making. The negotiation between principle and practice may not have been as overt as it was
in the debate over the general use of anaesthesia, but, nevertheless, Victorian doctors were
faced with difficult decisions when treating the dying.
In concluding this section of the thesis, I argue that there were two distinctive forms of
discourse at work in nineteenth-century discussions of the management of death and pain.
The first was the explicit debate over 'active' euthanasia that I detailed in Chapter Three. In
this, the principle that life was sacred was challenged, as was the idea that nature was a
benign force that inflicted little or no pain on the dying. The accepted practice of
administering pain relief offered the means by which 'active' euthanasia could be achieved.
Proponents of 'active' euthanasia argued that requested death was simply a logical extension
of the medical ability and desire to alleviate suffering. They also, however, drew on
arguments that ranged outside a debate over pain relief. The impact of illness and pain on
others (not only on those known to the patient but also on society as a whole) became a
subject of consideration, as did notions of the 'usefulness' of the incurable and suffering
patient.
The second form of discourse was not a debate as such, but rather the negotiation,
interpretation and articulation of medical practice - a process that was conducted within the
medical profession. This included defining justifiable and unjustifiable forms of medical
intervention and the subtle drawing of distinctions between the 'preservation' and
'prolongation' of life. All this was filtered through a professional emphasis on the
importance of the individual clinician's own experience when caring for the dying. At an
ideological level, pain was no longer understood in terms that associated suffering with
divine will. It was seen as the physician's duty to alleviate the pain of the dying patient
whenever possible. The exact moment and timing of death, however, was viewed as the
province of God. The medical profession called on notions of both scientific knowledge and
clinical experience in order to establish the authority required to discern and uphold this
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view. Moreover, medicine was viewed, as Christopher Lawrence argues, "as a resource to
understand the natural and moral world".35 Nowhere was this more evident than in the
decisions made when caring for the dying. 'Euthanasia' in this context may have retained its
classical meaning of the calm and peaceful death, but it was also a word that continued to
raise questions about the nature of the relationship between doctors and their patients and the
way in which medical practice was understood.
Part of defining the role of the physician in the medical management of death was the
translation of medical practice into a recognised and accepted form of language that could be
applied when discussing how best to care for dying patients - Munk's Euthanasia being an
example. Yet by the turn of the century this shared language was beginning to come under
pressure, as medical men themselves were willing to publicly pronounce that they were
using pain-relieving drugs with the intention of ending patients' lives. The following
statement appeared in an edition of the Lancet in 1900:
The North Devon Herald of August 16lh contains a letter signed 'A Physician' in
which the writer lays it down as his opinion that it is justifiable for a physician to kill,
or as he prefers to call it 'to end a patient's inevitable suffering and hasten his certain
death'. He states with perfect calmness that he has relieved the suffering of a good
many patients. So we trust has every medical man but not in the sense that 'A
Physician' evidently means it to be taken. He cites two instances in which he kept
patients under chloroform until they died. With this procedure we have no quarrel. It is
a recognisable practice in cases involving great pain. But apparently 'A Physician'
gave the chloroform to kill for he says, ' I have always used chloroform, it arrests the
heart's action in systole'. If he wanted to kill his patient why did he not push the
chloroform, or directly that his patient was under its influence divide the medulla?
According to him both the patient and the patient's friends were willing that life
should be terminated. If so, why prolong the agony? We can only repeat that the well-
known opinion that it is not the duty of the medical man to take life. 3
This extract is illustrative of how the language used to describe medical practice
would prove so important in the twentieth-century debate over 'active' euthanasia.
Significantly, the Lancet did not condemn the doctor's actions, but the journal did object to
the explanation he gave for his actions. The language he used to describe his decision to
administer chloroform (acknowledged by the journal as "a recognisable practice") could not
be accommodated by the principle that it was wrong for the physician to end life (a principle
which the Lancet firmly restated). Later in the twentieth century this negotiation between
principle and practice was to intensify and, in contrast to the nineteenth century, medical
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PART 2
The Twentieth-Century Euthanasia Debate
Introduction: Moves to Legalise Euthanasia - Medical Support and Resistance
In the final years of the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth century,
overt medical interest in euthanasia (and throughout this chapter I use the term to imply the
physician deliberately precipitating death at the patient's request) was intermittent and
somewhat muted. When considering the medical management of the dying, much of the
literature written during this period essentially restated the thoughts and sentiments expressed
earlier by William Munk. In On Care of the Dying, a pamphlet published in 1894 that was
intended for nurses, the physician Oswald Browne extolled the virtues of attending to patients
at the end of their lives. According to Browne, the duty of caring for the dying was one of the
highest privileges that "amply repays the most careful study".1
Other literature reaffirmed the importance of the individual clinician's judgement and
of abandoning aggressive treatment when death seemed imminent. Harrington Sainsbury, a
physician at the Royal Free Hospital in London, counselled that when death approached "no
healing herb in all the gardens will avail anything".2 Sainsbury acknowledged the great
responsibility involved in coming to the decision that a patient was past recovery. He
maintained, however, that "if the futility of the strife is irresistibly borne upon us, then we
should put aside our remedia as cures, and ranging ourselves upon the side of Death make
easy the couch with such solatia as we may offer". Death was to be viewed "as a friend", he
argued, adding: "let us not compel him [death] to hostility, since he must prevail."3 Though
Sainsbury spoke openly in terms that positioned the physician "upon the side of Death" (no
reference was made to the 'prolongation' of life, a consideration deemed important by a
number of elite nineteenth-century physicians) the notion that the physician might
deliberately bring about death remained expressly forbidden.
This view was evident in Robert Saundby's Medical Ethics, published in 1902.
Saundby, a physician, academic and prominent member of the Medical Defence Union,
included the following entry on euthanasia in his influential text:
By euthanasia, I understand the doctrine that it is permissible for a medical practitioner to give a
patient suffering from mortal disease a poisonous dose of opium or other narcotic drug in order
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to terminate his sufferings. This teaching is contrary to the fundamental rule that we must hold
human life sacred, and to do no act which has for its object wilfully to destroy it, but a
distinction may be drawn between a dose of opium given with the intention to cause death and
one regulated to relieve suffering, although the latter may impair the nutritive and digestive
functions, and indirectly hasten the fatal termination of the disease. It may be a choice of evils,
but although the endeavour to alleviate pain is supported by general opinion, nothing should be
done to warrant any suspicion that the sanctity of human life is trifled with by the medical
profession.4
Within the medical community, Saundby's book would have been widely consulted.5 Like
Thomas Percival in his eighteenth-century Medical Ethics, Saundby considered matters of
etiquette, such as the importance of respecting the opinions of colleagues and of promoting a
positive image so that the profession was seen as "discreet and sober".6 Clearly, however,
medical-ethical matters involving the relationship between doctor and patient were also
subjects of concern - as illustrated in his statement on euthanasia.
Significantly, Saundby used the word 'euthanasia' to imply the deliberate and
intentional ending of life by a physician - a definition that, as I detailed in Chapter 3, had
only emerged in the 1870s. This is the earliest example that I have been able to locate in
which a doctor uses the term 'euthanasia' in such a manner. In addition, he explicitly referred
to the risks associated with opium administration when he stated that medical intervention of
this kind had the potential to "indirectly hasten" death. Again, as discussed earlier in this
thesis, the risks associated with pain relief had been debated before in medical journals.
Saundby's reference to choosing between the "evils" of pain relief that entailed risk, or the
consequences of leaving the dying patient in pain, was reminiscent of George Oliver's
nineteenth-century caution that the choice between morphine use and unrelieved pain was "a
balancing of evils nearly equal" (see Chapter 2, IV).
The difference in Saundby's Medical Ethics when contrasted with earlier medical
literature, was that the perceived risks of pain relief were now being directly linked to the
medical management of the dying and with an acknowledgement that such intervention might
"hasten death". This connection may have been hinted at in the past, but it had not been made
in an overt manner. Indeed, a number of elite nineteenth-century physicians, such as C. W.
Hufeland and Henry Halford, had stressed that death should not be hastened in any way.
William Munk did suggest that pain relief implied a degree of risk, but seemed to argue that
this might be avoided if drugs were only administered with the intention of relieving pain
rather than inducing sleep.
Saundby's writing appeared to acknowledge that risks could not always be avoided,
regardless of the physician's intentions, but like Munk, he drew a distinction between
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acceptable and unacceptable aims on the part of the physician relieving pain. By
acknowledging that the use of pain relief might "hasten death" but simultaneously
emphasising the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate "intentions", Saundby was
anticipating a central element of the debate over legalised euthanasia and pain relief that
would be played out later in the twentieth century. The relationship between this principled
rejection of life being ended by medical means and the ongoing changes to the way in which
the practice of pain relief was articulated and understood, is a central theme of the remaining
chapters that follow in this thesis.
This, of course, is my own interpretation and reading of the significance of Saundby's
discussion of euthanasia. The fact that at the time of the publication of Medical Ethics
Saundby used the term 'euthanasia' in a way that had only relatively recently been defined,
appears to have passed without comment. The reaction from the medical community may
well have been very different had he endorsed the practice of physicians deliberately ending
life, but Saundby clearly stated that such a notion was neither desirable, nor ethical.
Discussion of euthanasia (as defined in the terms set out by Saundby) did spill over into the
medical journals in the early part of the twentieth century, but in a way that, as I have already
suggested, was sporadic rather than sustained in nature.
Articles written in response to American attempts to legalise euthanasia at State level
appeared in the British Medical Journal in 1904, 1906 and 1907.7 Then, in 1911, after the
publication of the book Death by Maurice Maeterlinck and considerable coverage of this
book in the British press, the BMJ responded with a leading article on 'The Right to Die'.8
Maeterlinck, a Belgian poet, playwright and Nobel-prize winner for his contributions to
literature, had argued that doctors were frequently in the habit of prolonging the agony and
suffering of the dying. Patients should be allowed to die swiftly and easily, he argued.9 In its
leading article, the BMJ rejected Maeterlinck's "plea for euthanasia" and took the opportunity
to restate its opposition to Lionel Tollemache's 'New Cure for Incurables'. The journal
argued that no patient was duty bound to submit to surgery or any other type of treatment.
However, this did not affect "the cardinal principle expressed in the Hippocratic oath - that
the doctor, whatever the circumstances, must 'give no deadly medicine to any one, even if
asked, nor suggest any such counsel.'"10
Maeterlinck's book also provoked a response from Sir William Osier, who in 191 1
wrote to the Spectator to say that he was disappointed by Maeterlinck's "hysterical" and
"unfortunate" remarks. "The truth is", Osier wrote, "an immense majority of all die as they
were born - oblivious."11 In stating his opposition to the notion that physicians should
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deliberately bring about death and by reinforcing the view that death was often painless and
easy, Osier's views were characteristic of commonly held medical opinion in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Yet, for other reasons, Osier is a particularly
interesting case. In his 1905 valedictory address given on his departure from John Hopkins
University (Osier was leaving to take up a chair in medicine at Oxford), Osier referred to
Anthony Trollope's novel, The Fixed Period, in which it was proposed that those over sixty
be put to death by chloroform.12
While his speech received no adverse criticism from medical colleagues, it did generate
hostile criticism from the American press. In the words of one of the Osier's biographers,
Harvey Cushing, the doctor was portrayed as advocating the killing of older people and as "a
cold scientist who would condemn man as a productive machine".13 Osier was forced to
clarify his remarks. He explained that his comments had merely been made as an attempt at a
joke about retirement and to illustrate his observation that, after the age of sixty, many
professional men began to take on less work and to slow down. The BMJ remarked that the
incident was simply an example of what it perceived as the American deficiency in sense of
humour and that to suggest that a professor of medicine would have seriously proposed such a
policy was ridiculous.14
Aside from a few articles in medical journals on the more general subject of death and
dying, it was not until the 1930s that there was any sustained discussion of the proposal that
physicians should induce death.Prior to this, however, when the term 'euthanasia' was used
it was frequently taken to mean a death that was deliberately brought about by medical
means. Doctors, though arguing against the idea, were increasingly using the term in this way.
Nicholas Kemp argues that historical accounts of euthanasia commonly "portray a brief but
concerted debate in the 1870s, followed by a trickle of articles up to 1906, and then a period
of comparative silence until the 1930s."16 This assessment, he maintains, neglects to consider
the links between a particular strain of early twentieth-century eugenic thought that endorsed
non-voluntary killing and the movement for voluntary euthanasia in the 1930s. I will not
explore this connection at any great length here, but Kemp makes a convincing case for
reading this eugenic literature as a relevant background to later twentieth-century debates
over legalised euthanasia.
The events and repercussions of the First World War, of course, dominate the
landscape of early twentieth-century British history. The war led to the deaths of
approximately three-quarters of a million Britons, claiming, in particular, the lives of many
young men. In 1914, 30.58 per cent of all men aged between twenty and twenty-four were
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killed.17 Interestingly, Kemp argues that there was little discussion in relation to the mercy
killing of soldiers who were mortally wounded and suffering terrible pain (though that is not
to say that it was not practised). There was, however, a debate about what were perceived to
be the draining costs of supporting the mentally ill within British asylums when huge
economic resources were required for war. The Eugenics Review described modem warfare as
"entirely dysgenic" because it was the young and fit who were killed, not the physically
disabled or mentally ill.18 Kemp contends that certain strains of this argument can be detected
in later literature that proposed legalised euthanasia. Certainly, if one wished to explore the
non-voluntary dimensions that arguably lay behind the proposals of some of those who
advocated legalised voluntary euthanasia in the 1930s, then Kemp's book would be a very
good place to begin.
My interest, however, is the medical profession's role in relation to moves to legalise
voluntary euthanasia and, in particular, the way in which the practice of pain relief fed into
these euthanasia debates. So far, I have tended to suggest that the profession was reacting and
responding to calls for voluntary euthanasia that originated outside of the medical community.
By the 1930s this was no longer the case. Early in the twentieth century, the BMJ had
considered it ludicrous that a respected professor of medicine would seriously advocate death
by chloroform. In 1936, doctors were proposing exactly this - though they had in mind
voluntary death for cases of incurable and painful disease, a very different proposition to
Trollope's fictitious policy of compulsory death for those over sixty.
When I argue, therefore, that the official position of the medical profession has been
one that has rejected legalised euthanasia, it should be stated that this refers to the collective
position of the profession and cannot be applied to each and every individual doctor. As I
argue in the following chapter, legalised euthanasia has both been supported and resisted by
medical professionals throughout the twentieth century. From what appeared to be a unified
position of opposition to the proposal that physicians should end life, by the 1930s onwards, a
number of doctors were prepared to openly campaign for the legalisation of voluntary
euthanasia. Explaining why medical professionals became involved in such a campaign
involves exploring a number of complex factors - some of which I will only briefly allude to
in the remaining chapters of this thesis. One important concern that I examine in detail was
the alleviation of pain in incurable and suffering patients. Eugenic thought might have
influenced the arguments of some of those who advocated legalised euthanasia, but for others,
the issue was one of pain relief and the perceived inconsistency of the medical profession's
official opposition to legalised euthanasia but endorsement of other forms of medical
intervention.
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In 1931, Dr C. Killick Millard, Medical Officer of Health for Leicester, raised the issue
of legalising voluntary euthanasia in his presidential address to the Society of Medical
Officers of Health, a speech that was later published in pamphlet form.19 Millard argued that
patients often endured harrowing and protracted deaths, and he quoted statistics showing that
deaths from malignant disease, in particular cancer, were higher than ever. The time had
come, he argued, to legalise the right of a patient to request death by means of medical
intervention, and by way of preparing the ground for such a move he set out a model
voluntary euthanasia bill.20 Then, in 1935, the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society
(VELS) was founded and held its first public meeting in BMA House.21 Prior to this meeting,
an executive committee of three ministers, three physicians and a solicitor had been formed,
with Mr C. J. Bond, Senior Consulting Surgeon at the Leicester Royal Infirmary, appointed
chairman and Millard appointed as honorary secretary.22 Their attempts to recruit eminent
figures from the medical, religious and legal fields were a success. By early 1937 the VELS
could count 268 members, with 70 doctors making up this number.23 Now euthanasia was no
longer a subject purely of philosophical discussion, it was the focus of a practical, legislative
programme and this meant that the medical profession had to officially respond.
In the chapter that follows (Chapter 5) I begin by giving an analysis of the 1936 Bill
that sought to legalise euthanasia and then consider publications produced in the same year
that supported this attempt to change the law. I go on to examine medical responses to these
moves to legalise euthanasia from a range of perspectives, from those who supported
euthanasia (albeit to varying degrees) to those who vigorously resisted. The theme of 'natural'
death once again surfaces, particularly in the literature from the 1940s that I consider. In
addition, the three categories of argument that I identify throughout the thesis - principled
support/opposition to euthanasia, practical debates centred round pain relief, and conceptions
of 'social death' - figure in these debates. At the end of the chapter I examine the second
attempt to legalise euthanasia in 1950 and the subsequent arguments and negotiations that
took place in relation to pain relief. In the final substantive chapter of this thesis, Chapter 6, I
look at debates that accompanied the emergence of the hospice movement, debates that, as I
will argue, attempted to bring some sort of resolution to the question of legalised euthanasia
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Parliamentary Debate, Private Correspondence and a Papal
Declaration
I. The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill 1936
On 1 December 1936, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, President of the Voluntary
Euthanasia Society, introduced The Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill for its second
reading in the House of Lords. The Bill set out legislative proposals for voluntary euthanasia
for patients "of sound mind" over the age of 21, suffering from "incurable and fatal illness"
and in "severe pain". The Bill, based on the model set out by Dr C. Killick Millard, specified
that the patient requesting euthanasia first be diagnosed as "incurable" and two medical
certificates issued, "just as in the case of the cremation". The two certificates and the
application for euthanasia would be sent to an official euthanasia referee appointed by the
Minister of Health, who would then interview the patient in person. If satisfied with the
request, a license would be issued, in the presence of an official witness, and the request for
voluntary euthanasia granted.'
Beyond the bureaucratic details of the proposed legislation (though they in themselves
were a source of concern, particularly for the two medical peers who spoke against the Bill)
the 1936 Lords debate provides an interesting insight into establishment thinking on
euthanasia in the first half of the twentieth century. Primarily the debate centred round the
first two categories of argument that I identify, that is, arguments relating to principle and
arguments relating to the practice of managing pain. However, also explicit in this debate
were frequent references to the "despair" of the patient who "prolonged the anxiety of
others" and the "burden" such a patient felt when others were forced to watch his or her
bodily and/or mental decline. Tellingly, Lord Ponsonby remarked in his opening address that
the "consciousness of being a burden" and the "despairing view that you are no longer of
use" was perhaps "as poignant as the suffering itself'.2 This reference to the perceived loss
of 'self and loss of ability to sustain relationships, at least in the manner they were prior to
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illness, also suggests that a notion of 'social' death factored into the euthanasia debate of
1936.
During the debate three Lords spoke in favour of the Bill, whilst six spoke against. In
proposing the Bill, Ponsonby maintained that a society re-examining its attitudes to suicide
also needed to re-examine its attitudes to euthanasia. He argued that a far more lenient view
of suicide was emerging, whereby the decision to take death into one's own hands was no
longer forcefully condemned as it had been in the past. Despite this change in societal
attitudes, it remained the case that a person who knowingly and deliberately took their own
life was denied a Church of England burial. To avoid such a situation, coroners' juries were
using what Ponsonby viewed as a legal sleight of hand, by bringing a verdict of 'suicide
while of unsound mind'. This, Ponsonby argued, "may be proved in a few cases, but in many
more is not, strictly speaking, justified by the evidence".3
In principle, it was not wrong in certain specified circumstances to take one's own life,
nor was it wrong to ask for assistance, he maintained. "We all know cases of suicide", he
stated, "which were not only innocent but very noble."4 Seeking to end one's life, as a means
of escaping pain, was no less an act of heroism than the accepted examples of self-sacrifice
for others or for higher causes. Indeed, consideration for others was "uppermost in the minds
of the patients" who sought to bring their lives to an end.5 As for euthanasia being against
the teachings of Christianity, Ponsonby disagreed, but added that when principles came
down to a question of varying interpretations of religious belief, euthanasia was then
"beyond argument". There would be those who opposed his view, but there were many other
religious men who supported his position.6
On the practical issue of pain relief, leaving the management of pain to the individual
discretion of the doctor was not a satisfactory answer. Narcotics were, in the first instance,
"detrimental to the prolongation of life" but in addition, pain could recur and was not always
sufficiently managed. This placed too great a responsibility on the doctor, leaving the
management of death to the "unfettered discretion of a single individual". Ponsonby cited a
case that had recently come to his attention, of a patient suffering from incurable cancer.
Great pain and suffering had been endured, only temporarily relieved by morphine, and the
patient had "begged to be released". Concluding this anecdotal case, Ponsonby emphasised
that inadequate management of pain was not the only question at issue. Perhaps more
important was "the suffering, the anxiety, the burden" that the patient felt was imposed on
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the others around him. Patients were often forced to muster a "pathetic attempt at
cheerfulness" when in fact this was only to prevent "being weighed down with the burden he
feels himself to be to his friends".7 Thus, the three strands of argument that I identify
throughout this thesis emerge in Ponsonby's defence of the 1936 Voluntary Euthanasia Bill.
His principled support of the concept that it is right to take life in certain circumstances,
based on a defence of suicide; his practical argument that pain relief neither prolongs life nor
is effective in all situations; and his suggestion of perceived loss of 'self: all factor in his
arguments.
Though Ponsonby was quick to stress that the Bill had outside support from a number
of leading medical and religious figures, in the debate itself, both medical and religious
opinion unanimously opposed the Bill.8 Most strident in his denunciation of the Bill and all
that it stood for was Viscount Fitzalen of Derwent, who rejected an earlier appeal that had
asked that denominations of Christians opposed to the Bill stand aside so as not to inhibit
those in favour of legalising euthanasia.9 "Of course the religious question comes in," he
argued, "it cannot be ignored." He went on to argue that the Bill was not only contrary to
Christian thinking, it was also 'unnatural':
This Bill is not opposed only on Christian and moral grounds, it is opposed because it
is contrary to the law of nature. We do not oppose it because the Church condemns it,
but because it is an evil and a cowardly act.10
Significantly, the Viscount's statement revealed an image of 'nature' that operated outside
the sphere of human influence. According to this view, man was not to attempt to control
such "laws of nature". To sanction euthanasia would be an "evil" and "cowardly" dismissal
of these laws and (implicit in his view I argue) an 'artificial' means of seeking to control
death.
Not only did Fizalen oppose the bill on principle but he also challenged the idea that
pain should be continually fought. "I have no wish to volunteer for any greater degree of
pain of suffering than is likely to fall my share," he maintained, " but ... when you think of
the modern mania for luxury I cannot help thinking it is rather a warning to us against the
degeneration of the race."" Directly linking his principled opposition to euthanasia with the
notion that the practice of pain relief somehow led to over sensitivity and lack of endurance
he argued:
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Ifwe allow sentiment to run away with us, then it means an abandonment of principle,
it means that we are governed by our emotions, and we sacrifice that great virtue of
grit that has been such a great characteristic of our race.12
This view, that the presence and experience of pain in human life is part of a 'natural' order
in the world was a view that, as I discussed earlier, was also articulated in nineteenth-century
debates over the introduction of anaesthesia in childbirth and surgery. However, whereas
medical writers in the late 1800s had linked sensitivity to pain to the notion that society was
becoming ever more civilized, Fizalen argued that this sensitivity was a negative by-product
of a society that was indulgent and lacked endurance.
In contrast to Viscount Fitzalen, the Archbishop of Canterbury gave a very different
religious view, conceding that at times there were exceptions to the principle that that life
was sacred and that taking one's own life was forbidden. "Is there any moral principle in the
world", he asked, "which in the infinitely varied and tangled circumstances of human life
does not admit some exceptions?" 13 He agreed with Lord Ponsonby, who had given
examples of heroic acts of self-sacrifice, that life could be voluntarily relinquished without
blame, indeed, in a manner that was to be praised.14 However, in his view, this did not mean
the endorsement of legalised euthanasia:
But it is one thing to admit exceptions to the principle that a man may not lay down
his life, and it is another thing to give public statutory authority to the counter
principle and to say that in certain cases a man, in his own interests and for his own
sake, may bring his life to an end.15
The Archbishop questioned if a dying patient would be capable of "sound moral judgement"
and thought that the possibility of relatives exerting "illegitimate pressure" on the patient
should not be dismissed. He could not, however, accept the view that "pain and the duration
of pain need be accepted as ... means of moral and spiritual discipline". The "marvellous,
far-reaching and beneficent use of anaesthetics" meant that such a view was untenable. The
Archbishop's opinion was that the law should not interfere in what he viewed as the
"relationship of mingled intimacy and responsibility that exists between doctor and patient".
If in relieving pain the doctor was aware that such intervention might lead to the shortening
of a patient's life, then it was a "perversion of language to say that such a doctor could
regard himself as guilty ofmurder or manslaughter, or could even be charged with it".16
The two medical peers who spoke in the debate, Lord Dawson of Penn and Lord
Horder, sided against the Bill but, interestingly, their reasons for opposition had as much to
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do with practicalities as they did with principles.17 Lord Dawson rejected what he saw as the
intrusive nature of the proposals that, he claimed, "would turn the sick-room into a bureau
and be destructive of our usefulness". Revealingly, he argued that there had already been a
change in medical practice regarding care of the dying patient. The prolongation of life was
no longer the primary purpose ofmedicine in such a case. Rather, the easing of pain, even if
this ultimately hastened death, was now the goal of 'enlightened' physicians. This change in
practice had "evolved without intervention or change of Statute".18 Lord Dawson challenged
the notion that such an attitude was due to "degeneration" in attitudes to pain, but argued that
the change was due "to a truer conception of what life means and what the end of its
usefulness deserves". This "truer conception" of what life meant was the result of man's
"natural habit of freedom of thought" and "the evaluation of morals and manners".19
What is significant, is that Lord Dawson's opposition to the Bill neither involved the
rejection of the notion that the doctor may hasten death, nor did it challenge the use of the
term 'euthanasia' to describe this practice.20 Where his opposition did lie, was in the idea
that medical practice could be standardised and legalised. The Bill would have the opposite
effects to those that it desired, since, he argued, it would deter the doctors who were
"carrying out their mission of mercy", and the "gentle growth of euthanasia" would be
disrupted.21 Lord Dawson's words revealed an understanding of 'euthanasia' which was
viewed as a practice that was not regulated by law, but had more to do with what the
Archbishop of Canterbury referred to as "the relationship of mingled intimacy and
responsibility between doctor and patient".
Lord Horder's speech, similar to that of the other medical peer, also voiced concern in
relation to the logistical details of the Bill. The very fact that the Bill made provision for
euthanasia to be administered by someone other than the doctor attending the patient
throughout illness was a worrying scenario, he argued. In his view, replacing the "intimate
relations" between doctor and patient with "the introduction of strangers from Whitehall"
was not the solution to the problems of a suffering patient.22 In concluding his speech to the
House, he stated:
The two extremes of dying in pain and being killed do not exhaust the possibilities for
the stricken patient, because there is a middle position created by a kindly and skilful
doctor, who gives assistance to an equally kindly Nature, and that is what is implicit in
the patient's question: 'You will stand by me, won't you?' and the doctor's assurance:
'Yes I will.'23
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Here, the principle that the physician should not kill was upheld by means that not only
stressed the technical competence of the doctor, but also gave an assurance that the dying
patient would be psychologically supported. Lord Horder's conception of 'nature' differed in
a number of respects from that mobilised by Viscount Fizalen. Rather than viewing nature as
a phenomenon not to be controlled, Lord Horder's argument allowed for the idea that nature
could be 'assisted' by medicine. Of course, both conceptions were based on the notion that
'nature' could be understood as existing independently of human experience - one view
opposing intervention on the grounds that this violates natural 'laws', the other sanctioning
intervention in order to ease an inevitable 'natural' passage of events. Lord Horder's view of
nature was one that was benign, even "kindly", whereas Viscount Fitzalen's view of nature
was one that incorporated concepts of pain and suffering. Both views were representative of
wider attitudes to the role of medicine, some of which have already been examined in the
discussion of nineteenth-century medicine in the first part of this thesis.
However, the views represented by Lords Horder and Dawson reveal a shift in official
medical opinion from that of the late nineteenth century. At first glance this shift is difficult
to discern, since in the late nineteenth century doctors were already incorporating changes in
practice, most notably the use of pain-relieving drugs, into a conception of a 'natural' order
to life. By the early decades of the twentieth century, however, a change had taken place.
This change is detectable in Robert Saundby's definition of euthanasia in 1902, but becomes
increasingly apparent by the 1930s. Doctors were now acknowledging that they might indeed
be hastening death by administering drugs and by giving priority to pain relief. They were
acknowledging the risks that might be involved in such practice, but once again attempting
to build these risks into a conception of'natural' death. This conception of'natural' death, as
newly conceived in the first half of the twentieth century, excluded any notion of legalised
regulation but instead placed a relationship of trust between doctor and patient at its centre.
Christopher Lawrence describes the medical world of elite physicians (such as Lord
Horder) during the inter-war period as a "patrician social order", such that moves to
standardise and intrude on this world were perceived as a threat to "disrupt their clinical
universe".24 As Lawrence details, Horder spoke explicitly of the privileged position in which
medical professionals were placed - a position that called, in Horder's own words, for the
doctor "to be a priest as well as a physician".25 According to Horder, physicians were
required to be civilized, dutiful and, importantly, humane. The last of these qualities meant
alleviating the incurable patient's pain with all the knowledge and expertise at the individual
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clinician's disposal, but with the privacy and confidentiality afforded to the relationship
between priest and confessor.
It should be made clear that the actors participating in the euthanasia debate of 1936
did not explicitly draw a distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' death. As such, the
categories of 'natural' and 'artificial' death are ones that I use for my own analytical
purposes. By utilising these categories, I argue that in effect, a distinction between a notion
of 'natural' death - the physician relieving pain within the confines of a private,
unscrutinised sphere - and 'artificial' death - the legalisation of state controlled 'killing' -
was being drawn in the medical peers' contributions to the debate over the Euthanasia Bill.
The principle that the physician should not kill was maintained, not only by rejecting the
suggestion that it was right to kill in circumstances where suffering patients requested an end
to their lives, but also by challenging any necessary connection between 'hastening death'
and 'killing'. The practice of pain relief was justified on the basis that nature was merely
being assisted. Fears of Toss of self were assuaged with reassurances that that the doctor
would 'stand by' the anxious patient. Above all, it is significant that the physicians in this
debate were comfortable with the word 'euthanasia', though they offered a different
interpretation of its meaning to that proposed in the 1936 Bill. As I will argue, later in the
twentieth century, the medical profession relinquished its claim to the term 'euthanasia',
seeking to distance itself from any connection with the word.
II. Debate in the 1930s: Defining 'Real' Euthanasia
Despite the unanimous rejection of the 1936 Bill, interest in legalised euthanasia did
not diminish during the latter half of the 1930s, nor for that matter was it silenced during the
years during and preceding the Second World War. In the medical journals of the 1930s and
1940s, articles and correspondence appeared at steady intervals, revealing a range of medical
views that either challenged or legitimated medical practice of the time. For example, in a
letter to the BMJ 'm December of 1940, Killick Millard argued that despite medical advances,
particularly in the fields of surgery and radiology, deaths from cancer were at least twice as
great as in the early 1900s.26 Though accepting that not all patients suffering from cancer
died in agony, Millard maintained that there remained cases of extremely painful, incurable
disease that could not be helped by attempts to relieve pain. For such cases, he would
continue to press for a change in the law, "so that, with properly considered limitations,
painless death might be administered".27 Responding to Millard's letter, Dr C. O. Hawthorne
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(who had strongly rejected proposals to legalise euthanasia in 1935) argued that publishing a
list of eminent members of the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalisation Society was "little likely
to impress opinion within the medical profession." The task of doctors was to "relieve
suffering", not to "destroy life". A test of Dr Millard and his supporters would be to ask if
they were personally willing to volunteer to "administer the final draught". In the assessment
of Dr Hawthorne, Millard was "but a feeble disciple whose record was one of faith without
works".28
In the aftermath of the 1936 Bill, the debate over euthanasia remained complex,
fraught with ideological tensions that combined with claim and counter-claim in relation to
the efficacy of pain relief. Thus, with Millard's intervention euthanasia was supported, not
only on the grounds that it was right to kill in certain circumstances, but also on the basis that
conventional medical intervention was at times inadequate in the face of terrible suffering.
With Hawthorne's intervention, euthanasia was rejected on the grounds that doctors should
do all they could to "relieve suffering" but should not "destroy life". The contrast between
"destroying life" (Hawthorne's phrase) and "painless death" (Millard's phrase) was shaiply
drawn: the first carrying negative connotations that violated the parameters of the doctor's
duty to relieve pain, the second carrying more positive connotations located within a context
of physician administered treatment. Significantly, it is worth noting the subtleties of
language at work in Millard's own definition of euthanasia. In his letter of 1940, Millard
described euthanasia as "artificial release from extreme suffering", supplementing an earlier
view in which he stated that it was "no more a sin to shorten life than to try to lengthen it
beyond its natural span."29 Legalised euthanasia was thus portrayed in 'artificial' terms, but
in addition, medical intervention that was seen as illegitimately prolonging life was also
classed as interference with 'nature' - a conceptual move that called into question the
distinction drawn between unacceptable 'destroying' of life and other accepted forms of
medical practice.
Another view of euthanasia emerges in literature from the 1930s. This view
challenged the legalisation of euthanasia on much the same lines as Lords Dawson and
Horder opposed the 1936 Bill. However, it then went further than the medical peers by
endorsing not only the 'hastening' of death, but also suggesting that it was right, in certain
circumstances, to end the life of a suffering patient. In the essay 'Euthanasia and Voluntary
Death' in his book on Euthanasia and Other Aspects ofLife and Death, Dr Harry Roberts
supported euthanasia both on the basis of principle and as a practical extension of the need to
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relieve pain.30 These two facets of Roberts' support for euthanasia were brought together in
the opening to his essay, in an excerpt from the memoirs of Berlioz in which the author
describes the painful and protracted death of his sister from breast cancer.
... From cancer of the breast and after six months of horrible suffering ... And not a
doctor dared have the humanity to put an end to this martyrdom by letting my sister
inhale chloroform. This is done to save a patient the pain of surgical operations that
last a quarter of a minute: but this was not done to deliver one from a torture lasting
six months ... The most horrible thing in the world, for us living and sentient beings is
inexorable suffering. We must be barbarous or stupid, or both at once, not to bring it
to an end.31
To allow patients to suffer in such a manner was indeed inhumane, agreed Roberts. Although
the law and the "acknowledged code" of the medical profession prohibited the ending of life,
it was "cowardice rather than conscience or professional honour" that led doctors to "observe
the established convention", he argued. However, Roberts suspected that many doctors did
on occasion allow feelings of sympathy and pity to "override their prudence". He continued,
"to humane man the inclination to administer a merciful overdose is often almost, not
unsurprisingly, quite irresistible."32
Here, euthanasia was construed, not in terms defined by the administration of pain
relief that might 'hasten' death, but in terms that explicitly referred to overdosing the patient,
albeit mercifully. This concept of euthanasia was more in line with the practice advocated by
Dr Millard and opposed by Dr Hawthorne. Roberts, however, criticised and rejected the
formal proposals of the VELS. So far as the defined objectives of the society were stated,
"most informed people outside of the Catholic Church will be in general sympathy," he
argued. However, he cautioned whether the voluntary dimension to the euthanasia bill could
be guaranteed, noting that during the inaugural meeting of the VELS in 1935, two
"distinguished doctors" had spoken of legalising "a painless destruction of 'mental
monstrosities'".33 Similarly, at the same meeting, C. J. Bond, the Chairman of the Executive
Committee, had stated that the proposals were limited only to voluntary euthanasia.
However, Bond then proceeded to argue that, "as public opinion developed it would be
possible to form a true estimate of the value of human life" so as to allow "further progress
along preventative lines".34
Roberts' suspicion of the non-consensual potential of legalised euthanasia was
matched by an equal suspicion of bureaucracy. Like Lords Dawson and Horder, Roberts
rejected the notion of "forms going from one official to another", a process that he deemed
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"stressful for both doctors and patients alike". The proposed official arrangements seemed
more suitable for the cremation of a dead body, he argued. Then there was the "gross but
accurate term ... the finishing off' of the patient who had "previously looked to the doctor
for succour".35 Placing himself in the hypothetical position of a cancer sufferer in the
situation where nothing more could me medically done, Roberts hoped that his doctor would
"make that necessary modification in my medicine, which would hasten the pace over a bad
bit of going." That, in Roberts' assessment, "would be real euthanasia."36 He concluded:
Personally, I would not hesitate to painlessly end the life of an acquiescent patient at
an advanced stage of such a painful and incurable disorder as cancer of the larynx or
oesophagus - regardless of the convention of formal legality. When my sympathy
outweighs my fear of, and respect for the law, I obey the orders of the former.37
This view, as articulated by Roberts in his essay, offered a further variation on the
interpretation of the term 'euthanasia'. Roberts presented a principled argument in favour of
ending life, at odds with legal or professional convention, but ruled out any formal change in
the law. He opposed altering the law because of his fears of allowing non-voluntary killing
and over-bureaucratisation of dying. In relation to pain relief, Roberts viewed a "merciful
overdose" as entirely in line with good medical care when all that could be otherwise done,
had been done.
Such a definition of "real" euthanasia positioned itself between the proposals that
sought to legalise euthanasia and the official endorsement of the Hippocratic principle that
the physician should not kill. It was a definition that accommodated the idea of the physician
deliberately ending life but rejected any suggestion of state regulation in such a practice. In
defining the doctor-patient relationship, this "real euthanasia" preserved the Archbishop of
Canterbury's view of "mingled intimacy and responsibility", but interpreted the question,
"you will stand by me, won't you", as implying the ending of a patient's life. This was
different from the terms set out by Lord Horder in the House of Lords debate. It was an
image of death governed by humane sentiments that went further than the notion of
'hastening death', but instead explicitly permitted the painless ending of life in certain
circumstances.38 However, like the view expressed by Lords Dawson and Horder, this
position ruled out the imposition of structures of rules or external state scrutiny.
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III. 'Natural' Death and Pain Relief in the 1940s
Ambivalence surrounding whether medical intervention in order to shorten life
represented 'natural' or 'artificial' death continued into the 1940s. Euthanasia once again
found its way into the pages of the medical journals, alongside wider theoretical discussion
of how death should be located within an understanding of the 'natural' world. In November
of 1940, Dr Frederick Parkes Weber, a physician who specialised in rare diseases but who
also fostered an interest in attitudes to death and dying, wrote to the BMJ offering his support
for legalised euthanasia.39 Re-iterating the view of nineteenth-century physicians such as
Henry Halford, Benjamin Brodie, William Osier and William Munk, Parkes Weber
maintained that "the act of dying" was "not in any way as terrible to the dying individual as
it seems to his friends present at the deathbed".40 Nevertheless, there were "occasional cases"
of extremely painful, chronic disease in which the patient "who longs for artificial release"
should be administered a legalised "painless death". 1
Despite his use of the phrase 'artificial release', Parkes Weber placed medical
intervention in order to bring about death, within a particular view of 'nature'. He regarded
nature as "one of the manifestations of God" over which humans had "gradually been
permitted more and more control". He continued:
We have been enabled to avoid much suffering and death by aseptic surgery,
anaesthetics, anodynes, chemotherapeutic means, etc. Why should we not in
exceptional cases of chronic painful incurable disease relieve the patient of his life at
his repeated request? One often hears Nature blamed for cruelty, which we ourselves -
a part ofNature - might nowadays, and possibly are intended to, prevent.42
Rather than being set apart from an independent natural realm, human action, in particular
medical practice, was a constituent part of Parkes Weber's understanding of'nature'. Just as
the use of pain relieving drugs was now established in the technical repertoire of other areas
of medicine, so too should the ultimate form of pain relief - death - be available to the
suffering patient.
This conception of human life as an integral part of 'nature' was reflected in other
non-medical publications of the time. In 1941, an edition of the News Chronicle carried an
article by Julian Huxley (grandson of T. H. Huxley and brother of Aldous), the then
secretary to the Zoological Society of London, in which he called for "an overdue revolution
in theology."43 This was to be accomplished by "doing away with the idea of a personality of
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God." 'Nature' would then be understood in terms defined by the "human personality"
encountering and experiencing the external world. It was man's own capacity for
"experiencing things as sacred", Huxley maintained, that formed the basis of religious belief.
The "human tendency" to organise knowledge and to understand experiences such as death
and suffering created notions of the divine. If there was suffering in the world, it was
because "we have not yet made our God look good enough, nor believed in it actively
enough", he argued. The history of religion showed that conceptions of God had changed
and adapted. The Christian God for example, was conceived of very differently from the
"cruel God of the Aztecs or the all too human God of ancient Greece". It was in this
changing and developing image of God that Huxley believed "the central hope of religion for
the future" lay.44
This view, that linked 'nature' with the 'divine', suggested that human understanding
of experiences such as death was continually changing and adapting to new circumstances.
All that was 'natural' was in effect 'man-made'. Humans were not simply part of 'nature' as
in Parkes Weber's view; rather, they were the on-going constructors and creators of the very
concept that was 'nature'. Implicit in this conception of 'nature' was that death could be
viewed in whatever way humans chose; suffering did not need to be seen as a 'natural' part
of dying. Medical intervention in order to end life could just as easily be incorporated into an
idea of 'natural' death because 'nature' in itself was a human construct. Not surprisingly,
given this view, it is interesting to note that Julian Huxley was a vice president of the
Voluntary Euthanasia Society.45 He was also a supporter of eugenic thought. As I have
stated, I do not wish to delve too deeply into the connection between the eugenic ideas and
the movement for legalised euthanasia. However, the text of the Galton Lecture that Huxley
delivered to the Eugenics Society in 1936, appears to support Nicholas Kemp's argument
that a concern for those suffering from incurable and painful illness was not all that
underpinned the ideology of some vocal advocates of voluntary euthanasia.46
Returning to the theme of notions of 'natural' death - adding another voice to the
debate over the management of pain and euthanasia was John Ryle, a Cambridge University
academic and consulting physician at Guy's Hospital, London. In 1940, his article 'Of Death
and Dying' triggered a series of letters to the Lancet, both in praise and in criticism.47 "To
die is as natural as to be born," wrote Ryle, arguing that religion and superstition engendered
an unnecessary fear of death in the living. In reality, the actual process of dying was never as
terrible as imagined, he maintained, voicing a similar view to that of Parkes Weber. This was
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due to what Ryle described as the "wonderful compensatory relief which nature allows".48
Nature for the most part, ensured that fever and shortness of breath "imitated the twilight
sleep of morphine". Nevertheless, for the "blessed help of morphine itself, we can never be
too grateful", he concluded.49
Interestingly, despite maintaining that death was for the most part a painless
experience, Ryle conceded in private correspondence with Parkes Weber, that in certain
circumstances medical intervention in order to end life should not be ruled out. He wrote:
I believe that there are, in fact, few cases in which a proper use of drugs fails to make
the declining phase of painful illness tolerable. We give them perhaps, a slow
euthanasia, but without incurring undue responsibility or laying ourselves open to
criticism or regrets. There are however, probably still others in which a quick
euthanasia should be permitted.50
"Slow euthanasia", the everyday practice of administering pain relief to the dying patient,
was contrasted with "quick" euthanasia, implying administering a fatal dose. Indeed, the
letters pages of the BMJ reveal other examples of the term euthanasia being used in a dual
sense, to evoke the accepted practice of administering pain relief or the purposeful ending of
life. In a letter of January 1940, one doctor contrasted "barbarous euthanasia" -
administering ever-increasing doses ofmorphine that leave the patient in what he argued as a
"pitiable" state - with what the author saw as humane, legalised euthanasia secured by
means of a lethal dose.51 On the same page however, another doctor argued strongly against
euthanasia, stating that though doctors "need not try to prolong life that is coming to a
natural end", the interference of the law would only lead to "many difficulties" for all
concerned.52
The question of the relationship between 'natural' death and euthanasia in these
debates is clearly complex with the word 'nature' and the word 'euthanasia' being used in
different contexts and to define different concepts. Thus, 'nature' was presented as an entity
that could be shaped and directed through medical intervention, or as a benign force that
pacified and eased the dying process, or, finally, as an entirely man-made concept that
absorbed changing moral, theological and ideological thought. However, despite their
varying understandings of 'nature', it is significant that those who articulated these differing
views allowed (either publicly or in private correspondence) for medical intervention that
was intended to end life.
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IV. Pain Relief and 'Social' Death in the 1950s
In 1947, the subject of euthanasia came to the attention of the British newspapers
after a London-based general practitioner, Edwin Barton, publicly admitted that he had
deliberately ended the life of a patient in his care after being expressly asked by the patient to
do so.53 Barton made his admission at a meeting of the VELS and in a later interview with a
newspaper stated, "we all know things are done, but they are not done legally. It is wilful
shortening of life and it is we, the general practitioners, who are willing to accept the
heaviest responsibility, risking our status as doctors and our necks if it came to the courts ...
Voluntary euthanasia should be legalised."54 Neither the police, nor the General Medical
Council took any action against Barton. The GMC argued that because no official complaint
had been made against the doctor, the case was "outside our province". An unnamed
member of the British Medical Association was quoted as stating that "a doctor is legally
entitled to say, I am not going to prolong the life of a sufferer."55 Again, the issue seemed to
be one of definitions: were Dr Barton's actions to be construed as the illegal "wilful
shortening of life", or were they the acceptable result of a doctor who did not wish to
"prolong the life" of a patient who was in pain?
Despite the defeat of the 1936 Bill, the Barton case, and a similar case involving an
American doctor that received a great deal of publicity in both the United States and Britain,
contributed to the issue of legalised euthanasia remaining an active subject of debate.56 A
further attempt was made in the House of Lords to legalise euthanasia 1950, but again
without success. Significantly, all four medical peer - Lord Horder (who spoke in the 1936
debate), Lord Webb-Johnson, Lord Haden-Guest and Lord Amulree (a key figure in geriatric
medicine) - spoke against the Bill.57 In his opening speech in support of legalised euthanasia,
Lord Chorley immediately drew attention to the question of pain relief. One of the
"outstanding triumphs" of the medical profession in the last century, had been the ability to
alleviate "an enormous amount ofmisery". Nevertheless, doctors could not take this "beyond
a certain point" and on occasion, particularly in cases of protracted illness, patients
developed high levels of tolerance to morphine. They were unable to lose consciousness and
a "terrible state of affairs" resulted.58 Lord Chorley then suggested that Lord Dawson of
Penn (who was no longer alive in 1950), although voting against the 1936 Bill, had in effect
made "an eloquent plea for voluntary euthanasia" when he suggested that it was entirely
acceptable to hasten death by using pain-relieving drugs.59 Lord Haden-Guest immediately
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challenged this view, stating that he had a copy of Lord Dawson's speech in front of him and
that it did not advocate the doctor giving a lethal dose of any drug to a patient.60
In his speech, again in opposition to legalisation of euthanasia, Lord Horder sought to
clarify his earlier statement of 1936 in which he had used the rhetorical question of the
patient asking "you will stand by me won't you?". This did not mean "abolish my pain",
argued Lord Horder, rather it meant, "Help me get rid of this pain, and if it cannot be got rid
of entirely then help me to bear with fortitude what I am able to bear."61 From just a few
brief extracts from the House of Lords debate of 1950, it is apparent that the practice of pain
relief occupied a central position in relation to euthanasia. This was evident in Lord
Chorley's assessment that when Lord Dawson spoke of hastening death in 1936, he was in
effect advocating euthanasia. In addition, there was Lord Horder's interesting insistence that
he was not advocating killing when he spoke of "standing by" the patient in pain. The way in
which the practice of pain relief was understood and publicly represented was of crucial
importance when either supporting or opposing euthanasia
Outside the confines of formal parliamentary discussion, the role of pain relief
continued to occupy a central position in euthanasia debates in the 1950s. A view that linked
the perceived inadequacies of pain relief and the notion of 'social death' was voiced by The
Very Reverend W. R. Matthews, the Dean of St Paul's Cathedral, London. Rather than
emphasising an argument based on sanctity of life, the Dean stressed the "sacredness of
human personality".62 Elaborating on this point, he argued:
When a Christian first hears the proposal to legalise voluntary euthanasia he naturally
thinks that it is a dangerous one, because it may weaken or even contradict the
principle of the sacredness of human personality ... but it seems plain to me that the
principle of sacredness of human personality cannot be stretched to cover the case of
those whom the proposed legislation has in mind.63
The "disintegration of personality" of the patient in terrible pain, so that he or she was
unrecognisable to family and friends, meant that the Dean endorsed legalised euthanasia.
This "gradual degeneration of a firm and fine character" into an "existence" that the Dean
described as a "continuous drugged dream" had led him to reconsider his position in relation
to euthanasia, initially opposing its legalisation, but now arguing in support. Sacredness of
human life, but also, importantly, sacredness of human personality, was a "fundamental tenet
of Christian faith", he argued.64 The Dean wanted to "make it quite clear" that he held no
sympathy for the notion that human lives could be disposed of "at the convenience or
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pleasure of the State, or some other human institution such as the family". Nevertheless, in
considering the case of the incurably ill patient who was "destined to have a period of
agonising suffering relieved only by the administration of narcotic drugs", then the "doctrine
of the sacredness of human personality", he argued, no longer applied.65
In contrast, in the case of Letitia Fairfield, a doctor, barrister and convert to
Catholicism, the practice of pain relief was used to bolster opposition to legalised
euthanasia.66 A great principle in Christianity was that the sanctity of human life and human
suffering could not, "in a Christian civilization be met by the destruction of the sufferer", she
argued.67 Regarding life in such a manner, she maintained, meant that there was an incentive
to pursue research into pain relief and the treatment of chronic illness. Each year brought
new methods of relieving pain and, in Fairfield's view, this was merely "at the beginning of
what mankind can do".68 The proposed legalisation of euthanasia was nothing more than
"confused thinking swayed by emotion" and whilst Catholics should never give the
impression that religion left them "callous or smug about other people's troubles", they were
on "firm ground ... in refusing to regard murder as the proper solution".69 Although
opposing on principle the suggestion that the lives of chronically ill patients be ended at their
request, Dr Fairfield also called into question the practical repercussions of legalising
voluntary euthanasia. Once a law was passed and the "commandments flouted", legalised
euthanasia would open the way for all kinds of abuse - including the prospect of non¬
consensual killing of those deemed to be "troublesome".70
At the annual general meeting of the VELS in 1955, members voted to change the
name of the organisation to the Euthanasia Society.71 This, it was argued, was for practical
reasons as opposed to any change in the fundamental philosophy of the movement. With a
simpler and less cumbersome title, the society would be more readily identifiable and easier
to locate in telephone directories. To make clear that the campaign was only for requested
death, a sub-title was added that defined the movement as "A society for obtaining the
legalisation of voluntary euthanasia'.72 However, despite this explicit reference to the
voluntary nature of the society's proposals, there remained a suspicion that legalised
euthanasia would lead to a broader interpretation of the specified terms so that the elderly
and mentally ill were put at risk. Given this fear, dropping the word 'voluntary' from the
society's title was, as Kemp suggests, "perhaps not the most politic gesture".73
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The view, that legalised euthanasia would leave the vulnerable in society exposed, was
a concern that was commonly expressed by opponents of such legislation. Indeed, in the
House of Lords debate of 1950, the Archbishop of York had argued against legalised
voluntary euthanasia by suggesting a connection between the proposed legislation and the
dangers of the Nazi euthanasia programme, stating that Germany had already "placed its feet
on a very slippery slope".74 When asked in 1957 how she envisaged her own death, Letitia
Fairfield responded by stating that she hoped that the doctors and nurses at her bedside "kept
their respect for human life" and did not consider it their right to end her life because she
was "old and feeble". She continued: "I want to feel that my going is as peaceful and as free
from pain as possible, not unduly delayed if the body has done its work, but certainly not
unnaturally hurried."75
Returning to the question of the use of anaesthetic drugs in the medical-management
of the dying, the examples provided by Dean Matthews and Letitia Fairfield reveal how pain
relief was tied to a notion of 'social' death in the 1950s. By drawing on a range of different
arguments, euthanasia was either supported or opposed. In the first instance, legalised
euthanasia was supported with an argument that stressed how poor relief of pain led to loss
or "disintegration of self'. In the second, euthanasia was opposed with an argument that
rejected any qualitative assessment of human life but stressed the growing effectiveness of
medical intervention that relieved pain. In the first instance, the principle of sanctity of
human life was re-formulated and presented as "sanctity of human personality" so as to
exclude from this latter term those who, in a "drugged dream", were perceived as artificially
"existing", rather than living. In the second instance, the use of pain relief was construed as a
potential means of securing a peaceful, painless and 'natural' death. This positive view of the
pain-relieving power of medicine was then contrasted with euthanasia, perceived in this
instance as a form of legalised "murder" that left the vulnerable subject to qualitative
assessments of the value of their lives. Once again, by modifying and defining the terms of
debate in order to accommodate particular and differing views, euthanasia was supported as
either an extension or violation of divine will, as either 'natural' or 'artificial'
The significance of consciousness and mental alertness alluded to in Dean Matthews'
reference to the dying patient's "drugged dream" of an existence, plays an interesting role in
euthanasia debates during the first half of the twentieth century. For supporters of euthanasia,
at least until the mid-1950s, the argument that the administration of pain relieving drugs was
not always adequate was supplemented by the condemnation of a certain strand of religious
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thinking, particularly Roman Catholic, regarding the use of pain relief. In 1936 Killick
Millard described "the Catholic dogma" connected to what he perceived as "the excessive
importance which many have attached to a man's state of mind on his death bed, and which
has found expression in the sacrament of'extreme unction'".76 This ceremony (mirroring the
ritual of baptism but marking the end, rather than beginning of a Catholic's religious life)
involved the priest reciting a special prayer, absolving the patient of his or her sins, and
anointing the body of the dying person with oil that had been blessed. Significantly, the ritual
required that the person had "full use of his senses" in order to reap the "spiritual benefit and
the comfort of mind" afforded by the ceremony.77
There were variations within Roman Catholicism on the administration of pain relief
at the end of life. The 1909 Catholic Encyclopedia, avowedly dedicated "to the sanctity of
life from conception to natural death", stated that "pain relief ... in so far as it may be
artificially brought about by the employment of anaesthetics, deprives the sufferer of reason
at a time when competency is most necessary".78 However, the Latin text of Summa
Theologiae Moralis, first published in 1904, suggested a slightly more lenient line and stated
that drugs could be given so long as "the use of reason is not permanently removed or at any
rate is soon restored."79 The use of pain relieving drugs divided Catholic opinion, with some
writers maintaining that the preservation of consciousness should be given greater
consideration than the need to alleviate suffering on the part of the dying patient. It was this
view that Killick Millard and the Euthanasia Society opposed, arguing that at times pain
relief was not only inadequate but also that its administration was, in certain circumstances,
constrained by religious "dogma".
Interestingly, both the Euthanasia Society and Roman Catholics who strictly held to
this notion of consciousness, though arguing on opposite sides of the euthanasia debate,
placed an emphasis on the dying patient's capacity for mental awareness. Though the
Euthanasia Society opposed any restraint being shown in administering pain relief, Dean
Matthews' reference to the "drugged dream" of existence, if compared with the Catholic
insistence on preserving mental clarity, hints at some shared idea that consciousness
constituted a key element of a patient's ability to function fully. Significantly, one Catholic
writer went so far as to suggest that as long as drugs did not deprive the patient of
consciousness, then the "artificial hastening of death" (and here I quote the author rather than
imposing my own analytical category of'artificial' death) might even be permitted.80
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However, this view that death might be 'artificially' hastened was not representative
of predominant Catholic thinking in the first half of the twentieth century. If consciousness
on the part of the dying patient was judged to be of vital importance, then so too was the
notion that death could not be hastened but rather should occur at a 'natural' divinely
appointed time. Killick Millard was clearly criticising what he saw as an overly zealous
attachment to the concept of a dying patient's consciousness when he condemned "the
excessive importance placed on a man's state of mind on his death bed". Yet by 1936, the
same year in which Dr Millard made his criticisms, there is textual evidence to suggest that
Catholic thinking in relation to pain relief and mental clarity was adapting to the demands of
changing medical practice and techniques.
In a reference book for priests, Henry Davis, a professor of moral and pastoral
theology at Heythrop Jesuit College, London, gave the following definition:
The term [euthanasia] is a euphemism for the deliberate taking away of the
consciousness of another, so that it will not return before death. The patient passes
away in painless sleep. We are assuming that drugs do not shorten life. If they do then
euthanasia is murder and indefensible. It is clearly defensible on moral grounds, to
administer drugs to relieve suffering or to produce necessary sleep.81
This endorsement of inducing "necessary sleep" by medical means was qualified by an
insistence that the patient should not be rendered unconscious unless he or she was
"spiritually prepared for death", having had "all possible ministration of the Church".82 Also,
the writer maintained that it was possible "with great care and attention" for pain to be
relieved without destroying consciousness, and concluded by adding that it was "a serious
sin against charity to be the direct and voluntary cause of another dying unprepared".83 This
illustrates how the administration of pain relief was gradually being being absorbed into a
particular religious conception of a 'good' death. The emphasis on mental clarity was
maintained, as was the notion of spiritual preparedness on the part of the patient - but there
was also a concession to loss of consciousness in extreme circumstances. Davis added: "...it
appears to be morally right to employ drugs to relieve pain and incidentally take away
consciousness."84 It also is interesting to note how this view of pain relief - benign if given
to produce "necessary sleep", malign if administered to "shorten life" - resonates with the
late nineteenth-century discussion of morphine use by the Catholic physician William Munk.
If, in the mid-twentieth century, the Catholic position on the dying patient's mental
state was adjusting in order to accommodate the practice of pain relief, then this adjustment
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in no way stretched to any re-consideration of legalised euthanasia as proposed by the
Euthanasia Society. Despite examples of Catholics, such as Henry Davis, using the word
euthanasia as a "euphemism" for relieving pain and inducing sleep, the use of pain relief, as
newly re-articulated by the Catholic Church, was increasingly becoming disconnected from
any association with the term euthanasia. As one Catholic writer wrote: "it is not euthanasia
to give a dying person sedatives merely for the alleviation of pain, even to the extent of
depriving the patient of the use of sense and reason."85
In 1937, the author of The Catholic Doctor, Fr. A. Bonnar, was scathing in his
reproach to those members of the Anglican clergy who supported legalised euthanasia,
arguing that:
It is not surprising that the Euthanatists have been able to get from the Anglican clergy
a more or less imposing list of supporters for their cause. It seems, and I say it in
sorrow rather than in contempt, that any crank or lunatic, if he be of sufficient social
standing, can get ample support from that disintegration of Christianity.86
While Dean Matthews used the term "disintegration" with particular reference to the
personality of a dying patient as a basis for supporting euthanasia, Catholic theologians like
Bonnar used the same word, "disintegration", when articulating what they saw as an attack
on principled Christian values. In particular, The Catholic Doctor criticised the Rev. Dr W.
G. Inge, the then Dean of St Paul's and a predecessor of Dean Matthews, for his support of
legalised euthanasia. Inge had reportedy stated that he hoped, even if his death was painful,
that he "should have the courage to wait until the end". This position was judged hypocritical
by Bonnar: "He approves of suicide, or its more recent suicide-cum-murder form which is
called Euthanasia, provided it is not for him or those connected with him."87
Nevertheless, despite this robust rejection of legalised euthanasia, the impact of pain-
relieving drugs on the medical management of dying patients was such that, in 1957, a papal
declaration spelling out the Catholic position regarding the administration of pain relief was
issued. This declaration stated that even if the doctor anticipated that the use of narcotics
would shorten life, pain-relieving drugs could legitimately be used. In such cases, death was
not to be intended or sought by the doctor; the intention was solely to be that of relieving
pain.88 With this official announcement, the debate over consciousness at the time of death
was effectively ended, endorsing the use of pain relief with the proviso that the 'intentions'
of doctors met specified criteria. Thus, what has become known, and not without
controversy, as the principle of 'double-effect' was written into Catholic doctrine. This
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'principle' maintained that if a doctor administered drugs with the intention of relieving pain,
providing the patient's death was a secondary and unintentional effect of the administration
of pain relief, then medical intervention of this type did not constitute killing, or for that
matter euthanasia. Medical intervention of this sort was described as merely good medical
practice.
It was on this basis that doctors such as Letitia Faifield endorsed the use of pain-
relieving drugs and yet rejected the suggestion that they entertained any notion of intentional
killing. In the script for a television programme on euthanasia in which she participated in
1957, Fairfield supported the principle of double-effect by referring to the recent papal
pronouncement on pain relief.89 Answering an argument made by moral philosopher and
honorary vice president of the Euthanasia Society, Professor Glanville Williams, who had
stated that the notion double-effect did not withstand scrutiny, Fairfield defended the
principle by maintaining that 'intention' held the key in determining acceptable medical
practice. The doctor's duty was to diminish pain, she argued, and "intention tells us how to
draw the line between shortening life and accelerating death".90 In a hand-written note in her
script, Letitia Fairfield added, "People do not really want Jehovah doctors with powers over
life and death."91
When challenged by Glanville Williams as to whether doctors were "frank about their
normal practices" and did "in fact administer euthanasia fairly often, and cover up by
pretending that real intention was simply pain relief', Fairfield insisted that pain relief was
"not a cover but a legitimate motive".92 Some Catholics were too strict on the issue of pain
relief when there was now a papal declaration stating that "there is no particular grace in
suffering", she argued.93 Just as she maintained that she did not want her own death
"unnaturally hurried", she also argued that by administering drugs with the sole aim of
relieving pain, doctors left the patient with "a natural chance to recover".94 Dr Stewart Noy
Scott, a general practitioner, also taking part in the debate, stated that "deliberately cutting
short life has a criminal purpose, it is murder. We have sworn not to do it."95 A producer's
note in the script added: "IfNoy Scott is willing, he should tell how he eased the death of his
own son. He kept him under [sedation] and gave him drugs at such intervals that the son did
not regain consciousness. The point is that his son died in comfort and peace."96
This discussion reveals how, to a large extent, support or opposition for euthanasia
depended on the way in which the practice of pain relief was understood and, indeed,
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articulated. What is interesting is the way in which, although this support or opposition
remained firm, the content of the arguments and the manner in which they were structured
changed, depending on the particular context in which the arguments were being made. For
example, in the early part of the twentieth century there was a particular preoccupation with
mental clarity at the time of death, certainly within Roman Catholic quarters, but by the late
1950s this was becoming less of a concern. Instead, by 1957 a position that endorsed the
liberal use of pain relief had emerged, even if this implied hastening death. This form of
opposition to the legalisation of euthanasia - opposition that rested on a particular defence of
pain relief - was gaining ground across a range of different constituencies: medical, legal
and religious.
In the same year as the papal declaration of 1957, the principle of double-effect was
effectively written into English law when Dr John Bodkin Adams was cleared of murder,
after being accused of administering overly high doses of morphine when treating elderly
patients. The summation of the trial that the presiding judge Lord Patrick Devlin made to the
jury, encapsulated the concept of 'double-effect':
He [the doctor] is entitled to do all that is proper and necessary to relieve pain and
suffering, even if the measures that he takes may incidentally shorten life. This is not
because there is a special defence for medical men but because no act is murder which
does not cause death. ...The cause of death is illness or injury, and the proper medical
treatment that is administered and that has an incidental effect on determining the
exact moment of death is not the cause of death in any sensible use of the term. But...
no doctor, nor any man, no more in the case of the dying than of the healthy, has the
right to cut the thread of life.97
In a manner that mirrored the acceptance of pain relieving-practices in the nineteenth
century, this twentieth century justification of pain relief accommodated the use of
anaesthesia whilst upholding a concept of 'natural' death. The difference in the twentieth
century, was the explicit acknowledgement that medical intervention of this kind potentially
hastened death and that, as a consequence, the timing of death was no longer, in every case,
solely the province of God or nature. Although a subject of discussion in the late nineteenth-
century, the 'intentions' that lay behind the administration of pain relief were now given
even greater emphasis. Stressing that it was only the desire to relieve pain that motivated
"proper medical treatment", opponents of legalised euthanasia understood pain relief in a
manner that was very different from that of those who supported legalisation. Advocates of
legalised euthanasia such as Glanville Williams argued not only that the concept of double-
effect was questionable, but also that an 'artificial' existence under the influence of drugs
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should not be inflicted on those who wished to end their lives. For euthanasia's opponents,
pain relief was a means of securing a 'natural', peaceful end to life, an image that portrayed
the doctor not disrupting but rather assisting the 'natural' course of a patient's death.
In this chapter I have traced a number of different strands of the euthanasia debates in
the first half of the twentieth century. From the first attempt to legalise euthanasia in 1936, to
the subsequent rather generalised and abstract debates that sought to define euthanasia, it is
clear that euthanasia was a subject of increasing debate as opposing parties sought to lay
claim to a definition of euthanasia on their own terms. By the early decades of the twentieth
century, official medical voices, such as those of Lords Dawson and Horder, were conceding
that the administration of pain relieving drugs carried a risk of hastening death. Other
medical voices, such as that of Harry Roberts, went further. 'Real' euthanasia, he argued,
involved 'ending life' rather than 'hastening death', but again without the need for legislative
change. Then there were those such as John Ryle who advocated the administration of
'painless death' for patients in extreme pain; a position that distinguished 'slow' euthanasia -
the everyday practice of hastening death by giving pain relief - and 'quick' euthanasia - the
administration of a fatal dose of pain relief.
The term 'euthanasia' was used in different ways and in different contexts, but despite
contributions to the debate of the kind offered by John Ryle, the idea that euthanasia should
imply the legal recognition of the physician deliberately bringing about death was largely
resisted. By the late 1950s, a more unified position within the medical profession was once
again emerging - one that endorsed the use of pain relief, even if this potentially hastened
death, but rejected the legalisation of euthanasia. In both medical and religious discourse,
those opposed to legalised euthanasia began to distance themselves from the any association
with the term 'euthanasia'. Resolving the arguments in relation to pain relief and euthanasia
would not prove easy. Yet, as the final chapter of this thesis explores, the justification and
consolidation of a position that endorsed the liberal use of pain relief but rejected the notion
of the physician 'intentionally' ending life, prepared important ground for arguments over
legalised euthanasia in the remaining decades of the twentieth century. The debate over pain
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Chapter 6
Euthanasia and the Hospice Movement
I. Hospice Care: An Institutional Response to 'Natural' Death
From the somewhat generalised and abstract debates of the first half of the twentieth
century, I turn now to consider the impact that the ideas behind the establishment of the
hospice movement had on the question of euthanasia. With the emergence of hospice
provision for care of the dying, a subtle shift in the construction of arguments, both for and
against euthanasia, can be detected. Up until now, this thesis has largely examined the
ideological and practical problems faced by individual, often elite, medical practitioners
when treating dying patients. Demarcating the acceptable range of responsibilities and
powers when caring for the dying was a process that predominantly involved doctors sharing
anecdotal accounts of encounters between individual clinicians and their patients, albeit
filtered through wider sets of particular changing cultural, religious and medical concerns.
With the entry of hospices as a new point of reference in euthanasia debates, on-going
arguments were now re-located to an institutional setting - a setting that provided, at least in
part, both rhetorical and material solutions to the problems of caring for the dying.
The development of ideas behind the modern hospice movement can be traced to the
1950s and 1960s when concern began to mount, initially amongst a small number ofmedical
professionals, in relation to what were perceived as the inadequacies in provision of care for
the dying. Arguments against legalised ending of life, already rehearsed at the end of the
nineteenth century and throughout the early part of the twentieth century, were once again
mobilised, but this time in the context of specific proposals for a practical, institutional
response. In effect, the establishment of the hospices and the accompanying philosophy that
underpinned their development moved euthanasia debates to new ground. With improved
practical provision for care of the dying, opponents of euthanasia felt their position was
strengthened, while supporters of euthanasia were forced, to some degree, to re-formulate
and re-examine the basis of their continued calls for legalisation. ,
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As with the contributions of William Munk in the late nineteenth century and Letitia
Fairfield during the first half of the twentieth century, an emphasis on palliative care
provided an alternative position for medical professionals who argued against calls for
legalising euthanasia. By the late twentieth century, however, palliative care had emerged as
a highly sophisticated and multidisciplinary field.' Those working in the hospice and
palliative care setting developed an alternative discourse characterised by the concept of
managing 'total pain': an all-embracing phrase referring to the physical symptoms, mental
distress, social problems and emotional difficulties of the dying patient. In practice this
meant offering support for the patient as a 'whole person' with not only doctors and nurses
involved in providing care, but also the involvement of a team of other professionals such as
chaplains, social workers, counsellors and occupational therapists.2
By offering this comprehensive network of not only medical but also social support
for patients, proponents of hospice care argued that calls for legalised euthanasia (in their
view a disturbing symptom of inadequate provision of care for the dying) were now rendered
redundant. Also, those who opposed euthanasia sought to bring a new sense of clarity and
definition to the term itself. No longer was the word 'euthanasia' cast in shades of grey.
Distinctions, such as those discussed earlier in this thesis, between 'real' or 'quick' or 'slow'
or 'barbarous' euthanasia were abandoned. Instead proponents of the hospice movement
disassociated themselves from the term euthanasia in any form. Legalised or otherwise,
euthanasia was viewed strictly in terms of requested 'killing' - a notion perceived to be
outside the bounds of hospice or indeed any type ofmedical care.3
To a degree, the concerns of the hospice movement resonate with the bleak view of
modern medicine offered by writers such as Aries and Illich, who depict death in hospital as
an isolating and de-humanising experience. Countering such alienation, proponents of the
hospices claimed to place patients and their families at the centre of their focus of care,
stressing the importance of listening to the dying patients, and rejecting the notion that
patients be subjected to aggressive or intrusive treatment. To this extent the hospice
movement could be construed as essentially 'anti-modern', embracing 'traditional' values
and "striking a responsive chord in people who lament the gradual erosion ofmany modes of
support once provided by family and community".4 Nevertheless, the emergence of the
hospices as an alternative form of terminal care cannot be neatly categorised simply in terms
of a response to a perceived increase in the medicalisation of death. If 'traditional' values lay
at the heart of hospice philosophy, then these values were 'reinvented' so as to accommodate
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innovative and advanced pain-relieving techniques and, if required, sustained levels of
medical intervention.
Jane Elizabeth Seymour has argued that the "persuasiveness of the hospice 'way' of
death lies perhaps in its promise to bring to fruition an image of late modern 'natural'
death".5 Drawing on the work of Norbert Elias, she describes this particular vision of
'natural' death as taking place "in bed, at home if possible and under benign medical care in
which interventions to ensure painlessness are balanced with the autonomous choices of the
dying individual and their close companions".6 It is indeed the case that the palliative care
movement grew, at least in part, in response to what was seen as the failure of modern
medicine to provide adequately for the dying, a point that I will elaborate on later in this
chapter. However, the palliative care approach of hospice care should not be perceived (and
Seymour, I suspect, would share this view) as inherently anti-medical. While the hospice
movement did stress the importance of the patient as a 'person', it also harnessed the full
powers of pain-relieving analgesics and narcotics, pioneering combination doses of different
drugs and advocating that this pain relief be liberally administered.
The hospice movement may have provided surrogate familial and community support
for the dying but this did not imply that an idealised Tost' death was somehow also being
reclaimed. Rather, hospice care incorporated the practical application of powerful pain
relieving drugs and a commitment to finding new ways ofminimising (even, it was claimed,
eliminating) the pain of the terminally ill, into a particular, contextually specific view of
'natural' death that absorbed these changing practices. In addressing the question of how
best to care for the dying, the hospice philosophy offered a set of social and technical
practices tailored to meet the requirements of the terminally ill in a particular medical
setting. It was from this fusion of medical and social 'technologies' that the proponents of
hospice care supported their principled opposition to legalised euthanasia with a practical
agenda for alleviating the suffering of the dying.
A central figure in the development of the philosophy behind the hospice movement
was Dame Cicely Saunders, who from 1958 to 1965 conducted research on the control of
pain in terminal cancer at St. Joseph's Hospice in East Hackney.7 She was also to provide
much of the impetus for the 1967 opening of St. Christopher's Hospice in Sydenham,
London, an event described by the medical sociologists Nicky James and David Field as "the
symbolic reference of the 'start' of the modern hospice movement".8 To date, Cicely
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Saunders remains resolutely opposed to the legalisation of euthanasia. In one of her early
papers on care of the dying, significantly titled 'The Problem of Euthanasia', she began by
posing two rhetorical questions: "Is euthanasia morally right?" and "Is there really no other
way of relieving the pain of a patient in the terminal stages of cancer?"9 Immediately, by
raising these questions, the notions of principle and of practice, the first two analytical
categories that I trace throughout my thesis, are brought sharply into focus.
As I will argue, principled and practical opposition to the legalisation of euthanasia
plays a central role in the philosophy of hospice care. Indeed, Saunders' own biographical
context, a strong personal religious faith coupled with professional training in nursing, social
work and medicine, also brings principle and practice into the frame.10 To intentionally
hasten the death of a patient would be, according to Saunders in her early paper on
euthanasia, "to have assumed a responsibility which is not ours". She continued: "Many
things we see are hard to reconcile with our faith in a loving and omnipotent God. There is
no complete and easy explanation but we can see some clues to the full answer that we will
only find in eternity. These are enough to give us confidence and to show us what we have to
do in practice."11 Saunders argued that this principled opposition would do little to sway
those who held different views, since "the protagonists of euthanasia will not be moved by
these arguments for these transcendental values have no reality for them".12 However, she
went on to defend her opposition on another level, namely, on the basis that euthanasia "can
and should be unnecessary" if proper pain relief is administered.13
"It is my experience ... that we can relieve the suffering of 90 per cent of the
patients," she wrote, adding that among the remaining 10 per cent, patients were
occasionally heavily sedated but narcotics were never given in doses "which would be fatal
in themselves." She concluded: "Those of us who think that euthanasia is wrong have the
right to say so but also the responsibility to help to bring this relief of suffering about".14 I
quote at some length from this first article written by Saunders on the subject of euthanasia -
indeed, she has written many more over the course of her career. Her arguments are a vivid
and important illustration of the way in which the principle - that the physician should not
intentionally kill - has been defended on two fronts by the hospice movement. On the one
hand, opposition to euthanasia often rests with spiritual, metaphysical faith - with the belief
that to intentionally cut short the life of a patient would be to stray into territory that is God's
alone. On the other hand, this opposition relies on a technical, medical argument that views
legalised euthanasia as unnecessary once pain is properly controlled and managed.
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The view that narcotics could be liberally administered in order to relieve pain but not
in such quantities or strengths as to prove "fatal in themselves", has already been discussed
in the previous chapter of this thesis. This view, one that embraced medical power but
simultaneously preserved a notion of death occurring at a 'natural' time, was a position that,
as we have seen, involved negotiation and debate. In many ways, the advent of the
philosophy of hospice care marked the consolidation of this position and its manifestation in
institutional form. Dr Saunders did not explicitly use the term 'natural' death, this is my own
analytical interpretation, but her religious references to an "omnipotent God" guiding her
medical philosophy and practice, strongly suggests a view that places death, at least partially,
outside of human control. I explore the way in which hospice philosophy upheld its own
particular view of 'natural' death, and again trace the three categories of argument in
rejection or support of euthanasia that run through this thesis: principled arguments, practical
arguments relating to pain relief, and arguments surrounding 'social' death.
In this chapter I have drawn on documentary analysis of Cicely Saunders' personal
papers and correspondence, both published and unpublished, alongside supplementary
analysis of background material that precedes and coincides with her writing. To begin with,
I focus on what medical sociologist David Clark has highlighted as the movement from
anecdotal to systematically gathered evidence on care of the dying that came to light during
the 1950s. I also consider the specific institutional changes that revealed the shortcomings of
provision of care for the elderly and terminally ill during this period. With regard to the
papers of Cicely Saunders that I have consulted, I have paid particular attention to material
that illustrates the ongoing tension between the question of euthanasia and the ideology and
practice of palliative care. I focus on Dr Saunders' correspondence with Dr Leonard
Colebrook, a vocal and prominent member of the Euthanasia Society, who became the
society's chairman in 1961.
I present this correspondence, dating from August 1958 to February 1963, in the form
of a detailed 'case study', illustrative of wider support for and opposition to euthanasia
during the second half of the twentieth century and I consider the wider themes that resonate
within this correspondence. My interest is primarily in arguments that pre-date the opening
of the first modern hospice in the late 1960s. In this sense, the focus of this final chapter is
not on the practicalities of the development and expansion of hospice care, but rather on the
impact that hospice 'ideology' had on debates over euthanasia and pain-relief in the 1950s
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and 1960s. The opening of St. Christopher's Hospice in 1967 may indeed have symbolically
marked "the 'start' of the modern hospice movement", but the ideas that underpinned
hospice care were being formulated and articulated some considerable time before the first
patient was ever admitted to St. Christopher's. In concluding the chapter, I examine the final
parliamentary attempt to legalise voluntary euthanasia in 1969 and consider the ways in
which the idea of hospice care (now an institutional reality) filtered through into this debate.
This new form of institutional care of the dying was offered as a practical alternative to
legalised voluntary euthanasia. This, I argue, brought a degree of resolution to the question
of pain relief for patients with incurable disease. At the very least, it had the effect of shifting
debates over legalised euthanasia to new ground.
With principled opposition to euthanasia and the practice of pain relief at the heart of
their philosophy, proponents of the hospice movement, by means of a sophisticated regime
of relieving both physical and mental pain, aimed to render euthanasia both unethical and
unnecessary. Despite this, the debate over euthanasia persisted, with voices both inside and
outside of the medical profession arguing that the hospice position was neither strictly
coherent nor honest. Other supporters of euthanasia, though acknowledging the significant
impact made by the hospice movement, argued that this new provision of care for the dying
did not fully resolve all the problems of the terminally ill. This chapter of this thesis
examines the complex and at times fraught relationship between the issue of euthanasia and
palliative care, a relationship that remains contested terrain to this day.
II. 'Natural' Death and New Evidence on Provision of Care for the Dying
Before Cicely Saunders wrote her first paper on caring for the dying cancer patient in
1958, interest was mounting with regard to the conditions and provision of care given to
dying patients. It would be easy to characterise Saunders as an isolated figure who, in single-
handedly recognising the shortcomings of mid-twentieth century medicine, went on to
develop a new philosophy of care. This would be an over-simplification, however, as the
decades preceding the publication of her article reveal that wider interest was being shown in
the terminally ill and dying. Apart from discussion of explicit concerns relating to the
possible legalisation of euthanasia, other writing considering the management of dying
patients can be found in the medical journals during the 1940s and 1950s.
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Material from this period has already been discussed in Chapter Five of this thesis.
However, additional writing from the first half of the twentieth century suggests that
discussion, not only on the issue of euthanasia but also on the more general subject of care of
the dying, was becoming a growing source of anecdotal interest. In August 1948 The
Practitioner published a collection of essays as part of its 'Symposium on Thanatology'. In
his introductory paper, titled 'The Signs and Symptoms of Impending Death', Lord Horder
wrote:
What is the relation between the doctor and a patient who is going to die? ... Nature
will take its course, and doctors and patient should be their natural selves. To a direct
question from an individual as to whether recovery is possible, the best answer is
something rather evasive to the effect that there is no very special treatment, but we
must rely on nature.15
The image of 'nature' as a third party, present alongside the physician at the bedside of the
dying patient, was an image to which Lord Horder had appealed in the past.16 The term
'nature', according to Lord Horder's usage, was synonymous with the individual discretion
of the elite practitioner who treated the dying patient in a largely private and unregulated
setting. 'Natural' death was at the centre of this closed world, and was not a phrase that was
viewed as requiring lengthy explanation or elaboration.17
Similarly, in his prize-winning essay of 1950 titled "The Management of the Hopeless
Case", Dr C. J. Gavey commented that it "was for each practitioner to decide for himself
carefully how far he can assist his desperate patient without transgressing the law".18 In
Gavey's assessment, with regard to the relationship between doctor and patient it was
"better" to "let nature decide who is to live".19 Such an emphasis on allowing 'nature' to
"take its course" or "decide who is to live" might suggest a non-interventionist attitude to
care of the dying. However, in another essay in the 'Symposium on Thanatology' edition of
The Practitioner, Dr W. N. Leak counselled that the individual physician's discretion was
the deciding factor when deliberating over the use of pain-relieving drugs. If the doctor
considered death "the end of all things" then "obviously a few doses ofmorphine" would be
an entirely acceptable course of action, Leak argued. If, however, the doctor thought "that
kindness and goodness have absolute value" and believed in "existence beyond the grave",
then, Leak stated, "his treatment will be more discriminating".20
As David Clark comments in his analysis of journal writing on care of the dying from
this period, "on questions of clinical care, the individual practitioner's personal beliefs,
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attitudes and morality seem to be the chief elements in the armamentarium".21 However,
Clark also highlights how this interest in care of the dying was also beginning to widen from
a focus on the relationship between individual piactitiouei and patient, to an awareness that
the overall provision of care was not of a sufficient standard. Clark quotes Leak's
observation that, "a paradoxical and awkward situation" had arisen, whereby on the one hand
life expectancy was rising and doctors were striving to prolong life, and on the other
relatives were "not available or willing" to look after unwell family members at home.22
In addition, in an article in The Practitioner directly addressing the question of
legalised euthanasia, the Principal Medical Officer of Health, A. Leslie Banks appealed to a
broader institutional answer to the problems of caring for the dying. "Improved hospital
services, with facilities for early diagnosis and privacy for the advanced cases" were the
solutions that he advocated. The legalisation of euthanasia was, he argued, a move that
signalled "the final admission of failure" on the part of doctors and other medical
professionals.23 Though remaining anecdotal in tone, a shift was beginning to take place
from an emphasis on the private bedside relationship between doctor and patient, to a view
that was starting to take in a wider assessment of overall care for the dying. This shift may
not have been detectable in the writing of elite practitioners such as Lord Horder, but for
those such as A. Leslie Banks, with responsibility for standards of care on a national as
opposed to individual level, it was becoming a growing concern. The very presence of a
collection of articles on death and dying in a major medical journal and a prize-winning
essay on the 'Management of the Hopeless Case' suggests that care of the dying was judged
as meriting special attention - albeit that this attention was anecdotal in its basis.
If material in the British medical journals was predominantly anecdotal in tone, a
number of reports published in the 1950s and early 1960s set out to provide comprehensive,
evidence- based appraisals of the state of conditions for the dying. The first of these reports,
compiled by the Marie Curie Foundation, surveyed patients suffering from cancer across the
country. The report revealed disturbingly poor levels of care. Cancer patients often endured
terrible conditions, short of the right food or warm clothes and bedding. The report also
highlighted delays in treatment and called for an immediate response to the need for
residential and convalescent homes.24 Former army doctor, Dr H. L. Glyn Hughes, compiled
a second report that examined the social conditions of the dying and considered the
implications for subsequent health policy.23 Pinpointing "a serious gap in the National Health
Service", Glyn Hughes' analysis revealed a depressing picture of care for the terminally ill
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who were not admitted to hospital but still required nursing care. In some cases the situation
was so bad that Hughes concluded that such conditions "amounted to actual neglect when
measured by standards that can be reasonably expected"26
Additional alarming evidence on the state of care for the elderly and chronically ill
emerged in the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1950 Dr John Sheldon conducted a study of the
elderly and sick in Wolverhampton and found that many old people were confined to their
homes, with a significant number confined to one room and with little outside support.27 A
later report, also written by Sheldon and published in 1961, revealed alarmingly poor
standards of care for those who were admitted to hospital. This report to the Birmingham
Regional Hospital Board contained highly emotive phrases, such as "human warehouses"
and "storage space for patients", to describe hospital geriatric units in this part of the
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country.
Sheldon's studies and a further report commissioned by the Ministry of Health in 1954
that uncovered inadequate standards of care for the chronic sick and elderly, reinforced the
earlier findings of Dr Marjorie Warren, the deputy superintendent of the West Middlesex
County Hospital.29 The hospital, and as a result, Dr Warren, took over a former Poor Law
infirmary in 1935 as an outcome of the 1929 Local Government Act which had passed
control of Poor Law institutions to local authorities in the hope of raising standards.
Discovering that staff had neither the training nor the inclination to adequately support and
care for the bedridden elderly, Dr Warren found that because elderly patients were viewed as
beyond recovery they were often given little attention. In an article in the Lancet in June
1948, she described the condition of elderly, chronically ill patients, permanently confined to
their beds: "in this miserable state, dull, apathetic and hopeless, life lingers on, sometimes
for years, while those around them whisper arguments in favour of euthanasia".30
The concerns of Marjorie Warren and others, such as Lord Amulree, who shared a
particular interest in the elderly, should, to an extent, be distinguished from the findings that
came to light in the aftermath of the surveys of cancer patients in the 1950s.31 Concerns
about the care, conditions and treatment of the elderly fed into a specific mid-twentieth
century debate about how old age should itself be viewed. With this came the development
of thinking that challenged the orthodoxy of confining elderly patients to bed - a practice
that was increasingly seen as detrimental to the health of patients. Rather than focusing
purely on care of the 'dying', the debate over geriatric provision centred on calls for a more
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systematic and detailed classification of elderly patients. This, it was argued, would enable a
distinction to be drawn between those classed as 'incurable' and those who could be
rehabilitated by means of more 'active treatment.'32 As Moira Martin argues: "medical
knowledge in the mid-twentieth century was finally challenging the view that ageing was in
itself a disease and doctors were now willing to admit the elderly to the realm of curative
medicine, from which they had long been excluded."33
Nevertheless, the reports on the care of cancer patients and care of the elderly shared
common ground in that both contributed to a picture of inadequate provision for the dying
and incurable sick. As this bleak view came to light, argument against the legalisation of
euthanasia took a different form. No longer was debate located purely on a philosophical,
somewhat abstract level or restricted to anecdotal accounts of individual patients. As
evidence gathered on the poor state of care of the dying, attention moved to the practical
improvements that could be made. Illustrative of this was a Lancet editorial in 1961 that
opposed legalised euthanasia and called for the collective efforts of the medical profession to
be applied to "make death, when it comes, easy and happy".34
A critique of medical care that emanated from within the profession was beginning
to surface, but not to the extent that mercy killing was now endorsed as a legitimate position.
According to this view the problem lay with deficiencies in practice, not in the overarching
principle that the physician should not kill. The body of supporting evidence had now
changed, moving from the anecdotal personal experiences of physicians to systematically
gathered surveys and interview material. Death had been revealed as a grim and harrowing
experience for many patients. Recourse to the maxim that 'nature should be allowed to take
its course' was simply no longer adequate without improvements in standards of care.
In part, key institutional changes in the structure ofmedical care prompted this call for
renewed attention to the care of the dying. The inadequacies of the newly formed NHS, with
its emphasis on curative medical provision rather than support for the terminally ill, had been
revealed. Yet even before the founding of the NHS in 1948, the transfer of Poor Law
institutions to local authority responsibility had started to expose a growing number of
doctors to the bleak realities of poor conditions, not only for the terminally ill, but also for
the chronically sick and elderly. Changes in the demographic make-up of the population also
meant that an ageing population was now increasingly affected by chronic as opposed to
acute health problems. This experience was often marked by periods of lengthy and difficult
180
illness at home but with death itself occurring in a hospital setting where provision for the
terminally or chronically ill was often poor.35
Resolutely opposed to the legalisation of euthanasia but identifying that much more
was required of the medical profession, Cicely Saunders entered the debate over how the
dying should be cared for best. Hers was a style that drew both on the discourse of earlier
writing on care of the dying and introduced a new set of vocabulary into the frame. Fusing
'traditional' values of community and family but simultaneously harnessing new types of
medical power, her hospice philosophy sought to assuage fears of death and improve the
lives of terminally ill patients. By offering a better standard of all-round care for the dying,
improved practice would serve to reinforce the principle that the doctor should never kill.
She was not to be without her opponents. If the hospice movement was one response to the
poverty of care for the dying, those advocating the legalisation of euthanasia offered an
alternative answer.
III. Justifying Pain Relief: A Twentieth-Century Ethical Debate
On 12 August 1958, Dr Leonard Colebrook of the Euthanasia Society wrote the first
of many letters to Cicely Saunders, beginning a sustained period of personal
correspondence.36 The letters are of interest for a number of reasons, not least because they
vividly illustrate the salient differences in medical opinion between those who opposed
voluntary euthanasia and those who sought to have it formally legalised. Though the private
correspondence of two individuals, written during a period which pre-dates the founding of
the first modern hospice, the letters are in many ways representative of the ideas
underpinning wider euthanasia debates that continued throughout the twentieth century.
Challenges were made by each of the writers, both on a more abstract philosophical level
and on a level that related directly to medical practice. Primarily, the correspondence was
concerned with a debate about how the pain of dying patients should best be managed and,
crucially, understood.
As discussed earlier in this thesis, during the early days of nineteenth-century use of
pain- relieving drugs, the medical profession had to justify its position in certain hostile
religious quarters. By the time of Dr Saunders' letters to Leonard Colebrook, the ability to
offer comprehensive pain relief supported rather than undermined her own, keenly felt
religious beliefs. "There are some who believe that the only right and dignified solution is to
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make inevitable death as swift and as easy as possible, and that the responsibility of choosing
release belongs to the individual", wrote Cicely Saunders in an article published in 1961.
This, she maintained, was "surely a flat denial of God's power and wisdom, and above all his
love".37 While euthanasia could not be contemplated on religious grounds, the need to find
solutions to the problem of the patient in pain also carried a sense of moral urgency. The
"deep concern" of those who advocated voluntary, legalised euthanasia was a "challenge" to
the "indifference and consequent neglect of sufferers in this country today" but, she
maintained, "the suffering that leads to such demands, can and should be alleviated".38
The practice of relieving pain was for Cicely Saunders, as it was for DrWilliam Munk
in the late nineteenth century, wholly consistent with a view that gave religious meaning to
death and dying. However, in the face of organised calls for legalised euthanasia, calls that
now carried the support of medical as well as lay voices, the justification of pain relief was
of central importance to those seeking to strengthen their rejection of euthanasia. Cicely
Saunders' justification of pain relief, so that no patient felt abandoned or left to suffer in
isolation, was also the justification for those who rejected voluntary euthanasia. Pain relief
by means of comprehensive physical and psychological palliative care was the key to
vindicating the position of those who opposed euthanasia and to silencing what she
considered to be the "deep" but misplaced "concern" of those in favour of euthanasia.
By drawing on documentary analysis of the correspondence between Saunders and
Colebrook, I consider the three categories of argument that 1 identify in this thesis -
principled opposition/support for euthanasia, arguments relating to the practice of pain relief,
and the notion of 'social' death. Taking a thematic as opposed to strictly chronological
approach to the material, I explore how these three categories relate to the overarching
concept of 'natural' death. As well as writing to one another, the two doctors were also
advancing their particular view of legalised euthanasia in a wider arena: publishing articles,
corresponding with medical journals, and taking part in public debates. I use some of this
literature to supplement the analysis of their correspondence, alongside additional relevant
material concerning euthanasia and care of the dying taken from medical journals and from
pamphlets produced by the Euthanasia Society.
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i. Principled Opposition and Supportfor Euthanasia
During the years 1958-1963, the period of correspondence between Leonard
Colebrook and Cicely Saunders on which I focus, Saunders was undertaking research on
cancer pain at St Joseph's Hospice in East Hackney.39 Alongside this work, she was
simultaneously developing a programme of social, psychological and physical support for
terminally ill patients. Colebrook was given Saunders' name by Brigadier Glyn Hughes after
the two men met to discuss care of the dying. Colebrook's first approach to Dr Saunders was
a formal letter in which he asked if she had any statistical data on the numbers of terminally
ill patients in pain and the extent of their suffering.40 From then on, their correspondence
centred on the discussion and negotiation of their opposing positions on the issue of
euthanasia.
Though supportive of Saunders' work, Colebrook's stance was diametrically opposed
to her principled, religiously grounded objection to euthanasia. He supported the right to
request a physician-assisted death from an alternative set of principles based on self-
determination and choice, describing euthanasia as "the simplest of human rights to choose a
quick and easy death in place of a horrible and slow one".41 This view, that euthanasia
represented a positive exercise of individual choice, was echoed in a 1962 Euthanasia
Society pamphlet. Criticising the earlier Lancet editorial of 1961 that had ruled out legalised
euthanasia, the Euthanasia Society publication declared that the medical journal had failed to
"directly pose the fundamental question of the patient's right to choose an easy death".42
Claiming the right of the individual patient to a quick and painless death at a time of
his or her own choosing, was a direct challenge to the religious meaning that Saunders
ascribed to death. Colebrook's letters are littered with references that contrast his own belief
system with that of Saunders.43 Although he was assured by Saunders that the vast majority
of her patients "would say to you at any time of night or day that they were pretty
comfortable", he was not convinced.44 Patients were bound to say that they were "pretty
comfortable", when, he argued, they were unable to conceive that there "might be any better
way than the endurance of pain ... anymore than in 1800 it would have occurred to any
patient that he might have his leg amputated under anaesthesia".45 Colebrook maintained that
Saunders was "doing a most valuable thing" in alerting doctors and nurses to "the
importance of kindliness". However, her philosophy was not, he argued, "the whole answer",
particularly for those "who cannot see pain and misery as the gifts of a benevolent Diety". If
pain and misery were somehow part of a divine plan, asked Colebrook, then "why try to
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relieve them?"46 A pro-euthanasia publication of 1962 took up this same point, arguing that
objections to euthanasia often rested on the belief that "suffering is the gift of God". This,
according to the publication, was a view that was "often linked with the contention, belief or
superstition that it is wrong to interfere with nature." However, if such ideas were extended
to their "logical conclusion", this would mean, "all alleviation of suffering, including the use
of anaesthetics is wrong".47
In a letter to the Lancet in 1962, Colebrook made reference to the recent Suicide Act
of 1961which had ruled that the taking of one's own life was no longer illegal (although to
assist another person in taking their own life remained a criminal offence). According to
Colebrook, the Suicide Act had profoundly altered the context of euthanasia debates,
strengthening the position of those in the Euthanasia Society who argued for legalisation.
The patient in pain was now, he argued, "at liberty to make the choice between waiting for
death from so-called 'natural causes' or seeking relief from his or her suffering by an earlier,
contrived death". Often, however, patients were unable to act on this choice since "the means
for ending their lives are not available to them".48
In another letter, again published in the Lancet, Colebrook questioned the journal's
conclusion that legalised euthanasia was "profoundly disturbing".49 The Lancet, argued
Colebrook, was preoccupied with the position in which doctors would be placed were
euthanasia to be legalised. How many doctors, he challenged, would "cut short their own
lives" if they knew they were dying slowly and painfully from inoperable cancer? Doctors
had the means to carry out such a decision; many patients, however, did not. He concluded:
"If we conceded their right to be spared unnecessary suffering or distress, should we refuse
to help them to achieve it when they asked for our help?"50 As young man, he had cared for a
number of patients "dying miserably from tuberculosis" and in more recent years had
watched elderly friends and relatives die "sometimes in wards for the chronic sick, crowded
with human wreckage - sometimes in more dismal still mental institutions".51 Describing a
visit to St. Joseph's where he had observed care of the terminally ill, Colebrook
acknowledged that he was "much impressed by the atmosphere of contentment, even of
cheerfulness, that Dr Saunders and the devoted Roman Catholic staff have been able to
create there". 52 The aim of the hospice was to "make the patients fairly comfortable rather
than cure, and to that end they have relied not only on medical and nursing techniques, but
also on high standard of kindliness and the consolations of religion (when they are
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acceptable)".53 However, he questioned how far religion could be relied upon in general
hospital wards where many patients did not share the same religious convictions.54
Though keen to stress that her opposition to legalised euthanasia rested on technical
arguments based on her research on cancer pain and her practical experience of treating
patients, the influence of religious faith clearly filtered through into Cicely Saunders' letters
to Leonard Colebrook. In a letter in December of 1959 she expressed the view that there was
a desperate need for many more terminal-care homes such as St. Joseph's, and remarked that
"there is much more to be done in this field generally". The relief of suffering in the dying
could be achieved by "putting our hearts and minds to it", she argued, adding that, "it is
because so few people do, that pathetic cases exist". However, she then remarked: "no
experience of illness is ever wasted (but can always be transformed into something of eternal
value and often something ofjoy here) and that is an infinitely worthwhile work.'55
In a later letter, recalling how she had nursed someone whom she had loved through a
lengthy illness, Saunders returned to the theme of finding religious meaning in death. "The
intangible things mean so much and are so hard to write", she commented, before describing
how nursing her dying friend would not have been "so joyful and full of timeless
tranquillity" if she and the dying man "had not left everything in God's hands all the way
through".56 Saunders wrote that she now had a "longing to help others to find that this hard,
inevitable thing [death] can be completely transformed." This was not just for "the good of
their own souls" but also "part of the working out of the world's redemption and just the bit
entrusted to us". In her view, Colebrook sounded as if he "wanted to take away from life and
death everything that we find hard to endure" so as to turn men and women into "a collection
of Lotus Eaters". The answer was not, she argued, in "running away" or in "taking
responsibility" as she believed Colebrook was proposing when he advocated legalised
euthanasia. While she was not "unseeing of distress or complacent", the answer lay in
"staying to fight until the fight finally changes into acceptance and love".57
From these extracts from the correspondence between Saunders and Colebrook
emerge two very different responses to the problem of suffering in the terminally ill and
dying. On the one hand is a claim to self-determination and individual choice to enable the
patient to be freed from pain by requesting death. On the other, is an emphasis on
metaphysical faith that claims that only trust in God can 'transform' suffering and death
from a positive to a negative experience. Cicely Saunders did not advance a philosophy in
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which the "consolations of religion" were alone seen as sufficient when caring for the dying.
She matched her spiritual belief with a commitment to finding new ways of alleviating and
eliminating pain. However, such medical intervention in the form of administering pain
relief did not disrupt her belief that, even in the light of such intervention, death continued to
be left "in God's hands". Leonard Colebrook and The Euthanasia Society contested this
position, arguing that by alleviating suffering (and not always sufficiently in the Society's
view), medical practice was already interfering with nature. To choose the timing and
manner of one's own death was purely an extension of this practice. This category of
principled argument in many ways reiterates well-rehearsed arguments that centre on
contesting or supporting metaphysical, religious objections to legalised euthanasia. It was in
the area concerning the practical application of pain relief, the next category of arguments
that I examine, that euthanasia debates entered new territory.
ii. The Practice ofPain Relief
As already illustrated, built into Saunders' philosophy of care was the notion that the
dying patient could be reconciled with his or her individual fate on a spiritual level. On a
physical level, however, pain relief was the responsibility of the attending medical team.
Saunders maintained that it was because so few medical minds had been devoted to the
subject of comprehensively relieving pain that the number of cases of suffering remained
unacceptably high. General and chronic wards, unable to offer what she described as
"individual and careful" nursing, were falling short of providing the type of pain relief that
could be offered by terminal care homes such as St. Joseph's Hospice. Ultimately,
euthanasia was to be opposed because, Saunders argued, the questions raised by the need to
relieve the suffering of dying patients could and should be answered with a medical as well
as religious response. In Colebrook's view, Saunders' means of assessing the pain of dying
patients was inescapably linked to her own religious values. The description of a patient as
"pretty comfortable" could only be achieved by ascribing one person's religious values to
another's suffering. Though acknowledging that her work was underpinned by a firm
religious belief, Saunders maintained that her concerns were of a practical nature, centring
on deficiencies in mainstream provision of pain relief and on how she and her hospice
offered a better alternative.
In a letter to the Lancet, Cicely Saunders responded to Leonard Colebrook's call for
legalised euthanasia by distancing herself from the view that "high standards of kindliness"
and the "consolations of religion" were all that were offered to relieve the pain of suffering
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patients. She argued that St. Joseph's was not an isolated example of an institution
developing new methods of caring for the dying. Other terminal care homes and hospitals
were carrying out similar work, based on the findings of clinical research and observational
studies of patients. She gave the example of the department of pharmacology at St. Mary's
Medical School in London, where the records of several hundred terminally ill patients were
being analysed. This research not only detailed the physical reactions of patients to analgesic
drugs, but also recorded patient attitudes in order to gain an insight into mental as well a
physical distress.58
Since writing her earlier articles on care of the dying and euthanasia, Saunders
believed that she had "learnt a great deal". The control of pain in terminal cancer was now a
reality and "only rarely indeed" was it necessary to have the patient continually sedated. She
added: "without going into the reasons why I personally believe that euthanasia is wrong, I
would like to emphasise that it should be unnecessary and is an admission of defeat."
Saunders assured her readers that the symptoms of dying patients, such as nausea or
breathlessness, could be controlled and relieved. When administering drugs at St. Joseph's,
the patients were not "troubled with tolerance or addiction". Indeed, they were "often on the
same doses for weeks or months".59 Addressing Colebrook's reference to the "consolations
of religion", Saunders stated that neither she nor many of the patients at St. Joseph's were
Roman Catholic. Depending on their particular religious orientation, patients were visited by
"priests and ministers as they desire or by no-one if they so wish".6
After Colebrook's visit to St. Joseph's, Saunders wrote to tell him that a patient whom
he had met, a Mrs Vidler, had died. Suffering from "fungating cancer", this patient had been
having regular morphine injections for almost a year and during the period of Colebrook's
visit was administered the pain-relieving drug four times daily. Saunders wrote:
Later in the week in which you saw her, she suddenly went downhill for no very
obvious reason. She once needed a slightly increased dose of morphine, but after that
the pain receded. We never cut down morphine in these circumstances lest the patient
should suffer withdrawal symptoms, but I am quite sure that the pain did what it so
often does - disappears spontaneously for the last few days. She was very peaceful; I
think she realised what was happening but was quite unafraid. She slipped away
quietly into unconsciousness about twenty-four hours before she died. We miss her
very much but remember her with nothing but admiration and gratitude.61
She then reported how another patient - Mr Morley, "the cheerful bus conductor who was
short of breath, but otherwise looked fairly well" - had been mobile and active since
187
Colebrook's visit. "I am letting him go home this afternoon," she wrote; "he realises what is
happening and he just badly wants to go and see his home again. We are very willing to do
so as his wife is prepared to cope knowing that she can bring prepared to cope knowing that
she can bring him back if there is any trouble." 52 Thus, Saunders presented Colebrook with
two patients, of whom he had direct personal knowledge, making clear that their pain had
been comprehensively managed. Significantly, the first patient had suffered from "fungating
cancer", which was the same disease that Colebrook had mentioned in an earlier letter in
which he disputed that the terminally ill were at all times "pretty comfortable".63 Implicit in
this sharing of anecdotal case histories was the view that euthanasia was not only morally
wrong but also a diversion from the effective, practical management of pain. Alongside
principled opposition to legalised euthanasia, hospice care also offered a developing
technical interest in pain relief and drug administration.
On request a list could be produced detailing the names of drugs and levels of dosage
most commonly used at St. Joseph's.64 For mild to moderate pain, soluble aspirin and
paracetamol were administered. For moderate to severe pain, pethedine tablets were given or
diamorphine by mouth in small doses. For severe pain, diamorphine was administered in
larger doses until such a point when sedation was considered more appropriate than
increased levels of analgesic. As well as detailing the possible combination of drugs to be
given, the list also dealt with the treatment of common symptoms. Care of the mouth was of
vital importance (as it was in William Munk's time) and for dysphagia iced drinks were to be
given along with aspirin emulsion, or in the case of excessive salivation, small doses of
atropine. Morphine could be given for discomfort as well as pain but opiate drugs were not
to be used as sedatives to treat insomnia. However, it was noted that sleep often came after
the administration ofmorphine to treat pain, due to the relief felt by the patient.65
The St. Joseph's list, formulated by Saunders, also recommended an article on
intractable pain that gave details of drugs that could be used as alternatives to morphine. This
article presented the findings of general practitioners John Hunt and Michael Linnett, who
concluded that, since GPs had close contact with their patients, often through long periods of
illness, they were exposed to knowledge of pain-killing drugs "which is difficult to gain
elsewhere".66 In their article, Hunt and Linnett wrote that they were impressed "by the
benefits that may be gained by mixing analgesics, by changing them from time to time to
minimise sensitivity, tolerance or addiction".67 Cicely Saunders also endorsed this practice of
giving combinations of drugs administered at regular intervals.
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Also in accordance with Saunders' thinking the article argued that "a patient should
not have to watch the clock and count the minutes until his next injection is due." The
distress of both patients and relatives could be avoided by preventing unnecessary delay in
the administration of pain relief. The article elaborated:
They may be comforted [patients] by knowing that a tablet is put out, or a syringe
loaded near by, ready to help at once should a spasm of pain come on. Special
instruction of the nursing staff on these matters may be needed. A pain chart
indicating the time, severity and duration of each attack, kept by a nurse and never
mentioned or shown to the patient, is sometimes a help.68
On the issue of morphine use, doctors Hunt and Linnett called into question the "popular
misconception that the most powerful analgesics of the morphine group are so dangerous
that they should only be given in the last resort". This, they argued, was "sometimes an
unfortunate hindrance to the adequate relief of pain".69 In their view, the objective of the
doctor was to secure for the patient complete and continuing freedom from severe pain as
opposed to temporary relief, where drugs would only be administered on the return of pain.
When morphine was given in appropriate combinations with other drugs - drugs known as
'antagonists' - "comprehensive analgesia" was often "safe and pleasant ... and the patient
can continue these mixtures for many months".70
Cicely Saunders' opposition to Leonard Colebrook's advocacy of euthanasia should
be viewed against a wider backdrop of growing clinical interest in the treatment of terminal
pain, illustrated in the writing of Hunt and Linnett. Isabelle Basanger's work on the growth
of what she terms "the medicine of pain" in the 1950s, explores how medical attitudes were
changing during this period, particularly in relation to the patient suffering from chronic as
opposed to acute pain.71 With the emergence of specialist pain clinics, employing multi-
disciplinary teams that included psychiatrists or clinical psychologists, chronic pain was
increasingly being seen as a psychological as well as physical phenomenon. Pain was
perceived, not simply as a symptom of illness, but as Basanger describes "as an entirely
separate problem requiring specific treatment".72
The hospice commitment to finding new ways of relieving pain, combined with an
emphasis on the psychological well-being of the patient, provided an important point of
focus for the development of pain management as a clinical speciality. Beyond Saunders'
unmoveable position that rejected any suggestion that the physician might intentionally bring
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life to an end, lay a complex picture of the development of pain-relieving strategies where
drugs were used in various combinations, with varying dosage levels and with varying aims
in mind. This use of combinations of drugs allowed for control of a patient's physical pain
and control of a patient's level of consciousness. Stimulants used to promote alertness could
be reduced or withheld. Sedatives to promote drowsiness could also be administered as
judged necessary.73
Yet, as the article by Hunter and Linnett also revealed, the relief of pain brought about
by morphine was often measured against the possible negative side effects of such drug use.
For example, the article cautioned that the dangers ofmorphine addiction remained real, and
counselled that "the old rule of thumb - that it is unwise to prescribe morphine for long
unless the end of a painful illness can be foreseen either in recovery or death - still holds."
Interestingly, the article then concluded that "many doctors would feel worse about being
responsible for producing one addict than for failing to relieve pain entirely in a chronic
condition."74 This was a time of experimentation - a time when patients' reactions to pain
relief were being observed and new regimes of treatment developed. Research on pain relief
provided a body of new medical evidence that could be directly applied when discussing
terminally ill patients, as typified by the cases of Mrs Vidler and Mr Morley. These cases
stood not merely as isolated histories, but were instead presented as illustrative of growing
medical knowledge and sensibility with regard to pain relief. In gaining support for her work
and strengthening opposition to euthanasia, Saunders was effectively developing a number
of different 'voices' in which she could propound her philosophy of hospice care. One voice
operated on a religious level, stressing that life could only be taken when God determined.
Another emphasised the technical, medical aspect of hospice provision for the dying, with its
development of new pain relieving techniques and symptom control.
However, the type of pain relief administered depended on the type of illness in
question and Saunders' work was largely based on her experiences with cancer patients. In
the instance of non-fatal illnesses where patients might be expected to live for many years
but without cure, morphine use was avoided for fear of addiction. In essence, if a causal link
could be made between a patient's illness and his or her eventual death, then powerful pain
relieving drugs could be legitimately given. If, however, no such link could be made, it was
justifiable to avoid morphine use even if this implied, in Hunt and Linnett's words, "failing
to relieve pain entirely". This conclusion reinforced Lord Patrick Devlin's 1957 legal
summation in the Bodkin Adams trial, which, as discussed earlier in this thesis, endorsed the
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use of pain relieving drugs even if this shortened life. Yet it also raised the question of the
distinction between chronically ill and terminally ill patients and the manner in which, in the
first case, pain relief was given with caution, whilst in the latter, it was judged appropriate to
administer pain relief liberally.
The reluctance to administer pain relieving drugs to the chronically ill, for fear of
establishing patient dependence or addiction, was an issue raised in a report on terminal
illness in the elderly prepared by Dr A. N. Exton Smith, a physician at London's Whittington
Hospital.75 His report, published in a 1961 edition of the Lancet, concluded that while the
control of pain was largely achievable in the case of patients suffering from malignant
disease, in cases of chronic illness, in particular rheumatoid arthritis, the relief of pain was
far more difficult.76 Severe pain lasted for far longer periods, from months to years, and the
suffering of patients in this group was magnified because their mental alertness allowed them
to recognise their helplessness. While the pain of such patients might have responded to
narcotics, "these had not been used for fear of habit-formation in an incurable but not
directly fatal condition".77
However, in cases of patients dying from malignant diseases such as cancer, Exton
Smith concluded that less than a quarter of the patients in his study experienced moderate or
severe pain. This pain was relatively limited in duration, and significantly, in all patients it
could be controlled by powerful analgesics or narcotic drugs administered at intervals
throughout the day under supervision as advocated by Cicely Saunders. Exton Smith
considered that Saunders' regime of pain control was "a counsel of perfection to the busy
general practitioner or district nurse", but it seems that in theory at least, he supported its
powerful potential. Despite this largely positive assessment of the capacity to relief pain in
the dying, the study also revealed a small minority of patients who had lost all desire to live
so that "their end was brought nearer by a refusal to eat or drink". Of the two hundred and
twenty patients studied, eleven "repeatedly expressed a wish to die". One patient thought that
too much was being done to help her, another asked "to be done away with", and some
"prayed for death".78
It is interesting that at the end of his Lancet article, Exton Smith thanked both
Saunders and Colebrook for their "encouragement and assistance". In part, his report
endorsed the developing philosophy of hospice care, reinforcing the view that pain in
terminal illness could be controlled if drugs were administered at regular intervals and if
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improved institutional provision was made for the dying. Drawing attention to the earlier
findings of the Glyn Hughes report and the inadequacies of current standards of care for the
dying, Exton Smith concluded, "constant medical care and a high standard of nursing are
needed for patients whose illnesses have reached a terminal stage".
Yet his report also found a minority of patients requesting that they wanted to die, a
conclusion that was underlined when the research of Dr John Hinton was published in 1963.
Hinton, who fostered a particular interest in the psychiatric difficulties faced by dying
patients, found that doctors were unable to "control all physical discomfort" and that mental
anxiety was "sufficiently common for a significant number of patients to consider suicide".79
This was a finding that could be interpreted in two ways. First, as evidence that legitimated
the position of the pro-euthanasia lobby, or secondly, as an indication that even more needed
to be done to relieve the pain and anxiety of the dying so that legalised euthanasia was no
longer an issue.
Provided in the institutional setting of hospice care, the impact of developments in
techniques of alleviating pain did not end disagreement over legalised euthanasia, but it did,
to some degree at least, shift the debates to new ground. Despite maintaining his support for
legalised euthanasia, after his visit to St. Joseph's Leonard Colebrook expressed the opinion
that "there would be little or no problem of euthanasia if all terminal care disease folks could
end their lives in the atmosphere that you have done so much to create".80 In his letter to
Cicely Saunders, he added: "alas that can hardly be for many a long year and meanwhile
how many thousands end their lives in very different circumstances?"
However, he conceded that his visit to the hospice had helped to put the question of
euthanasia "in perspective".81 Similarly, the 1961 Lancet editorial on euthanasia
acknowledged the "gross inadequacy" of current provision of care for the dying, but urged
that "advocates of induced euthanasia should especially study and consider" the writing of
Cicely Saunders. According to the journal, her articles on care of the dying showed "in detail
and from experience what can be done ... to make a 'good end' is not an entirely outworn
conception or accomplishment". 82 The development of hospice care of the dying gave
opponents of legalised euthanasia a practical, institutional alternative to demands that the law
should be changed to allow patient-requested death. The strength of this alternative was such
that, even if proponents of legalised euthanasia did not accept principled, religious
opposition to their arguments, they acknowledged that terminal care in a hospice setting did
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go some way to address the practical inadequacies of care for suffering patients. Indeed,
when writing her appeal to establish a new hospice in London, Saunders quoted Colebrook's
comment that "there would be little or no problem of euthanasia" if the care offered by
terminal homes such as St Joseph's was universally available.83
The hospice philosophy offered a new regime of pain relief for dying patients, where
drugs were administered liberally and, when needed, at regular intervals. Saunders argued
that death was left in "God's hands" and yet at the same time, the introduction of a new
regime of pain relief for the dying meant that a set of medical and technical practices had to
be absorbed into this particular conception of 'natural' death. Interestingly, the Lancet article
that rejected the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia argued that the term 'euthanasia' should
itself be "reclaimed in its derivative sense", to imply simply "an easy happy death". The
journal added: "if euthanasia in this sense was put on a par with childbirth ... could not all
deaths be made very easy and, in our ageing population, even happy?"84
Yet as I considered earlier, when the use of pain-relieving drugs in childbirth was first
introduced in the nineteenth century, the medical profession faced opposition from those
who argued, largely on religious grounds, that such intervention was 'unnatural'. The
practice of pain relief in the hospice setting meant that treatment was uniquely tailored to
patients who were terminally ill. As I have discussed, this implied a different set of medical
practices than those employed when a patient was classed as chronically ill. For patients who
were dying, morphine and other pain relieving drugs were administered without the fear of
addiction or tolerance. This practice was then, I argue, absorbed into an idea of 'natural'
death, preserving the view that death was not being artificially 'induced', and the view that
medical intervention was not interfering with divine will.
Hi. 'Social' Death and Hospice Care
In her 1961 letter to the Lancet, Cicely Saunders claimed that the greatest suffering
that the terminally ill faced came in the form of "isolation". This isolation applied to the
terminally ill as a group "left out of so much of our planning", and as individuals "who need
a listener more than any other form of therapy."85 The importance of relieving not only the
physical but also the psychological pain of patients was an integral element of the
philosophy of hospice care. Saunders argued that it was wrong to view patients simply in
terms of a catalogue of medical symptoms. The key to effectively treating pain was to focus
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on the patient as a 'whole' person, with individual needs and anxieties. In a letter to
Colebrook, she explained:
In the old days we were taught in nursing pneumonia or typhoid patients, that one had
to lift every effort off their shoulders and even think for them. I think care of the dying
calls for something more individual. We have to try and watch what a patient's disease
means to him, and never let him get overwhelmed by it. I do not claim that none ofmy
patients suffer any pain or distress at all, but only that I try to keep it within their own
personal limits of endurance.86
The medical sociologists James and Field have argued that the response of the pro-
euthanasia lobby to poor standards of terminal care was "to extend the individual's control
over their own death", whilst the hospice answer "was to develop a community response
which obviated the need for euthanasia".87 I argue that the hospice 'solution' to euthanasia
was an institutional response to the problem of caring for the dying - albeit rooted, as James
and Field suggest, in what were viewed as the traditional values of community and family.
Yet built into this institutional response, as the last excerpt from Cicely Saunders' letter
illustrates, was an emphasis on not only the physical but also the social and psychological
needs of the individual in pain. If the Euthanasia Society, as it was known in 1961, employed
the language of individual agency in advancing its position, then so too did the hospice
movement, albeit in a different manner.
By providing an institutionalised version of traditional sources of support such as
family, community and religion, the hospice movement sought to challenge the idea that the
incurable patient was no longer capable of engaging with others or participating fully in
social interaction. However, in addition to these 'traditional' forms of social support, the
hospice philosophy of care also included the notion that psychological pain could be
clinically and systematically 'treated'. Addressing only physical pain was insufficient: the
patient's psychological, spiritual and social needs also needed to be brought into focus. This,
of course, was not a novel idea. In the nineteenth century, physicians such as William Munk
and Benjamin Brodie had also been concerned with the mental state of dying patients. What
was new, however, was the manner in which the hospice philosophy viewed physical and
mental pain as inextricably linked in the all-encompassing concept of 'total pain'. If the right
approach was taken, it was argued, this 'total' pain could be medically managed. Just as the
hospices developed a routine of medical practices to deal with physical pain, psychological
pain was also met with a regime of particular techniques.88
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When Saunders undertook her research in cancer pain at St. Joseph's, an important
part of her work was to sit with patients and talk to them, recording these conversations so
that they could be transcribed and analysed at a later date. Similar to the work of Elisabeth
Kiibler-Ross, a doctor at the Montefiore Hospital in New York, Saunders developed a
practice of talking and listening to terminally ill patients.89 Built into this practice was the
notion that a patient, if socially supported and relieved of physical pain, could come to terms
with his or her death and reach a sense of acceptance. This multi-layered concept of pain,
understood in terms of both physical and mental suffering, meant that the concept of'social'
death was anathema to Saunders' philosophy of care for the dying. The terminally ill were
never to be left with untreated physical pain or with feelings of isolation. With this approach,
Saunders argued that at St. Joseph's "we try, and we believe often with success, to enable
our patients to remain themselves throughout the illness ... They often make of it
(consciously or unconsciously) not just a long defeat of living but a positive achievement of
dying."90
The notion of 'pain' as much more than a collection of physical symptoms can be
found in the correspondence between Saunders and Colebrook. In a letter to Saunders of
September 1961, Colebrook stated that he was puzzled by what he took to be her
"categorical assertion in the Lancet" that the symptoms of terminal illness could always be
relieved. Was it really possible, he asked, "to get rid of the severe breathlessness of a badly
failing heart" or "the sense of suffocation and dysphagia of cancer of the throat?" In a letter
that he had written to the Lancet, Colebrook had described St. Joseph's as enabling patients
to be "pretty comfortable". Saunders had subsequently taken issue with his account and
argued that the aim of the hospice "was something rather higher". Colebrook apologised if
he had misquoted her. Yet he maintained that he believed his phrase was accurate, given that
she had stated that pain-relieving drugs were often given for "weeks and months" and that
she had conceded that hospice care could not "take away the hard thing that was
happening".91 Colebrook "rejoiced" that she could do so much, but added that he "should
feel grieved if you seemed to claim to be able to do all these things that make up the (very)
hard way to death for a considerable minority".92
Saunders replied by acknowledging that Colebrook was "speaking for a group that
will not come my way". Although she considered that the campaign for legalised euthanasia
would raise concern about the standards of care of the dying, and was grateful for
Colebrook's support in raising the profile of her "plan for St. Christopher's", she maintained
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that the Euthanasia Society's view was "a negative approach." Colebrook, however, was "a
doughty opponent" for whom she had "a high personal regard".93 Saunders then dealt with
the physical symptoms of dying patients that had particularly concerned him in his letter.
Suffocation could be treated by the "judicious use" of "ephedrine and heroine", whilst
dysphagia, she claimed, responded "remarkably well to various measures", the first of which
was get the patients hydrated.
She was neither claiming that she could remove a patient's symptoms altogether, nor
that blindness and paraplegia could be alleviated. She remarked, "I do not think that people
will think that I am doing anything so foolish".94 Explaining her position further, she
explored what was meant by the word 'relieve':
The derivation from the Latin 'to lift' means to me that we should take away the
burden of these symptoms. Obviously this is easier with some than with others. 'The
hard thing that is happening' is weakness, and approaching death means dependence
and parting. That cannot be taken away but the physical distress can be relieved (in my
sense) until the end comes within the individual patient's threshold so that he is able to
'make a good end'95
Some of the "misunderstandings" between herself and Colebrook came about, she thought,
because they did not mean the same thing when they used the word 'relieve'. "Of the two
definitions in the dictionary", she stated, "you take 'remove' and I take 'alleviate', and I
think that I use it in the medical sense. To 'relieve' pain does not mean to remove the cause
but to take away the distressful feeling." Saunders wondered that it might be because she had
read philosophy before medicine that this created another point of difference between them.
"The intangible things mean so much and are so hard to write, or to get across to others," she
commented.96
Thus, Cicely Saunders' conception of 'pain', an idea that encompassed not only
physical but also psycho-social elements to suffering, meant that the experience of dying was
ascribed a particular meaning within the hospice setting. In part, death was a medically
managed experience, characterised by a willingness to administer drugs whenever required,
even to the point where physical pain was pre-empted and the patient did not have to ask for
his or her next dose of pain relief. In addition, however, the hospice philosophy absorbed a
particular set of religious and cultural beliefs so that dying was viewed as a process that
could be "transformed" by means of the patient relinquishing his or her psychological fears
and "weakness". Pain was an experience that could be shared. Dying was an experience that
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meant dependence and acceptance, if not of God's will, then of the moral world of the
hospice.
Saunders rejected the idea of 'social' death and in its place her hospice philosophy
brought together a number of different elements, including an emphasis on the alleviation of
physical suffering combined with therapeutic strategies that addressed the psychological
state of the dying patient. Behind this approach, lay her firm commitment to a religious faith
that infused her own understanding of the meaning of death. Ultimately, it was a
combination of these values that permeated the hospice view of 'total' pain. If, after 1967,
hospice care was to become a practical, institutional alternative to legalised euthanasia, in the
late 1950s and early 1960s it was already offered as an ideological alternative. The ideas
expressed by Cicely Saunders in the correspondence presented in this chapter were
articulated when the practical plans for establishing modern hospices were still in a stage of
infancy. Nevertheless, as I argued earlier, Saunders' letters to Leonard Colebrook offer a
valuable insight into the core concepts that underpinned the establishment and subsequent
expansion of this provision of care for the terminally ill.
It is possible to situate this embryonic discourse of hospice philosophy, as exemplified
by Saunders' writing, as part of a wider literature concerned with death and dying produced
in the 1960s and 1970s. This literature, that stressed the importance of "awareness of dying"
and emphasised the psychological need for incurable patients to express their fears, has been
portrayed by Aries as a bold defiance of what was previously "the taboo" and "denial" of
death.97 More recent analysis is rather more sceptical. In an extremely thought-provoking
study of the growth of literature on death and dying from the 1960s, medical sociologist
David Armstrong argues that this discourse on death and dying subjects the patient to new
methods of analysis and "interrogation".98 The terminally ill patient is exposed to multiple
levels of medical scrutiny, both physical and psychological, and is compelled to verbalise
personal thoughts and feelings that are subject to the interpretation of medical professionals.
Though fragmented into different parts, Armstrong contends that this discourse on death and
dying still represents a manifestation of medical power.99
It also is possible to apply some of Armstrong's thinking to the ideas behind hospice
care. One the one hand, importance is placed on listening to the individual patient and
tailoring treatment according to personal requirements, anxieties and feelings. On the other,
the hospice arguably presents a prescriptive view that requires that the patient share in the
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hospice values of acceptance and dependence during death. In addition, the hospice regime
of pain relief as advocated by Cicely Saunders relies on pain being controlled and even pre¬
empted. Arguably, it might be suggested that this requires that the patient relinquish a certain
amount of autonomy. At what point does the control of pain become the control of the
patient? Saunders would no doubt strongly dispute this interpretation and point to the
achievements of the hospice movement and the advancements that have been made,
particularly in the area of caring for cancer patients. One need only read Susan Sontag's
highly influential Illness as Metaphor to realise that taboo, secrecy and fear have often
accompanied terminal illness and suffering.100 Hospice care has done much to challenge this
and to change, in innovative ways, the manner in which pain is medically treated and
managed.
The development of the management of terminal pain as a specialist area of medicine
has, I argue, had a significant impact on twentieth-century arguments over euthanasia. This
does not mean that these debates have ended - indeed, regular press and media coverage of
the question of legalised euthanasia suggests quite the contrary. However, I contend that the
content of the arguments, both in favour of and against legalised euthanasia, has altered. An
important contributing factor to this change has been the way in which the practice of pain
relief and the management of pain began to be articulated by the medical profession in the
latter half of the twentieth century. In stating that pain relief was the priority when caring for
terminally ill patients (even if death was 'unintentionally' hastened as result of such
intervention) and in offering hospice care as an institutional focal-point for refining pain-
relieving practices, the medical profession moved opposition to legalised euthanasia to new
ground. In turn, supporters of legalised euthanasia adapted and shaped their arguments in
order to respond. By way of explaining and illustrating this point, I conclude this chapter by
looking at the attempt to legalise voluntary euthanasia in 1969.
IV. Debating Euthanasia and Hospice Care
In March 1969, the House of Lords was presented for the third time with a bill that
proposed the legalisation of voluntary euthanasia.101 Sponsored by Lord Raglan, the bill was
ultimately defeated by sixty-one votes to forty, but of particular interest, given the focus of
this thesis, was the manner in which the debate was framed from a medical perspective. In
his opening address, Raglan immediately made direct reference to the positive contribution
made by the hospice movement in improving standards of care for the terminally ill. He even
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acknowledged that "it might be said that if everyone could spend his last days in such
surroundings there would be no need for this bill".102 However, since hospice provision was
not available to the majority of patients who required such care, he argued, legalised
euthanasia provided a guaranteed means of securing a humane and pain-free death. In
addition, he maintained that even if with "money and education" hospice care was made
more readily accessible, there would be those who chose not "to eke out their lives in this
way". Most people wished to die at home in familiar surroundings and not in an institution,
he stated, adding, "I myself should like to die at home if I could."103
For those opposed to voluntary euthanasia, Raglan's comments were seen as an open
admission of the successes of hospice care in meeting the needs of those suffering from
incurable and painful disease. If the real problem was simply the scarcity of hospice
provision then surely the focus should be on increasing the number of hospices instead of
permitting requested death, they questioned rhetorically. Lord Thurlow, who in 1969 was
chairman of St. Christopher's Hospice, argued that rather than legalising euthanasia greater
financial support was needed for more hospice and geriatric care, and research into the
management of pain. From his perspective, the debate had only served to highlight that these
were the central issues at stake, rather than the need to change the law to allow doctors to
end the lives of their patients. In Thurlow's opinion, Raglan's speech was "an appalling
confession of failure" containing what he viewed as the admission that "we should legalise
euthanasia because there are not enough places like St. Christopher's."104
When contrasted with previous House of Lords debates on voluntary euthanasia, the
1969 debate differs in a number of respects. In the arguments conducted around the earlier
bills of 1936 and 1950, the Lords who opposed any change in the law had tended to
emphasise the relationship of trust between the doctor and the patient. In this latest debate,
however, it was the existence of an institutionalised form of care for the terminally ill that
provided rhetorical weight to arguments that opposed legislative change. Lord Horder's
reference in 1936 to the question of the patient asking 'you will stand by me, won't you?'
and the doctor answering 'yes, I will', was now supported by providing a practical example
of a form ofmedical care in which the relief of pain made a priority. This priority was given,
not with reference to the private realm of the relationship between elite physician and
patient, but rather with reference to a specialist branch of medicine that was entirely devoted
to caring for incurable patients.
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Lord Raglan's insistence that most patients wished to die at home could also be
addressed. By 1969, St. Christopher's had it own team of staff dedicated to home care. In
addition, if the patient could not remain at home, one of the aims of St. Christopher's was to
make the hospice less like other forms of institutionalised medicine by attempting to create
an environment in which the patient could feel as comfortable as possible. With hospice care
as a practical alternative that could be expanded if only sufficient funds were made available,
legalised euthanasia was portrayed as a short-sighted and expedient means of 'solving' the
problem of patients in pain. Although other arguments that had been rehearsed before were
made in opposition to the bill, including, for example, references to the dangers of opening
the way for non-voluntary euthanasia, the debate over pain relief was now cast in a different
manner. Even if many patients were unable to access the type of care offered by the hospice,
the 'ideal' model was now in place. This set the standard and this provided a new strand of
argument in opposition to the legalisation of euthanasia.
Interestingly, the Voluntary Euthanasia Society (the word 'voluntary' was reinstated
in the society's title in 1969) had also shifted its arguments, and in a significant fashion. The
VES was responsible for drafting the bill presented to the House of Lords in 1969 and again,
it was stipulated that the request for euthanasia had to be certified by two doctors. This time,
however, the clauses that defined the grounds for euthanasia were altered. Whereas in
previous bills the case for euthanasia was specified as one in which "fatal illness" was
"accompanied by severe pain", in 1969 a patient said to be suffering from "irremediable
conditions" was deemed an appropriate case for voluntary euthanasia.105 These "irremediable
conditions" were further defined as: "physical illness thought to be incurable and expected to
cause distress; or a condition of grievous physical affliction occasioning serious injury or
disability thought to be permanent and cause distress; or a condition of physical brain
damage or deterioration such that normal mental faculties are irreparably impaired".106 In
addition, in the final draft of the bill a reference to "incapacity for rational existence" was
added as a supplement to the phrase "expected to cause distress".
Clearly, this significantly widened the scope of the proposals for legalised euthanasia.
No longer was the focus purely on the incurable patient in pain. Now a whole range of cases
were brought into the frame - from those who were diagnosed with a degenerative mental
illness, such as dementia, to those who were diagnosed with an illness that would lead to loss
of physical control, such as Parkinson's disease. To retain the 'voluntary' element to the
legislation, it was proposed that any individual would be free to draw up an advanced
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declaration. This declaration would explicitly set out the wishes of the patient in the event,
for example, of an accident that resulted in brain damage, or the diagnosis of an illness that
might later effect the capacity to make decisions. It would come into force thirty days after
being made and would remain in place (unless revoked) for three years.107
The explanation for the Voluntary Euthanasia Society's apparent movement away
from a concern that focused solely on "fatal illness and severe pain" so as to include an
expanded range of cases and an advanced declarations can be explained, I suggest, in two
ways. The first explanation relates directly to a subject that has been a theme throughout this
thesis, namely, the practice of pain relief. When the first attempt was made to legalise
euthanasia in 1936, the concern had been with incurable patients suffering from what was
viewed as the widespread problem of unrelieved pain. By 1969, this situation had altered.
There was now very little debate about the ethical permissibility of administering pain-
relieving drugs in liberal doses. As long as the intention of the doctor was the alleviation of
pain rather than the deliberate shortening of life, this practice was deemed not only
acceptable but the mark of good practice. Combined with the impact of the emergence of
hospice care that sought to tackle the problem of terminal pain in a comprehensive, multi-
faceted manner, arguments in favour of the legalisation of euthanasia were gradually
changing in relation to the perceived 'problem' of pain.
In many ways, the advent of modern hospice care was a manifestation (in institutional
form) of principled opposition to legalised euthanasia accommodating changes in medical
attitudes and practices that related to pain relief. To some extent, palliative care undermined
the arguments for legalised euthanasia that were based on the need to relieve pain. Those
campaigning for a change in the law did not fully accept this accommodation between
principle and practice. Yet they did adjust their arguments to allow for the existence of
hospice provision for the terminally ill and to allow for the revised medical, legal and
religious position that is was now permissible to liberally use pain relief at the end of life.
That is not to argue that the relief of pain was no longer a contested issue. As Leonard
Colebrook's letters to Cicely Saunders reveal, the degree to which pain could be fully
managed and alleviated remained a point of dispute. Although recognising that
improvements had been made in the management of pain, The Voluntary Euthanasia Society
did not concede that hospice care could be offered as a direct substitute for legalised
euthanasia. The shift in emphasis was far subtler. Those who campaigned for legalised
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euthanasia appeared to acknowledge that pain and suffering could be medically controlled by
the use of analgesic drugs in the final days and hours of the patient's life, but not over the
course of a lengthy period of illness. By rendering the patient unconscious until death
occurred, the VES conceded in 1971 that "most deaths may be peaceful".108 However, it was
the "process of dying" that "may go on for weeks and months, and even for years" with
which the organisation now stated that it was concerned.
The second explanation for the shift in the focus of the VES is that throughout the
1960s concern had been growing about medical intervention that was perceived as sustaining
life in 'artificially'. This was a perception held not only by the general public, but also within
medical quarters. For example, the British Medical Journal of February 1968 carried an
article describing how a doctor (suffering from stomach cancer) was repeatedly resuscitated
against his wishes after his heart stopped beating on five occasions. Preparations were being
made to intervene with an artificial respirator, but the doctor died before this could be
achieved.109 Related to fears of medical intervention of this kind, was the increasing use of
life-support technology that sustained patients, though damage to the brain prevented
consciousness or communication.110 Revealingly, Lord Raglan stated in Parliamentary
Debate of 1969 that "the doctor's dilemma is principally where there is not the presence of
pain to provide an obvious guide as to what to do."11'His interest was more in the concern
that medical intervention, of the highly technological kind, was sustaining lives when
"bodies" and "personalities" had "disintegrated".112 In effect, it was the introduction of more
highly technological forms of medical intervention that opened a new front of debate over
euthanasia, presenting medical professionals and wider society with a new set of questions in
relation to defining the boundaries between life and death.
Euthanasia debates were entering a different phase. Just as the medical profession was
finding a new rhetorical and practical 'solution' to the campaign for legalised euthanasia and
the issue of pain relief, a different set of questions concerning the relationship between
perceived 'quality' of life and life-sustaining medical intervention was becoming part of the
debate over euthanasia. This was uncharted territory. As arguments over pain relief reached a
tentative end-point, another front in the debate over legalised euthanasia was opened.
Exploring this debate is the subject for another thesis, but as contend in the following
conclusion the negotiation between principle and practice remains a central component of
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In July 2000, the Wellcome Wing at the Museum of Science in London put on public
display a 'Euthanasia Machine' that had been used in the Northern Territories of Australia to
allow a small number of terminally-ill patients to end their own lives.1 The decision to
exhibit the machine attracted a considerable amount of publicly and controversy. Yet it was
remarkably mundane in appearance: a simple laptop computer attached to a battery, air pump
and syringe driver, that functioned by running a software package with the emotive title 'The
Deliverance Programme'. After a series of questions, the programme would ask the patient if
he or she wished to die. If the 'yes' button was pressed three times the computer activated
the pump and a lethal dose of drugs was injected through a needle strapped to the patient's
arm.
In many senses, this computer that ends human life with the touch of a button appears
to bring to fruition all the aspects of 'medicalised' death that so pre-occupied and concerned
Philippe Aries and Ivan Illich. Technical, efficient and managed by machine - even the role
of the doctor is usurped in this twenty-first century version of requested death. At first
glance, it seems that this confirms the commonly held perception that euthanasia debates are
the product of a bio-technological age. Depending on the interpretative slant of the viewer,
this machine might epitomise all that is 'artificial' with legalised requested death, or,
alternatively, represent a defiant attempt to regain control at a time when medical
intervention has already collapsed the 'natural' boundaries between life and death. However,
what I have attempted to argue and illustrate in this thesis is that despite the immediate
appeal of this view, debates over euthanasia have.earlier historical origins that are rooted in
nineteenth-century arguments about the meaning of pain and the practice of pain relief.
I began by considering how the idea of 'natural' death - the concept that death was a
peaceful, gentle and painless transition from one world to the next - became established as
the dominant paradigm of euthanasia (the 'good' death) in the nineteenth century. As
orthodox theological interpretations of the 'value' of pain began to weaken, the ability of the
doctor to intervene with powerful pain-relieving drugs allowed the patient's final days and
hours to conform to the conventions of this ideal model of 'natural' death. The physician
played an increasingly managerial role at the deathbed, administering drugs that secured
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bodily calm and attending to psychological distress by offering the comforts of religious
belief and a faith in his own professionalism.
It was not until the 1870s that the word 'euthanasia' began to be used to evoke the
idea of the physician administering pain-relieving drugs so as to end life at the request of the
patient. Earlier in the nineteenth century, the term was used in its classical form, implying a
'good' death that was calm and easy, rather than evoking any sense of mercy killing or
requested death. Ending the life of the dying patient was expressly forbidden; indeed, a
number of elite Victorian physicians expressed the view that it was the doctor's duty to
prolong life, even if death appeared to be imminent. However, although the term
'euthanasia' would only begin to change in meaning towards the end of the nineteenth
century, in the preceding years medical judgement and intervention were already an
important part of the debate over how to achieve a 'good' death.
The mid-nineteenth century doctor was faced with a range of decisions when caring
for the dying patient. Was curative treatment to be withheld or withdrawn? Was the patient
to be informed of his or her prognosis? While the exact timing of death was judged to be the
province of God and nature, this did not mean that the physician was passive. Clinical
judgement played a crucial part in tailoring treatment to suit the individual requirements of
the patient as the doctor strove to stage-manage the ideal form of 'natural' death. The image
of the Victorian physician as a bearer of comfort and reassurance to the incurable patient is
only part of the picture of nineteenth-century pain relief. While the medical profession
maintained a united front in its commitment to anaesthesia, when discussing pain relief
within the confines of the medical journals there was a more open acknowledgement of the
potential risks and side effects of using drugs such as chloroform and morphine. This
assessment of the risks and benefits of pain reliefwas rarely explicitly made when discussing
the medical management of the dying patient. For example, while there was a vigorous
debate about the dangers of chloroform precipitating death in surgical situations, this debate
was not transferred to discussion of chloroform use in the care of the dying.
Nevertheless, the widespread use of analgesic drugs and the associated arguments that
accompanied the new pain-relieving practices brought into focus two competing ethical
models that would resonate in later debates over euthanasia. The first valued the preservation
and 'sanctity' of life above all else, while the second considered the minimisation (and if
possible the eradication) of pain to be of greater importance. As I argued in the early
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chapters of this thesis, the introduction of anaesthesia signalled the growing legitimacy of
renouncing pain even if this implied anxiety about exposing the patient to potential danger.
Interestingly, however, when it came to care of the dying patient and the use of pain relief,
the medical profession maintained that there was no disruption in the overarching principle
of 'sanctity' of life. The new pain-relieving techniques were absorbed into a notion of a
calm, peaceful and 'natural' death.
Medicine was portrayed as assisting rather than challenging the course of nature.
Nineteenth-century doctors mobilised a number of arguments in order to support the idea
that death was not to be feared. Death was depicted as an experience that was frequently
painless (even in the absence of medical intervention); the importance of religious faith was
underlined as a valuable source of psychological support; and medical intervention in order
to relieve pain was promised. Yet, as I have argued, beyond the commitment to the principle
that it was wrong for the physician to end life lay a more complex picture in which great
weight was placed on the individual doctor's own clinical judgement when caring for the
dying patient. The word 'euthanasia' may have remained faithful to its classical,
etymological roots, but given that the doctor had now assumed a key role in securing the
'good' death, it was a term that implicitly referred to the importance of medical intervention,
and, in particular, pain-relieving practices. In defining the role of the physician in the
medical management of death, medical practice was translated into a shared form of
language that could be employed when discussing care of the dying. This included defining
justifiable and unjustifiable forms of medical intervention and drawing subtle distinctions
between the 'preservation' and the 'prolongation' of life. Despite a collective insistence that
life should not be shortened in any way, there were variations in the manner in which doctors
articulated medical practice. While some referred to the duty of the physician to 'prolong'
life, others rejected this view and stated that while life should not be shortened, equally, it
should not be deliberately lengthened.
It was against this background of the negotiation between the principle that the
physician was forbidden from ending life and the practice of pain relief, that non-medical
writers began to use the term 'euthanasia' in a sense that implied the physician explicitly and
deliberately ending life at the patient's request. The use of analgesic drugs was an integral
part of this proposal. It provided the practical means of securing a quick and painless death
and supported the argument, at least in the view of those who advanced the idea of requested
death, that doctors were already interfering with nature when they sought to relieve pain. The
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principle of the sanctity of human life was undermined by the medical profession's habitual
recourse to pain relief, argued supporters of this version of euthanasia. Despite medical
claims to the contrary, drugs such as chloroform and morphine did shorten life, they
maintained, adding that their proposals were only a logical extension of the desire to
alleviate pain. As I have considered, the relief of pain was not the only factor that appeared
to motivate calls for physician-induced death. However, it was an important focal point for
those who advocated requested death in the late nineteenth century and, indeed, would
remain so during the campaign for legalised euthanasia in the first half of the twentieth
century.
More than sixty years would elapse between Samuel D. Williams first using the term
'euthanasia' to evoke the idea of the physician ending life by means of administering a
sufficiently strong dose of pain relief, and the first attempt to legalise voluntary euthanasia.
Although in 1936 the collective position of the medical profession was one that remained
opposed to any suggestion that the doctor should end life, there were subtle shifts in the way
in which the practice of pain reliefwas articulated in relation to the care of the dying patient.
Doctors began to concede that the use of pain-relieving drugs had the potential to hasten
death. However, a distinction was drawn between what was seen to be the private,
unscrutinised realm of the individual doctor easing the suffering of the incurable patient in
pain, and the proposals for legalised euthanasia. The first was perceived to be based on a
relationship of trust, a relationship that was cemented by the doctor's assurance to the patient
that death would be made as easy and as painless as possible. The second was portrayed as
the state endorsement of legalised killing, a move that threatened not only to impose
intrusive bureaucracy in the final stages of a patient's life, but to also undermine the sense of
faith that the patient placed in the doctor. Moreover, if the first image was compatible with
the ideal of'natural' death, the second was viewed as a direct challenge.
The process of accommodating pain-relieving practices that potentially hastened death
to the principle that the physician should not end life culminated in the 1950s and 1960s. By
emphasising that it was the intentions of the doctor administering pain relief, rather than the
outcome of the use of analgesic drugs, provided the guide to acceptable and unacceptable
forms of medical practice, the principle of 'double effect' was publicly acknowledged in
religious, legal and medical circles. This signified the acceptance that the use of drugs, if
given solely with the intention of relieving pain, was justifiable medical practice even if
death was hastened as a result. In stressing the importance of the intentions of the doctor, the
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liberal use of pain relief was now endorsed while preserving the principle that it was
ethically wrong for the physician to intervene so as to precipitate the patient's death.
This view that embraced the use of pain relief that potentially hastened death yet
simultaneously upheld the principle that the physician should not (deliberately) end life, was
a position that, as I have explored in this thesis, evolved through a process of negotiation and
debate. In many ways, the advent of the philosophy of the hospice movement marked the
medical consolidation of this position and, with the opening of St. Christopher's Hospice in
1967, its manifestation in institutional form. Robust in her opposition to legalised euthanasia,
Cicely Saunders argued that to intentionally cut short the life of a patient would mean
doctors assuming a role that was, in her view, the province of a divine power. However, her
opposition was also based on a practical argument. She maintained that legalised euthanasia
was simply unnecessary once pain was properly controlled and medically managed.2
The concept of 'total pain', as developed by Saunders, was an innovative response to
both the physical and psychological needs of the terminally ill. Physical pain was tackled
with an array of therapeutic strategies that included drugs being used in different
combinations and doses that were given, if required, at regular intervals. Once the patient
was relieved of physical suffering, it was argued, the psychosocial dimensions to pain could
then be addressed. The notion of 'total' pain was novel, but it is interesting to consider how
the attitudes of nineteenth-century physicians in relation to care of the dying also appear to
resonate in the approach of the hospice movement. Nineteenth-century doctors, such as
Henry Halford, Benjamin Brodie and William Munk, also took the view that pain operated
on a number of levels. They too made the connection between physical and psychological
pain and argued that both had to be confronted in order for the patient to secure a 'good'
death.
This similarity between the twentieth-century concept of'total pain' and the approach
of nineteenth-century physicians to the dying gives an insight, I argue, into some of the
success of the ideas behind the hospice movement. Hospice care offered both medical and
social support for the terminally ill. In seeking to distance itself from other forms of
institutionalised medicine, the language of hospice philosophy, as illustrated by Cicely
Saunders, spoke frequently of the need to treat the patient as an individual and to relax any
strict adherence to general rules when it came to administering pain relief. Although, as I
suggested, the argument could be made that the discourse of hospice care and 'total' pain is
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'imposed' on the patient, it might also be argued that the hospice setting allowed for
idiosyncrasies and differences in patients and tailored treatment accordingly. Certainly, there
is a sense that when the ideas of the hospice movement were in their early stages, part of the
hospice 'ideal' was to establish a relationship of intimacy and trust between the patients and
medical professionals. In this sense, the discourse of the hospice resonates with the language
of palliation used by elite nineteenth-century doctors when discussing care of the dying. The
hospice movement's 'reinvention' of older medical attitudes to the management of death
(that pre-date the growth of state-run institutionalised medicine), combined with a
willingness to develop innovative pain-relieving techniques, had a significant impact on
twentieth-century medical discourse on death and dying. It also, once hospice care was
consolidated and expanded, had an important impact on way in which medical care was
practically administered to patients who were terminally ill.
There are now more than two hundred hospices in Britain. Some are run by the
National Health Service but the great majority are independent charities based in their own
communities and reliant on locally donated funds.3 Given that only a small proportion of
deaths occur in a hospice setting, the aim of medical professionals working in palliative care
is to seek a greater transference of hospice practices to hospital wards and patient homes.4
There is also growing interest in the ways in which the principles of hospice and palliative
care might be applied to older people in care homes or with mental illness.5 The concept of
loss of sense 'self and the notion of 'social' death are frequently referred to in academic
literature that explores the experiences of patients with illnesses such as Alzheimher's
disease or dementia.6 There is, therefore, the potential for hospice care, with its record of
success in treating terminal illness, to be applied to the care of elderly patients with a very
different set of needs.
At the end of the last substantive chapter of this thesis, I concluded that acceptance of
the concept of 'double effect' and the emergence of hospice care provided the medical
profession with both rhetorical and practical 'solutions' to the debate over legalised
euthanasia and pain relief. I also argued that the Voluntary Euthanasia Society shifted its
position somewhat in the late 1960s and conceded that there had been improvements in the
medical management of pain. The Voluntary Euthanasia Bill of 1969 was the last attempt to
seek a change in the law with a proposal that explicitly made reference to the word
'euthanasia. It is at this point that the main analysis ofmy thesis draws to a close. However,
it must be said that there have since been efforts to formally alter the status of the law with
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regard to the doctor-patient relationship. For example, in 1976 a bill was presented to the
House of Lords in which one of the clauses stated that the patient should be entitled to
complete relief from suffering. The clause stipulated that, if requested, the physician should
render the patient unconscious in the event of other forms of pain-relief proving ineffective.7
The bill was easily defeated, not least because the majority of Lords considered there
was no need for such legislation. Tellingly, the opinion was expressed that the alleviation of
pain was already the duty of the doctor, even in situations where death might be hastened as
a result.8 For those who opposed the bill, the accommodation between the principle that the
doctor is prohibited from ending life and the practice of pain relief appeared to be
comfortably established. However, the fact that a bill was even presented that included a
clause pre-occupied with securing complete alleviation of suffering for the patient suggested
that although improvements in pain-relief were recognised, there remained dispute about the
degree to which pain was being successfully managed in all cases.
Yet, even after acknowledging this concern with the practice of pain-relief, this
proposed legislation revealed the increasing shift from a concern with pain to issues related
to perceptions of 'quality' of life - issues that were not necessarily tied to the patient
experiencing physical pain, or for that matter, fatal illness. Other clauses in the bill stated
that patients affected by degenerative illness or brain damage should not have their lives
sustained by medical intervention if they had earlier expressed (in a written statement) a
wish to die.9 This was the new element to the debate over euthanasia. Just as in the argument
over pain-relief, the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining technology has also
undergone negotiation and debate in the latter half of the twentieth century (indeed, it
continues today) as part of an on-going process of accommodation between established
principle and changing medical practice.
It is true that unlike other European countries, for example the Netherlands and
Switzerland, Britain has resisted any moves to legalise patient-requested death.10 However,
the British courts have displayed a degree of flexibility, making decisions on a case-by-case
basis which in turn establish precedents that provide legal 'markers' when assessing
medical-ethical dilemmas. The most recent case to attract attention was the case of Ms B, a
paralysed patient whose life was being supported by a ventilator. She requested that her
doctors turn off the ventilator and when they opposed, the court ruled that she was within her
rights to refuse treatment, even if this resulted in her death." The case of Ms B was
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particularly important because it coincided with the failure of Diane Pretty's attempt to
secure her 'right-to-die' at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. She had
already lost her case in the British courts.12 Mrs Pretty, a motor-neurone disease patient,
subsequently died in hospice care. For euthanasia campaigners, the two cases represented the
unfairness and hypocrisy that, in their view at least, characterises legal and medical
definitions of 'acceptable and unacceptable' forms of medical intervention. Legally,
however, distinctions have been drawn between what is judged to be the legitimate
withdrawal or withholding of medical treatment that sustains life and the illegitimate
intervention of medical treatment that ends life. The patient may request and consent to the
former but not the latter.13
This is stating very simply what is a complicated area of medical-ethics. A fuller and
more satisfactory explanation of the arguments and negotiations involved is the subject for
another thesis. However, there is one point that 1 wish to make about the cases of Ms B and
Mrs Pretty that is perhaps neglected in the medical-ethical literature that discusses the
distinctions between the legal withdrawal and withholding of treatment and the illegal
ending of life. Beyond the debate about 'acts' and 'omissions' lies an important point about
the way in which medicine, the law, and indeed, wider society distinguishes between
'natural' and 'artificial' deaths. I suggest that the paralysed woman was perceived as being
'kept' alive and therefore prevented from dying a 'natural' death. Mrs Pretty was seen as
wanting to die in a manner that used medical intervention to disrupt the 'natural' order to life
and death. To consent to her death, therefore, would have been to allow a death that was
wholly 'artificial'. Of course, this is not a view that is universally shared. So long as the
distinction between 'natural' and 'artificial' death is contested, there will be support for and
opposition to the concept of legalised euthanasia. The way in which medical practice is
articulated and understood remains an integral part in this argument.
Ivan Illich's appeal to the image of Nemesis based on what he views as the all-
encompassing stranglehold of medical power on Western life may indeed be overstated, but
it is nonetheless powerful. He writes:
The Greeks saw gods in the forces of nature. For them, Nemesis represented divine
vengeance visited upon mortals who infringe on those prerogatives the gods
enviously guard for themselves. Nemesis was the inevitable punishment for the
attempts to be a hero rather than a human being.14
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Even though the subject of euthanasia was not Illich's particular target when he wrote these
words, his reference to infringing "on those prerogatives the gods enviously guard for
themselves" resonates with a certain view of euthanasia. Is euthanasia the desire to control
and shape nature as this view suggests? Or is it merely the means by which the men and
women can 'naturally' claim what it is to be "human" as opposed to being "heroes" in the
face of either physical or psychological suffering?15 Across two centuries, the public position
of the medical profession has been to reject the idea that legalised, physician-administered
ending of life is in any sense a legitimate development of the medical practice. Yet the
euthanasia debates examined in this thesis are about more than opposition to legislative
change. They are also about the way in which changing practice was articulated and
understood so as to preserve a concept of 'natural' death but at the same time embrace new
medical techniques. This process continues today.
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